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Profit sharing with employees is a longstanding practice that has 
recently received increased attention, both in the United States and 
internationally. Between one-sixth and one-fourth of U.S. firms and 
employees participate in profit sharing.
There are two major theories on the economic effects of profit shar 
ing. First, profit sharing has long been advocated on the grounds that it 
can improve company performance by encouraging worker effort, 
cooperation, and sharing of ideas and information (the "productivity 
theory"). A second, more recent theory is that profit sharing can lead to 
fewer layoffs and greater employment and output stability, for firms 
and for the economy as a whole, by changing employer incentives to 
hire and retain employees (the "stability theory").
This study reports on a new database on profit sharing in U.S. com 
panies with public stock. A telephone survey was conducted of 500 
public companies half with profit sharing for employees other than 
top management, and half without. To maximize comparability, an 
attempt was made to match profit-sharers with non-profit-sharers 
within the same industry. Data were collected on profit-sharing cover 
age, types, and formulas, as well as on company unionization and per 
sonnel policies that may compete or interact with profit sharing in 
affecting firm behavior (summarized in table 1.3). To provide evidence 
on the productivity and stability theories of profit sharing, the survey 
data were matched with publicly available data from public companies 
on financial characteristics and performance over the 1970-91 period.
What predicts the adoption of profit sharing? Eleven prior studies 
comparing profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies have not 
produced consistent findings on the relationship of profit sharing to 
factors such as unionization, firm size, employee composition, firm 
growth, capital intensity, and industry variability. Focusing on the 
adoption decision, this study found few variables that could help pre 
dict a company's adoption of profit sharing; among a wide range of 
variables examined, only unionization and increases in profit margins 
and stock prices were found to increase the probability of profit-shar 
ing adoption in this period. This calls into question the studies that only
use cross-sectional comparisons of performance, since profit sharing 
may in part be an effect, rather than a cause, of better company perfor 
mance. Among firms that have adopted profit sharing, greater coverage 
of employees is predicted where the profit sharing is older and there is 
a higher proportion of nonunion and professional/administrative 
employees.
Does profit sharing affect productivity? A wide range of past evi 
dence is surveyed in chapter 3, focusing on 26 statistical studies that 
attempted to estimate the effect of profit sharing after accounting for 
other influences on firm performance. A substantial amount of the 
prior evidence indicates that employee profit-sharing plans are associ 
ated with higher company performance, although the causality and 
mechanisms are unclear. Accounting for past performance and a vari 
ety of influences on productivity, this study found that profit-sharing 
adoption is associated with productivity increases of 3.5 to 5 percent, 
which are maintained with no subsequent positive or negative trend. 
The average productivity increases are found to be larger for small 
companies and for companies adopting cash plans, and are unaffected 
when accounting for personnel policies that may affect productivity. 
There is, however, substantial dispersion in the outcomes, and very lit 
tle evidence on the mechanisms through which profit sharing may 
affect productivity, since it does not strongly interact with measures of 
information-sharing or other policies in affecting productivity.
Does profit sharing lead to greater employment stability? Fifteen 
prior studies are surveyed in chapter 4; most of the studies that directly 
measured stability found some association between profit sharing and 
greater stability, though the studies on how the profit share is treated in 
employment decisions had more mixed results. The stability theory 
requires that profit shares not simply be "gravy" on top of regular com 
pensation for a given level of output; they should, instead, substitute at 
least in part for fixed pay. Such substitution was found to be unlikely 
for old profit-sharing firms, since average compensation levels were 
generally substantially above industry averages. For firms that adopted 
profit sharing within the sample period, the average small increase in 
total compensation was exceeded by the typical profit share, indicating 
that profit sharing is more likely to be substituting in part for regular 
compensation in these firms. After firms adopted profit sharing, the 
employment cutbacks accompanying decreases in product demand
VI
tended to be smaller than in the preadoption period, particularly where 
profit sharing appeared to partially substitute for regular compensation. 
For most of the estimates, however, sampling error could not be 
rejected as an explanation for the apparent differences in behavior. The 
relation of employment stability to profit-sharing plan types and for 
mulas, and to profit-sharing participation by unionized employees and 
different occupational groups, gave several indications of mild support 
for the theory, but the evidence is not strong. The often favorable but 
not strong results may in part be explained by several difficult empiri 
cal issues in testing the theory, and by the broad definition of profit 
sharing used in this study, which includes a number of so-called profit- 
sharing plans that do not fit the requirements of the stability theory.
What are the implications for companies, unions, public policy, and 
future research? Chapter 5 relates the results to practitioner literature 
on group incentives and discusses union concerns, public policy 
options, and rationales. Given that the issues addressed by the profit- 
sharing theories productivity, unemployment, and macroeconomic 
stability are central to economic performance and security, further 
attention and research on profit sharing are strongly encouraged.
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The idea of tying worker pay to company profits has existed almost 
since the emergence of capitalism. Albert Gallatin, U.S. Secretary of 
the Treasury under Thomas Jefferson, reportedly instituted a profit- 
sharing plan in 1795 at his Pennsylvania Glass Works out of a belief 
that such a system was important for the newly developing U.S. 
democracy (PSCA 1959). Experiments in profit sharing attracted sup 
port from eminent scholars in the 1800s, including Charles Babbage, 
John Stuart Mill, and Stanley Jevons. A pastor and crusader for profit 
sharing, Nicholas Paine Oilman (1899), documented 34 profit-sharing 
plans in 1899. 1 Two decades later, the National Civic Federation 
(1920) documented 46 plans in the United States with worker pay tied 
to a percentage of profits (and many others with more loosely based 
elements of profit sharing).
Much of the early support for profit sharing can with fairness be 
described as ideological. Many proponents viewed profit sharing as a 
way to integrate workers into the capitalist system by sharing the bene 
fits of capitalism in a more direct and tangible way than allowed by 
fixed wages. Advocates promoted it as a cure for "unrest" and "irratio 
nal agitation" in capitalism, arguing that the "great uplift and inspira 
tion that sharing of profits cultivates in the employee" would lead to 
"harmony and contentment" (Askwith 1926: 20). It was seen by many 
advocates as a means to build support for capitalism and to solidify 
opposition to the competing communist and socialist systems. It was 
also seen by some as a logical extension of political democracy Gall 
atin advocated profit sharing on the grounds that the
democratic principle upon which this Nation was founded should not be 
restricted to the political processes but should be applied to the indus 
trial operation (quoted in U.S. Senate 1939: 72).
2 Introduction, Trends, and Data Description
Ideological support for profit sharing has continued in the twentieth 
century. A U.S. Senate subcommittee (1939) held hearings on profit 
sharing toward the end of the Great Depression, clearly displaying sup 
port for profit sharing as a means of strengthening capitalism. The 
ideological support is well-exemplified in the title of a 1954 book by 
John Spedan Lewis, Fairer Shares: A Possible Advance in Civilisation 
and Perhaps the Only Alternative to Communism (1954). As a further 
illustration, a 1950s comparison of attitudes between employees in 
profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies lamented that profit 
sharing "doesn't necessarily carry over into strong faith in free market 
ideas broadly" (Opinion Research Corporation 1957: 16). 2 Short of 
engendering support for free markets and capitalism, the ideological 
approach may still be exemplified today by companies that maintain 
profit sharing in part out of a belief that employees should share in the 
fruits of company performance (without attempting to change worker 
or firm behavior).
Much of the support for profit sharing during the twentieth century, 
however, has shifted from a broad ideological approach to support 
based on more narrowly construed economic reasons. Undoubtedly the 
dominant argument for profit sharing in the twentieth century has been 
the idea that it can motivate employees to work harder for increased 
profits, primarily through increased productivity. By tying worker pay 
to profits, the argument goes, the incentives of workers and owners can 
become aligned so that productivity-reducing conflict is minimized 
and productivity-enhancing cooperation and innovation are encour 
aged. This idea (which will be referred to as the "productivity theory" 
of profit sharing) was one of the arguments for profit sharing among 
early supporters (Oilman 1899; Askwith 1926), but assumed a larger 
role in the U.S. Senate hearings in the 1930s, where it was claimed that 
profit sharing brings the worker into a
thoroughly cooperative effort to increase profits of the company by 
stimulating production at lower cost, conserving materials, creating sav 
ings of waste, protecting the product of the institution, stimulating 
greater sales effort, and bringing into harmonious cooperation all the 
operating and productive factors of the company operation (U.S. Senate 
1939: 65).
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This theory has received increased attention in the 1980s, stimulated 
in part by concerns about lagging productivity growth.
A second argument for profit sharing (developed more recently than 
the productivity theory) is that it can aid economic stability and 
decrease unemployment. A key concern of market economies has been 
macroeconomic instability, represented both by business cycles and, in 
the extreme, by episodes such as the Great Depression in the 1930s. An 
often-cited culprit in economic recessions is the fixed wage system if 
wages adjusted more quickly to equate supply and demand in the labor 
market, the argument goes, the economy would spend more time in 
full-employment equilibrium. Making wages more responsive to eco 
nomic conditions, as profit sharing allows, is seen therefore as one 
potential solution to economic instability. Simply making worker pay 
more flexible, however, may not contribute toward macroeconomic 
stability; as John Maynard Keynes argued, flexible wages may aggra 
vate business cycles through effects on aggregate purchasing power 
(1964: 257-71).
Martin Weitzman has developed a theory supporting the stabilizing 
effects of profit sharing that does not rely on claims of increased flexi 
bility in total pay. This theory (which will be referred to as the "stabil 
ity theory") holds that profit sharing changes the incentives of firms to 
hire and retain workers. In brief terms, this theory suggests that firms 
view profit-sharing payments not as a cost of employing labor, but 
rather as a profits tax. The fact that the "tax" is being paid to the work 
ers is incidental to the firm's short-run demand for labor; what concerns 
the firm when hiring or laying off workers is the fixed wage that it must 
pay. If, for example, the fixed wage is $9/hour and the average profit 
share is $ I/hour, the firm will hire or retain workers as long as their 
output exceeds $9/hour. The $l/hour does not figure into the short-run 
decision since it is directly related to the company's profits, and the 
worker will be hired or retained as long as s/he contributes to profits 
(i.e., has output exceeding $9/hour). This is in contrast to a firm with a 
fixed wage of $10/hour, which will lay off the worker when the value 
of the worker's output falls below $10/hour. Assuming, therefore, that 
profit-sharing payments substitute for fixed wages, average worker pay 
per hour is similar in the two systems ($10/hour total), but the risk of 
layoff is different because of the firm's different incentives. In the long 
run, profit-sharing and fixed-wage economies will have similar levels
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of compensation and employment, but when short-run shocks occur, 
the theory predicts that profit-sharing economies will have less unem 
ployment and milder recessions. Unlike the productivity theory, the 
stability theory provides a strong public policy case for encouraging 
profit sharing, since the gains from stability accrue to the economy as a 
whole.
This study will summarize existing evidence on the productivity and 
stability theories and bring new evidence to bear on both of them. A 
key question to be answered prior to that is why employers have 
adopted profit sharing what leads firms to view it as a useful form of 
compensation? These three questions adoption, employment, and 
productivity effects are addressed with use of a new panel dataset on 
500 U.S. firms, containing up to 21 years of employment and financial 
data on each firm.
Definition and Types of Profit Sharing
No neat definition of profit sharing covers the variety of plans that 
can legitimately claim to share profits with employees. One strict defi 
nition would be that profit-sharing plans must have a formula specify 
ing a fixed percentage of profits to be divided among employees in a 
predetermined way.3 However, this excludes plans that permit a discre 
tionary amount to be added to the fixed percentage. It also leaves open 
the question of how profits are defined, and what kinds of restrictions 
may be applied to the formula some plans provide shares of profits 
only after a threshold level of profits has been met or make the percent 
age of profits to be shared depend upon the overall level of profits. 
Also, it excludes plans where there may be no fixed formula, but where 
the discretionary contribution, in practice, systematically depends on 
profits. These and other examples argue against a strict definition of 
profit sharing, since the productivity and stability theories may easily 
apply in cases that do not meet the strict definition.
The Profit Sharing Council of America, a nonprofit association rep 
resenting U.S. companies practicing profit sharing, does not employ a 
strict definition. It promotes plans that give employees "a direct stake 
in profits," but notes that "profit sharing is an extremely adaptable and
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flexible invention" and that "there are many variations among individ 
ual plans as to how company contributions are determined, credited to 
participants' accounts, [and] distributed" (PSCA 1984: 8, 10, 16). The 
PSCA membership exhibits this diversity in plan types and formulas 
(PSCA 1989).
This study likewise does not employ a strict definition of profit shar 
ing. Rather, a profit-sharing plan is defined broadly as a plan in which 
part of employee compensation during a particular period is based sub 
stantially on the profitability of the company in that period (without the 
requirement of a formula).4
As used here, profit sharing is distinguished from employee stock 
ownership. Profit sharing and employee ownership share many 
attributes as different forms of compensation schemes tied to company 
performance. Stock ownership, however, is a separate route for sharing 
company success: the initial contribution of stock is generally not 
based on company profits, and its value to employees is necessarily 
tied not only to the company's current but also to its future expected 
success. Good performance in one period has the primary effect not of 
increasing employee income, but of increasing wealth through the 
stock price. 5 It raises significant issues related to asset portfolios of 
employees, particularly by introducing substantial risk. In addition, the 
perquisites of stock ownership generally include at least minimal vot 
ing rights. For these and other reasons, employee ownership may plau 
sibly have motivational effects different from profit sharing. Also, the 
stability theory of profit sharing does not apply to employee stock 
ownership. While the effects of employee ownership will be treated 
incidentally here, the focus is on the direct sharing of profits with 
employees, not on affecting their asset portfolios through changes in 
stock price. (For research on employee ownership, see Blasi 1988; 
Conte and Svejnar 1990; and Blasi and Kruse 1991).
There are three basic forms of profit sharing in the United States: 
cash, deferred, and combination cash/deferred plans. In the cash form 
of profit-sharing plan, employees have their share of the profits added 
directly to their paychecks (usually at quarterly or annual intervals). It 
is a deductible business expense for the employer, but taxable to the 
employee as income. There is no central source of information on all 
cash plans, since they need not be reported to the government. In the 
deferred form of plan, the profit share is put into a pension trust for the
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employee, where it is invested in a pension portfolio and the eventual 
value is normally received by the employee at retirement. (As such, it 
is a popular form of "defined contribution" pension plan, in which the 
employer's obligation is defined at the point the contribution is made, 
rather than at the point the benefit is received by the employee.) The 
income is not taxable to the employee until received at retirement. 
Finally, the cash/deferred profit-sharing plans are simply a combina 
tion of cash and deferred contributions.
There are three noteworthy features of deferred profit-sharing plans. 
The first is that, beyond the direct company contribution, employees 
may be permitted or required to make contributions in many of these 
plans. An increasingly popular pension option has been the 401(K) 
option, in which employers typically match a percentage of employee 
contributions to a retirement plan. For example, a popular method is 
for the employer to contribute 50 percent of the value of the employ 
ee's contribution, up to a specified percentage of the employee's pay. 
The 401(K) option has muddied the definition of deferred profit-shar 
ing plans, since many of these plans are technically listed as profit- 
sharing plans even though the employer contribution is not related to 
profits but wholly to the employee contribution. Simply having a 
401(K) option, however, does not disqualify a plan as profit sharing, 
since the employer match may be tied to profitability as well as to the 
employee contribution.6
A second noteworthy aspect of deferred profit-sharing plans is that, 
once the employer contribution is made, it may be largely invested in 
the employer's own stock. The subsequent performance of the com 
pany will affect the employee's account value through the effect on the 
stock price. As noted, this study distinguishes profit sharing from 
employee stock ownership, but in practice the two may be combined 
even in the same plan. Unlike the standard defined benefit pension, in 
which the employee receives a specified benefit at retirement (usually 
based on final salary and years of service), deferred profit-sharing 
plans may be structured so that more than 10 percent of the assets can 
be invested in the employer's stock. In this way, deferred profit-sharing 
plans may closely resemble Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs), and in fact there is overlap between them. ESOPs are pen 
sion plans that are required to invest primarily in employer securities, 
and thereby become a pension vehicle for employee stock ownership
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of companies (see Blasi 1988; and Conte and Svejnar 1990). Because 
deferred profit-sharing plans may (but are not required to) invest 
heavily in employer stock, they can combine profit sharing with a large 
degree of employee stock ownership.7 Therefore there is no neat sepa 
ration between profit sharing and employee ownership, and it may be 
that investment of profit-sharing funds in company stock can strongly 
reinforce the link in employees' minds between company performance 
and personal reward.
A third noteworthy aspect of deferred profit-sharing plans is that, as 
pension plans, they are subject to regulations governing pension plans. 
Plan administrators each year must file a form in the Form 5500 series 
(5500, 5500C, or 5500R), and such information is publicly available. 
As such, it is a valuable source for research, but contains very little 
information on firm characteristics. 8
Growth and Prevalence in the United States
What are the trends in profit sharing? Apart from the theories on its 
effects, is it a common enough phenomenon to warrant attention and 
study?
Table 1.1 summarizes a variety of evidence on prevalence and 
growth of profit sharing in the United States. The longest series of data 
comes from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Employee Benefits Sur 
vey, which has the percent of companies making profit-sharing pay 
ments and the percent of payroll represented by such payments for 
most of the years since 1955. The percent of companies making profit- 
sharing payments grew through the later 1950s but has hovered 
between 19 and 23 percent since 1963. The Survey of Benefits in 
Medium and Large Firms, by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS), shows slow growth in the number of employees in profit-shar 
ing companies over 1981-84, though no real trend in employees cov 
ered by profit sharing over 1985-91 (taking into account the changed 
survey coverage in 1988).9
These sources refer to both cash and deferred profit sharing. Two 
additional data sources refer only to deferred profit-sharing plans. A 
Hewitt panel of 250 large employers showed increased use of profit
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NOTES: Employee class: CL = clerical; PR = production; P/A = professional and administrative; T/C = technical and clerical.
COC: Chamber of Commerce of the United States (various years); BLS: Bureau of Labor Statistics (various years);
Hewitt: Hewitt Associates (1985,1986); B&N: Bell and Neumark (1993); C&S: Chelius and Smith (1990); MLL: Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990);
B&S: Bradley and Smith (1992); Kruse: Kruse (1991b); Smith: Smith (1988).
a. 1987-91 Chamber of Commerce surveys exclude cash profit sharing and include salaried employees.
b. 1979-84 Hewitt numbers from constant sample of 250 large employers, while 1985 number reflects larger sample of 812 employers.
c. BLS survey coverage changed in 1988; both new and old coverage numbers are presented for 1988. BLS numbers for 1990, unlike other years, are for
small private establishments. Survey methodology was changed in 1991, with a redefinition of occupadonal groups. In the new group of professional/
administrative/technical employees, 13 percent were participants, and in the new clerical/sales group, 16 percent were participants.
d. Total payroll includes payroll of nonparticipants.
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sharing over the 1979-84 period. The more comprehensive Form 5500 
data, which comprise close to the universe of deferred profit-sharing 
plans in the United States, show steady growth in coverage over the 
1980-86 period (Kruse 199 Ib). The percentage of private wage and 
salary workers covered by all deferred profit-sharing plans grew from 
13.3 percent to 18.4 percent over this period, according to these data. 
Eliminating the influence of 401 (K) options and other "thrift" features 
(which permit or require employee contributions) shows an increase 
from 11.4 percent to 15.3 percent over this period. 10
The prevalence of profit sharing does not appear to differ greatly by 
occupational group (as shown by the BLS numbers, and the Mitchell, 
Lewin, and Lawler comparison of clerical and production workers) or 
by firm size (the Chelius and Smith numbers on small firms show a 
prevalence only slightly higher than the Hewitt and Chamber of Com 
merce figures, and the BLS small firm survey in 1990 shows coverage 
equivalent to that in medium and large firms). The prevalence appears 
higher in companies with public stock (as indicated by Bradley and 
Smith, and the Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler numbers). There is also a 
difference by union status: Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990) report 
that unionized workers were less likely to be covered by profit sharing 
(among unionized groups, only 15 percent of clerical and 18 percent of 
production units were covered, while the corresponding numbers for 
nonunion groups were 42 percent and 46 percent). However, profit 
sharing became much more prevalent among union workers in the 
1980s, particularly in the manufacturing sector, as shown by Bell and 
Neumark (1993). 11 Much of this was linked to concession bargaining 
(Zalusky 1986,1990). 12
While these numbers indicate substantial portions of employees in 
some form of profit sharing, many of these plans do not tie profit-shar 
ing payments tightly to company profits. As will be reviewed in chap 
ter 3, most plans also allow a discretionary component by the 
employer. A recent examination of 10,000 variable-pay plans found 
2,200 that "have a clear, preannounced performance-payout link," are 
more than one year old, cover more than 20 people, and are not fully 
deferred (McAdams and Hawk 1992). 13
In summary, data on the prevalence of (broadly-defined) profit shar 
ing in the United States indicate that roughly one-sixth to one-fourth of 
companies have profit-sharing plans, and roughly the same percentage
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of private-sector employees are covered. Such coverage does not differ 
greatly by firm size or occupational group, but is much less common 
among unionized workers. Several sources point toward slow growth 
in the prevalence of plans in the early 1980s, even among unionized 
workers, but no general trend in the later 1980s.
Data on international trends are extremely sparse. The prevalence in 
Canada appears similar to that in the United States: two surveys indi 
cated profit sharing at 22.2 percent of Canadian firms in 1985, and 17.3 
percent in 1989/90 (the difference apparently reflects not a decline in 
profit sharing, but a tighter definition and different method in the later 
survey) (Long 1989, 1992). It is clear that profit sharing is a common 
practice in a number of European countries (Uvalic 1990; Perry and 
Kegley 1990; D'Art 1992). 14 The PEPPER report (Promotion of 
Employee Participation in Profits and Enterprise Results) documents 
the extent of profit sharing and employee stock ownership schemes, 
and government policies affecting such schemes, among European 
Community members. One conclusion is that "recently there has been 
a steady growth of various forms of PEPPER schemes in the majority 
of EC countries, with widely different relative weight" (Uvalic 1990: 
197). The percentage of employees covered by such schemes is esti 
mated as 18 percent in France, 8 percent in the UK, 7.4 percent in the 
Netherlands, 5 percent in Germany, and 3 percent or less in Ireland, 
Italy, and Spain (Uvalic 1990: 200). 1S
There has been particularly strong interest in profit sharing in the 
United Kingdom, spurred in part by its potential to reduce unemploy 
ment. Within the United Kingdom, cash profit sharing was found in 20 
percent of establishments in 1984, although only 9 percent of private- 
sector workers reported participating in profit sharing in 1987. Profit 
sharing was found to be more common in large plants, but just as com 
mon for union members as for other employees (Blanchflower 1991: 4- 
5). Results from a 1988 survey of 180 of the largest publicly held UK 
companies indicated that 6.1 percent had cash-based profit sharing for 
all employees (Peel, Pendlebury, and Groves 1991). 16 The prevalence 
appears to be increasing, spurred largely by tax incentives: Singleton- 
Green reports that the number of plans and employees covered doubled 
between 1991 and 1992, so that 700,000 employees are now covered 
(1992: 38).
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Data on profit sharing in non-European countries are difficult to 
find. Florkowski (1991: 102) reports that 12 non-European countries 
have some form of mandatory profit sharing in the constitution or stat 
utes, but in several of these countries it is not enforced (the countries 
are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, India, Mexico, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela). A major effort has been made 
in Singapore to encourage the use of profit sharing for both productiv 
ity and stability reasons, and more than half of the labor contracts in 
Singapore now contain profit sharing (National Wages Council 1986). 
The extensive use of bonuses in Japan and Korea has been viewed as a 
form of profit sharing that may have contributed to the economic suc 
cess of those countries (Freeman and Weitzman 1987; Kim 1988). 
While nearly all Japanese firms with more than 30 employees pay 
bonuses twice a year to regular employees, only 24.6 percent of firms 
have a formal profit-sharing plan (Jones and Kato 1992a).
Therefore, while the practice of profit sharing may be slowly grow 
ing in the United States, it is not clear to what extent this is true outside 
of the United States. At a minimum, profit sharing is very much a 
strong topic of interest internationally, as legislation and public policy 
discussion make clear (Uvalic 1990; Florkowski 1991).
New Data on Profit Sharing in Publicly Held Companies
Available data on profit sharing have important limitations on their 
usefulness. 17 Among these limitations are one or more of the following: 
lack of information on both cash and deferred plans, lack of sufficient 
company performance data, response rate problems common to busi 
ness mail surveys, or lack of longitudinal information on individual 
companies to control for firm-specific effects.
This study surveyed 500 companies to collect information for test 
ing the productivity and stability theories of profit sharing. Such tests 
require longitudinal information on company performance and 
employment that many companies are unwilling or unable to provide. 
Companies with publicly traded stock, however, are required to make 
public a wide variety of company information. These data are pack 
aged in Standard and Poor's CompuStat database. A subset of 500
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companies from the 1990 CompuStat (with over 3000 public compa 
nies)18 was surveyed to obtain information on profit sharing and other 
firm characteristics. Firms with profit sharing were oversampled, in 
order that they would constitute one-half of the final sample. An 
attempt was made to pair each firm surveyed in the initial sample with 
a firm of the opposite profit-sharing status in the same industry. 19 For 
example, for each profit-sharing food processor, an attempt was made 
to find a non-profit-sharing food processor to act as a paired control. 
This could be done for 410 of the surveyed firms (creating 205 pairs). 
Comparison of characteristics between the within-industry pairs will 
automatically control for any industry effects on those characteristics. 
Construction of the dataset is described in appendix 1.
Each company was asked, "Does your company have a profit-shar 
ing plan for employees other than top management?" If the response 
was positive, the company was treated as a profit-sharing company, 
and a series of questions elicited information on the features and cover 
age of the plan. 20 The resulting sample of profit-sharing companies 
may be overinclusive, since it includes whatever type of plan is viewed 
by the employer as profit sharing (even if there is little or no de facto 
relationship to profits). The advantage is that it allows analysis of what 
goes under the name of profit sharing in the United States, with addi 
tional data to distinguish plans by profit-sharing formulas and features. 
The lack of a strict definition matches the practice of the Profit Sharing 
Council of America, as noted earlier in this chapter.
Table 1.2 contains statistics on the prevalence of profit sharing 
among firms surveyed in the initial sample (prior to the attempt at pair 
ing). 21 As can be seen, 112 of the 275 firms, or 40.7 percent, have a 
profit-sharing plan for employees other than top management. Collec 
tively the 275 firms employed slightly over 6 million employees in 
1990. Profit-sharing firms had an estimated 2.3 million participants, 
representing 38.2 percent of the total employees among the firms in 
this sample. Industry distribution shows the highest concentration of 
profit-sharing participants in durable manufacturing (47.7 percent) and 
the lowest in utilities (6.3 percent).
The closest comparison for these numbers comes from the Colum 
bia Business Unit Data Set (Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990), which 
reports results of a survey of business units among publicly held com-
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NOTES: These numbers consider only the responses from the primary sample, which was based on a systematic sample of all firms with at least eight 
years of employment data over the 1980-89 period. Companies contacted to provide matched pairs are excluded from selection rule for pairing. PS = 
profit sharing.
Table 13 Descriptive Statistics on Profit-Sharing Dataset
N
Percent employees in PS
Percent cos. w/unions
Percent of employees in
union, if unionized






















































































Gainsharing 45.3 39.0 1.1 0.22
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NOTES: Except where NA (not answered) is used,
U = union.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <05.
reported percentages exclude "don't know" responses. PS = profit sharing; NPS = nonprofit sharing;
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panics. Despite differences in the level of analysis and response rates, 
the results are similar.
Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990: 76) report that 36 percent of the 
units have profit sharing for clerical workers, and 37 percent have 
profit sharing for manufacturing production workers. This is closely in 
b'ne with the 40.7 percent of companies in this study that report profit 
sharing for employees other than top management.
Additional sources of data on profit sharing in publicly held compa 
nies come from Smith (1988) and Bradley and Smith (1992). Report 
ing on a survey of 52 of the "INC 100 Fastest Growing Publicly Held 
Firms," Smith found that 17 (33 percent) reported general profit-shar 
ing plans. Focusing on firms with public stock in the computer (hard 
ware and software) industries, Bradley and Smith (1992) found that 41 
percent reported profit-sharing plans. The results from these three data 
sources on U.S. companies with public stock (consistent with Cana 
dian results from Long 1992) indicate that profit sharing is more preva 
lent in such companies than among private companies. One reason for 
this may have to do with information disclosure about profitability: pri 
vate companies may be more reluctant to give signals of profitability 
(to competitors or unions) through the size of profit-sharing payments, 
while publicly held companies must already report profit figures to 
investors.
Descriptive statistics on the full sample of profit-sharing and non 
profit-sharing companies are presented in table 1.3. Columns 1 and 2 
contain statistics for the profit-sharing (PS) and non-profit-sharing 
(NPS) companies. Column 3 contains the paired differences for the 
410 companies that could be matched within their industry, which con 
trols for any general differences associated with an industry. As in all 
sampling, there exists random error from sampling a population. Col 
umn 4 presents the f-statistic testing whether random sampling error in 
the mean paired difference can be ruled out as an explanation of the 
difference. 22
Among the profit-sharing companies, an (unweighted) average of 
78.5 percent of employees participate in the profit sharing. These com 
panies are less likely to have unions present (the average difference 
between industry pairs is 7.1 percent, where sampling error can be 
ruled out at the 90 percent level). If unions are present, a majority of 
unionized workers participate in profit sharing in 44.7 percent of the
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companies. A major purpose of the survey is to determine whether 
profit sharing is accompanied by other personnel policies that may 
affect productivity and employment stability, either by themselves or 
by interacting with profit sharing. Of the seven personnel policies that 
firms were asked about, table 1.3 indicates that profit-sharing firms are 
generally more likely to have all seven policies and to cover a larger 
percent of employees. The differences are not large, however, and only 
for job enrichment programs can one reject sampling error as an expla 
nation for the difference between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing 
firms. The same story holds for information-sharing with employees: 
table 1.3 indicates that profit-sharing firms share three types of infor 
mation with a larger percentage of employees, but random sampling 
error cannot be ruled out as an explanation for the paired differences. 23 
While the effects of these policies will be analyzed later, the simple 
differences presented here do not support the idea that profit-sharing 
companies are more likely to make greater efforts to involve their 
employees through these other policies.
The occupational mix of profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms 
shows no significant differences. Within profit-sharing firms, produc 
tion and service workers are somewhat less likely to be covered (75.8 
percent) than are clerical/technical (86.5 percent) and professional/ 
administrative employees (87.6 percent).
Among profit-sharing firms, more than one-third (37.7 percent) 
have cash plans, and an additional 8.5 percent have combination cash/ 
deferred plans. One-fourth (24.7 percent) have more than one plan. A 
majority of the plans (61.5 percent) were begun within the last 20 
years, and one-sixth (17.3 percent) report changes in other personnel 
policies when profit sharing was adopted. Comparisons of 1990 sales 
and employment levels show no significant differences between profit- 
sharing and non-profit-sharing companies.
The apparent growth in popularity of profit sharing in the United 
States over the 1980s, and popular interest in the potential of profit 
sharing to increase productivity and/or stabilize employment, provide 
the setting for this study. These data will form the basis of analyses of 
the productivity and stability theories of profit sharing, and of the fac 
tors that predict adoption of profit sharing.
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NOTES
1. Although the rate of failure was high, however, In an 1896 survey of SO plans, many of 
which were documented by Oilman in an 1891 book, only 12 were fully operating (Monroe 
1896). Also, of 299 plans begun in England between 1829 and 1913, only 133 were operating at 
the end of the period (National Civic Federation 1920:392).
2. A current example is the hope that profit-sharing plans may help to change negative public 
opinions about corporate profits (Fosbre 1989).
3. This closely matches a resolution of the International Congress on Profit Sharing in 1889, 
which defined profit sharing as an "agreement, freely entered into, by which the employee 
receives a share, fixed in advance, of the profits" (quoted in National Civic Federation 1920: 22).
4. The report on the U.S. Senate hearings on profit sharing regarded "welfare and benefit pay 
ments," including a wide array of fixed benefits such as health care and educational benefits, as 
forms of profit sharing (1939: 53-57). Such fixed benefits, which are not viewed as "profit shar 
ing" by employers, are excluded from the definition used in this study.
5. In some limited circumstances employees may be able to have quick access to the increased 
wealth by selling the stock or borrowing against it.
6. The use of profit sharing in 401 (k) plans appears to be increasing (kertesz 12990).
7. This is supported by two pieces of evidence on investment of profit-sharing funds. An aver 
age of 26.4 percent of these funds were invested in company stock in 1991, and the percentage of 
plans where company stock represents more than 50 percent of plan assets increased from 16 per 
cent in 1980 to 27 percent in 1990 (PSRF 1992b, 1992c).
8. Employers are required to report on deferred profit-sharing plans under the provisions of 
the Employee Retirement Incomes Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, using the Form 5500 series. 
Such reports are publicly available either by hardcopy or computer tape. These reports contain a 
large amount of financial information on reported plans; however, they have the following prob 
lems. Most important, while employers may check a box indicating that theirs is a profit-sharing 
plan, "profit sharing" has no clear definition. Until 1986, the only restriction on what would qual 
ify as a profit-sharing plan for tax purposes was that contributions to the plan could not be made in 
a year in which employer profits were not positive; in 1986, even this mild restriction was 
dropped. Employers need not have a clear formula typing worker pay to profits to qualify as a 
profit-sharing plan, and in fact, in many of these plans contributions are wholly discretionary or a 
fixed percent of participant pay. Therefore the "profit sharing" label is overinclusive. A second 
problem with these data is that, while the plan's financial information is detailed, very little infor 
mation is provided on the employer other than location, industry, and number of employees. For 
most analyses, these data must be matched to industry data (Cheadle 1989; Kruse 1991c) or other 
specific company data (Bloom 1985; Kruse 1992).
9. For further evidence from this data source, see Coates (1991). The survey is based on a 
sample and the numbers are subject to sampling variability. For percentages of this magnitude, the 
standard error of any one year's estimate is approximately 1.4 percent, implying a 95 percent con 
fidence interval of plus or minus 2.8 percent (BLS 2336, 1989: 145). Year-to-year differences of 2 
percent are clearly within the bounds of sampling variability. The changes from 1988 to 1989 
could be due to sampling variability; another possible explanation is that there were several large 
companies that restructured or terminated profit-sharing plans in these years to fund employee 
ownership of stock, and these may have been included in the survey (Blasi and Kruse 1991: HI- 
115)
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10. These figures constitute the "low" estimates from Kruse (1991b), which count only the 
largest plan in a company. Smaller plans may cover additional workers, but there is no way to 
ensure against double-counting of workers covered by more than one plan.
11. The spikes in 1982 and 1984 are primarily due to large autoworker contracts negotiated in 
those years.
12. Looking at the concession issue, Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler compare union contracts 
with and without profit-sharing provisions over the 1981-88 period. Of all contracts with first-year 
wage decreases, profit sharing appeared in 17.1 percent of them. In the 133 contracts with profit 
sharing, 36 percent involved a first-year wage decrease, compared to 14 percent of the 1,666 con 
tracts without profit sharing. The prevalence of COLA freezes or eliminations was also higher 
among contracts with profit sharing (1990: 25).
Bell and Neumark (1993) also report the overlap between profit sharing and wage concessions 
(defined as a nominal wage freeze or decline in the first year of the contract). The percentages of 
all manufacturing workers negotiating contracts in a given year in which the contract included 
both profit sharing and a wage concession, were 0.0 percent through 1980, 1.4 percent in 1981, 
33.2 percent in 1982, 8.4 percent in 1983,0.9 percent in 1984,1.7 percent in 1985,16.7 percent in 
1986, 4.3 percent in 1987, and 0 percent in 1988. Comparison of these numbers with those 
reported in table 1.1 reveals that wage concessions existed for a majority of workers in profit- 
sharing manufacturing contracts only in 1982, 1983, and 1986.
13. Additional recent survey evidence is contained in Markham, Scott, and Little (1992) and 
Lissy (1991).
14. For an earlier international survey, see Latta (1979).
15. For an earlier analysis of profit sharing and employee stock ownership schemes in Europe, 
see Latta (1979).
16. For a historical view of profit sharing in the UK between 1865 and 1913, see Hatton 
(1988) and Lindop (1989).
17. For a comprehensive listing of data sources and research findings, see PSRF (1989).
18. This comprises the "primary, secondary, tertiary, and OTC" files of CompuStat.
19. Such pairing was done within the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) defini 
tion.
20. For respondents who inquired about the definition, a profit-sharing plan was defined as 
one in which employer contributions to the plan are based at lest in part on the financial perfor 
mance of the company.
21. Including the contacts during the attempts at pairing would induce a bias in the representa 
tiveness of the firms, due to the stopping rules for pairing.
22. When the absolute value of the /-statistic is greater than 2, one can be confident at the 95 
percent level that the within-industry difference between the profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing 
firms is not due to sampling error (i.e., a difference this large from random sampling error would 
occur less than 5 percent of the time).
23. These results differ from Peel, Pendlebury, and Groves (1991), who find that British firms 
with profit sharing or stock ownership are more likely to share information and engage in consul 
tative practices with employees.

2 
Prediction of Profit Sharing
Why is profit sharing ever adopted? The simplest model of neoclas 
sical economic theory assumes perfect information and mobility in 
competitive labor markets, with the conclusion that each worker 
receives the value of his or her contribution to output (marginal reve 
nue product). In this simple model, where the employer has perfect 
information on employee effort and output, the form of payment does 
not matter. In the absence, however, of perfect information on worker 
behavior, the employer runs the risk of employee "shirking" (substan 
dard performance). Where supervision is costly, the compensation 
scheme may be set up in one or more of several ways to induce appro 
priate levels of worker effort.
First, if worker effort is costly to monitor but individual worker out 
put can be easily measured, piece rates may be used (Parsons 1986; 
Lazear 1986; Brown 1990; Keefe 1991). A compensation system is set 
up which pegs worker pay to units of well-defined output. (This may 
be true of only a portion of pay: a base hourly wage may be set, and the 
piece rate or commission may be on top of this.) This necessitates eas 
ily observable quantity and quality of output that can be attributed to 
an individual. Drawbacks of piece rate systems include the possibility 
of excessive wear or misuse of capital equipment and difficulty in set 
ting appropriate piece rates, particularly in cases where worker collu 
sion is possible (Levine 1992a).
Second, in the presence of costly monitoring, employers may 
choose to defer a significant amount of employee compensation to 
minimize the risk of employee shirking. Even with less than perfect 
monitoring, employees will not shirk if the consequences of being 
caught include the forfeiture of deferred compensation. This can be 
done with a pension plan (through vesting requirements or final pay 
formulas in defined benefit plans), or by "tilting" the tenure-earnings 
profile so that employees are paid less than the value of their output 
early in their tenure, and more than the value of their output later 
(Lazear 1979).
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A third method of motivating employees in the presence of costly 
supervising is to pay an above-market "efficiency" wage the wage 
can be set such that employees will put forth optimal effort for fear of 
being caught shirking and losing the wage premium (Akerlof and 
Yellen 1986; Katz 1987).
Finally, collective incentive schemes such as profit sharing are a 
fourth option in the presence of costly supervising. 1 Bringing employee 
and employer incentives into closer alignment by tying a portion of 
pay to a measure of company performance, the employer may be able 
to lessen the principal-agent problems of costly supervision. Profit 
sharing may be a better way of doing this than individual piece rates 
when: (a) output is not easily ascribed to an individual, that is, produc 
tion is interdependent and/or aided by worker cooperation; (b) setting 
piece rates is too costly; or (c) potential misuse or abuse of capital 
equipment is a concern.
Therefore one motivation for profit sharing is to induce higher lev 
els of worker performance, particularly in situations where perfor 
mance is enhanced by cooperation among employees. The chief 
liability of profit sharing for productivity purposes is the "1/N prob 
lem" if there are N workers in a profit-sharing plan, the average 
worker share is only 1/N of any increased profits going to workers. 
Individual incentives for better quality and quantity of work are diluted 
by the fact that the economic rewards must be shared with the other 
members of the profit-sharing plan. This predicts that profit sharing 
will be more popular in small companies, where the smaller denomina 
tor causes a smaller "1/N problem." It also predicts that profit sharing, 
to have positive productivity effects, will generally need other changes 
in workplace relations to encourage focus on collective goals, resulting 
in increased "peer pressure" (Kandel and Lazear 1992) or "horizontal 
monitoring" (Fitzroy and Kraft 1987). (This and other theoretical 
issues are discussed in chapter 3.)
A second potential benefit to employers is that profit sharing builds 
in a degree of compensation flexibility. When exogenous events lower 
company profitability, profit sharing automatically decreases employee 
compensation without the need for costly renegotiation of the hourly 
wage, or worker layoffs that may sacrifice firm-specific skills. This 
would lead two types of firms to adopt profit sharing as a means of 
sharing variability with workers. First, profit sharing may be favored
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by those experiencing increased variability in company performance, 
where flexibility in labor costs is desired through flexibility in worker 
pay rather than through layoffs. Second, it may be favored by new 
firms with uncertain prospects employees may be attracted by the 
promise of a share in lucrative profits if the firm does well, without 
tying the firm to a high fixed wage if the firm does poorly. By accept 
ing profit sharing in this way, an employee in the new firm is essen 
tially buying a lottery ticket as a part of his or her compensation. The 
flexibility in compensation may be a liability for risk-averse workers 
who prefer to avoid income variability this may be mitigated by 
higher average levels of compensation, or lower probabilities of layoff 
if the stability theory is correct.
A third potential motivation for employers to adopt profit sharing is 
to discourage unionization. The reasoning is that by encouraging a 
focus on profitability, profit sharing may cause employees to identify 
more closely with employers, thus discouraging the adversarial act of 
unionizing. While this possibility forms part of the traditional hostility 
of union leaders toward profit sharing (National Civic Federation 
1920: 368-381; Lindop 1989), and unionized employees are less likely 
to be in profit-sharing plans (Czarnecki 1969; Mitchell, Lewin, and 
Lawler 1990), no reliable evidence exists on whether it does, in fact, 
discourage unionization.2
Profit sharing is predicted, therefore, in situations where: (1) super 
vision is costly, group cooperation is valuable, and care of capital 
equipment is a concern; (2) compensation flexibility is desired by the 
firm; and/or (3) the firm desires to discourage unionization by increas 
ing employee identification with the company's goals.
Prior Research
The presence of profit-sharing plans has been predicted in several 
studies, but it is fair to say that this field of research is underdeveloped. 
Eleven studies will be reviewed here, and are listed in table 2.1. 3 As 
will be seen, the findings do not support simple conclusions about the 
factors predicting profit-sharing presence. In contrast to the studies
Table 2.1 Studies on Prediction of Profit Sharing
Study
Cahuc and Donnont 1992
Carstensen, Gerlach, and 
Hubler 1992
Cheadle 1989
Estrin and Wilson 1989
Fitzroy and Kraft 1987
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w/PS)
136 German 
manufacturing firms (45 
w/PS)
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5500, >100 participants, 
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(n=5998, 2741 w/PS)
52 British metalworking 
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PS presence (includes 
several with employee 
ownership)
PS presence (deferred 
plans)
PS presence
PS income per 
employee
PS presence after 
union drive
Main results
Pos. assoc. w/base wage, blue-collar 
employees, and capital stock 
Neg. assoc. w/market share
Pos. assoc. w/size of firm, workers' councils, 
and training expenditures 
Neg. assoc. w/degree of firm competition 
No assoc. w/unionization
Neg. assoc. w/unionization 
Pos. assoc. w/engineering personnel, and 
mean age of PS in industry and state 
No assoc. w/industry variability or w/size of 
firm
Pos. assoc. w/profits variability, market share, 
works councils, job evaluation schemes 
Neg. assoc. w/size of firm, blue/white-collar 
ratio 
No assoc. w/unionization
Pos. assoc. w/ratio of blue-collar to white- 
collar, and w/age of PS plan
PS plans tend to be dropped after union drive 
whether union won or not
Gregg and Macbin 1988





establishments (229 w/ 
PS)
357 Canadian firms
183 U.S. business units 
(107 w/PS)
Same as Cheadle, but 










employees, and of 
production 
employees, for PS
PS presence, percent 
covered, and (profit 
share)/(labor costs)
PS adoption (deferred 
plans)
PS presence
Pos. assoc. w/firm size, rising product 
demand, supervisor ratio, unionization, 
industry employment change 
Neg. assoc. w/labor costs/sales, and female, 
manual, and part-time proportions
Nonmanagerial: Pos. assoc. w/voluntary 
turnover rates, and evaluations of worker 
performance 
Production: Pos. assoc. w/evaluations of 
worker performance 
Neg. assoc. w/ unionization and capital 
intensity
Pos. assoc. w/age of plan for measures 2 and 3 
Pos. assoc. /profitability for measure 3 
Neg. assoc. w/union presence for measure 2 
Neg. assoc. w/profitability for measure 1
Pos. assoc. w/industry variability 
Neg. assoc. w/avg. size of firm 
No assoc. w/unionization
Pos. assoc. w/sales, growth in sales, and 
financial sector 
Neg. assoc. w/unionization and capital 
intensity
NOTES: PS = profit sharing, Neg. = negative, Pos. = positive, Assoc. w/ = associated with (all reported associations are statistically significant).
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reviewed, this one will look not simply at the presence of profit shar 
ing, but will use longitudinal data to examine factors predicting the 
profit-sharing adoption decision.
One of the most comprehensive attempts to predict profit sharing 
was made by Cheadle (1989). Using the Form 5500 data tapes from 
1981, with data on all pension plans covering 100 or more participants, 
Cheadle analyzed the choice between deferred profit sharing and 
defined benefit pension plans (using matched industry data as explana 
tory variables). Some of his findings were that: (1) unionization is neg 
atively associated with the presence of deferred profit sharing; (2) a 
high ratio of engineering personnel in the industry is positively associ 
ated with deferred profit sharing, "consistent with an incentive 
motive"; (3) industry-level variability is generally uncorrelated with 
the choice of plan; and (4) size of firm is unrelated to the presence of a 
profit-sharing plan. Additionally, the mean dates of establishment of 
profit-sharing plans and of defined benefit plans (by industry and by 
state) have strong effects on the likelihood of adoption for the two 
types of plans: "if pension plans in an industry are (on average) five 
years older, the probability of a firm having a profit-sharing plan is 
reduced by 13 percent" (p. 395). Cheadle concludes,
The explanation with the most consistent support is the "customary" 
hypothesis, the idea that the dominant savings plan in an industry/region 
is determined more by past practice than the inherent superiority of one 
plan over the other, (p. 399)
In Kruse (1991c), I report on a similar analysis that uses Form 5500 
and 5500C data matched to industry data, but analyzes adoption or ter 
mination of the different types of plans over the 1980-86 period. 
Within this period, an estimated 185,800 firms in the United States 
adopted deferred profit-sharing plans, while 53,300 terminated such 
plans. Lower average establishment size and higher variability of 
industry employment over the 1970-80 period caused firms without 
plans in 1980 to be more likely to adopt defined contribution plans (the 
majority of which were deferred profit-sharing plans), rather than 
defined benefit plans. This provides some support for the flexibility 
argument (that increased variability favors profit sharing) and the pro 
ductivity argument (that profit sharing will be more likely in small 
firms where the 1/N problem is less).
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In a study of profit sharing and productivity by Fitzroy and Kraft 
(1987), data from 1977 and 1979 were analyzed for 65 West German 
metalworking firms. Predictions were made, not of profit-sharing sta 
tus but of the profit share income per employee. The two most impor 
tant variables were the ratio of blue-collar to white-collar workers, and 
the age of the profit-sharing plan. Similar techniques were used by 
Kim (1993) on a dataset of 183 U.S. business units in public compa 
nies in 1986. The age of the profit-sharing plan was found to positively 
affect both the percentage of employees covered and the profit-sharing 
bonus as a percent of labor costs, while union presence was found to 
negatively affect the percentage of employees covered. While profit 
ability was found to decrease the likelihood of having a profit-sharing 
plan, it was also found to increase the profit share as a percent of labor 
costs.4
Similarly, a study of French manufacturing firms attempted to pre 
dict profit share income as a proportion of the base wage, rather than 
the simple existence of profit sharing (Cahuc and Dormont 1992). Pos 
itive predictors were found to be the base wage level, capital stock, and 
blue-collar employees as a percent of all employees in the firm, while a 
negative predictor was the firm's market share in the preceding year.
Profit sharing prevalence in Great Britain has been analyzed in sev 
eral studies. In Poole (1989), a sample of 1,125 large enterprises, both 
with and without profit sharing and employee stock ownership 
schemes, was contacted, resulting in 303 interviews. Several tests of 
these 303 enterprises revealed that profit-sharing companies were more 
likely to be in the financial sector, and had higher capital intensity, 
sales volume, and growth in sales volume. In addition, profit-sharing 
companies were found to be more likely to have staff associations, but 
slightly less likely to have unions (1989: 65 116). Based on this sam 
ple, Poole and Jenkins conclude that: "our data suggest that an 
improved profits performance is frequently the trigger mechanism for 
the adoption of schemes" (1990: 95).
A sample of 52 British metalworking firms, 21 with profit sharing, 
was analyzed by Estrin and Wilson (1989). The existence of profit 
sharing in 1978 was positively associated with profits variability and 
market share, and negatively associated with company size and blue/ 
white-collar ratio. Several industrial relations variables were analyzed; 
those found to be more prevalent in profit-sharing firms included
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works councils, formal job evaluation schemes, and managers' percep 
tions of worker participation, but there was no significant association 
with unionization.
Using the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, Gregg and 
Machin (1988) analyze a cross-section sample of British establish 
ments. Among the findings were that profit sharing was more likely in 
firms that were very large (>50,000 employees), had rising product 
demand, were in industries with smaller employment declines, did not 
have high labor costs as a percentage of sales, and had smaller propor 
tions of manual, female, and part-time employees but larger propor 
tions of supervisors. The presence of a "strong" union (proxied by 
whether members were in a closed shop) increased the probability that 
an establishment would have profit sharing by 2.1 percentage points, 
while the presence of a "weak" union increased this probability by 7.1 
points.
The use of profit sharing in a 1989 sample of 136 German firms (45 
of which had profit sharing) was examined by Carstensen, Gerlach, 
and Hubler (1992). Firm size was found to be a positive predictor of 
profit- sharing use, as were workers' councils and high training expen 
ditures. Profit sharing was more likely among firms that had little com 
petition in the product market, but equally likely among union and 
nonunion firms.
Jones and Pliskin (199la) analyzed results from a 1987 survey of 
313 Canadian organizations. Results indicated that the existence of 
profit sharing for any nonmanagerial employees was associated with 
higher voluntary turnover rates and higher managerial evaluations of 
worker performance, whereas profit sharing for production employees 
was associated with a lower proportion of workers unionized, lower 
capital/labor ratios, and higher evaluations of worker performance. For 
the production employees, the difference between 0 percent and 33 
percent unionization (where 33 percent was the mean value of union 
density) was estimated to be associated with only a 1 to 2.5 percent 
decrease in the probability of being eligible for profit sharing.
On the unionization question, therefore, while Gregg and Machin 
found a positive effect of unionism on the probability of profit sharing, 
and Estrin and Wilson and Carstensen, Gerlach, and Hubler found no 
effect, Jones and Pliskin found a negative effect. Unionists have long 
had an uneasy and suspicious relationship with profit-sharing plans
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(see, e.g., National Civic Federation 1920, and Zalusky 1986). 5 The 
principal complaints against profit sharing from the union perspective 
have been that profit sharing brings workers into competition with each 
other, and that it is difficult or impossible for workers to verify that 
managers are defining and sharing the profits properly (see discussion 
in chapter 5).
One relevant study concerns the effect of new unionization on profit 
sharing. Freeman and Kleiner (1990) analyzed data from 203 firms 
with union elections, and from 161 matched pairs that did not have 
union drives. They found that profit-sharing plans tended to be dropped 
after a union organizing drive. The effect was largest where the union 
had won and signed a contract, which is consistent with the traditional 
union antipathy toward profit sharing. The effect, though, was also 
negative where the union had lost, or won but had not signed a con 
tract. However, sampling error could not be rejected as an explanation 
of the differences, so it is uncertain whether new unionization does 
affect profit-sharing status.
These 11 prior studies have not provided clear answers on what fac 
tors predict profit sharing. There have been contradictory findings on 
even basic variables such as unionization and firm size. Employee 
composition, firm growth, capital intensity, and industry variability are 
other variables that have been highlighted as potentially important by 
previous research.
It is worth noting that most of the prior research has relied on cross- 
sectional data, meaning that causality is a particular concern. The char 
acteristics associated with profit sharing may be valid predictors of 
profit sharing, or may be (at least partially) consequences of profit 
sharing or of other factors related to profit sharing. This study employs 
panel data, enabling analysis not only of the presence of profit sharing, 
but of the factors predicting profit-sharing adoption. By examining 
how changes in particular variables are related to subsequent decisions 
to adopt profit sharing, one can have heightened confidence about the 
causality between these variables and profit sharing.
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Motives for Maintaining Profit-Sharing Plans
The profit-sharing firms that were surveyed for this study were 
asked to rate the importance of several factors in maintaining profit- 
sharing plans. (They were not asked why such plans had been adopted, 
since many survey respondents were not involved in the adoption.) The 
responses are summarized in table 2.2. There it can be seen that "pro 
viding a source of retirement income" is the predominant expressed 
reason for maintaining profit sharing, with "recruiting and retaining 
personnel" and "motivating existing employees" the next most impor 
tant reasons. The remaining reasons received a majority of 1's or 2's on 
the 5-point scale.
The lower half of table 2.2 disaggregates the answers by whether the 
firm maintains any cash plans or not. As would be expected, "provid 
ing a source of retirement income" is much more important for the 
firms that maintain only deferred plans.6 For the remaining motives, 
those maintaining any cash plans gave slightly higher importance to 
motivating existing employees, and lower importance to recruiting and 
retaining employees, and to reducing the likelihood of unionization.7
These results are broadly consistent with the expressed opinions of 
Profit Sharing Council of America (PSCA) members (PSRF 1992a), 
and with the stated objectives of British respondents in Poole (1989). 
In a 1990 PSCA survey with 197 respondents, the most-cited objec 
tives for profit-sharing plans were employee retention (95.4 percent), 
increasing employee interest (94.9 percent) and sense of partnership 
(90.4 percent) in the firm, motivating for higher productivity (83.8 per 
cent), and recruiting key personnel (80.2 percent). Other objectives 
listed by more than half of the respondents were: increasing or stabiliz 
ing profits (71.1 percent) enhancing employee job security (61.4 per 
cent), and providing supra-wage benefits without a fixed commitment 
(57.4 percent). For each of these objectives, more than three-fifths of 
those listing it stated that the plan had great or moderate success in 
meeting the objective. From the British data reported in Poole (1989: 
69), the three most highly-rated objectives of profit-sharing schemes, 
according to executive respondents in the companies, were "to make 
employees feel they are part of the company," "to make employees
Table 2.2 Expressed Motives for Maintaining Profit-Sharing Plan
Question: Each of the following are reasons for maintaining the profit-sharing plan. 
Please use the 5-point scale to indicate how important each is for maintaining the profit-sharing plan(s) in your company.
Not 
important 





Providing a source of retirement income
Recruiting and retaining personnel
Motivating existing employees
Reducing likelihood of unionization
Reducing the probability or size of layoffs































Breakdown of answers by presence of cash plan:
Providing a source of retirement 
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Recruiting and retaining personnel
Motivating existing employees
Reducing likelihood of unionization
Reducing the probability or size of 
layoffs
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more profit conscious," and "to increase sense of commitment to the 
company."
Predicting Adoption of Profit Sharing
The results from prior research provide no firm guidelines on the 
variables and specifications that should be used to predict profit shar 
ing. Therefore a variety of variables and techniques was used in 
attempting to predict the adoption of profit sharing (discussed in 
appendix 2). The adoption decision is presumably influenced by 
changes that the firm is undergoing. To examine this, most variables 
were specified as the change in values in the two years preceding the 
adoption decision (from t - 2 to t - 1, if t is the current year). 8 (The cur 
rent year's values are not included since these could reflect the effects 
of profit sharing, rather than causes of the decision.) The variables 
examined here as possible predictors of profit-sharing adoption include 
union status, firm size, and changes in the profit margin, sales, stock 
price, capital intensity, research and development spending, firm and 
industry compensation levels, debt levels, interest expenses, and vari 
ability in sales and the profit margin.
A summary of significant results is provided in table 2.3 (based on 
the logit specifications presented in tables A2.2 and A2.3 in appendix 
2). Only four variables helped predict the adoption of profit sharing.
The first was an increase in the profit margin in the preceding two 
years. As noted in column 2, the within-industry paired results show 
that a 1-point increase in the profit margin (e.g., from 11 percent to 12 
percent of sales) is associated with an increase of 5 to 7 percent in the 
probability of adopting profit sharing in any year. This appears to be 
important for the adoption of cash plans (row 4), but not for the adop 
tion of deferred plans.
The variable that most consistently predicts the adoption of profit 
sharing is a change in the stock price. As shown in column 3 of table 
2.3, a 10 percent increase in stock price in the preceding two years is 
associated with a 4 to 9 percent increase in the probability of adopting 
any profit sharing, and this variable appears important for both cash 
and deferred plan adoption. Note that stock prices should reflect inves-
Table 23 Summary Results on Prediction of Profit-Sharing Adoption
All figures based on logit specifications reported in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3.
Percentage change in adoption probability from:
Baseline yearly 
probability of 
adoption in year t°
(1)
1 percentage-point 
increase in profit 
margin 
(from/- 2 to/- 1)
(2)
10 percent 
increase in stock 
price 










Adoption of any profit sharing .019
1. Nonpaired values
2. Within-industry paired differences
Adoption of cash plan .008
3. Nonpaired values
4. Within-industry paired differences
Adoption of deferred plan .007
5. Nonpaired values
6. Within-industry paired differences
Variables never found significant in predicting adoption
Change from f - 2 to f - 1 in: 
Labor expenses per employee (natural log) 
(both firm- and industry-level) 
Sales (natural log) 
Debt/equity ratio 
Interest payments/sales 
Employment level (natural log) 









8 to 9 
n.s.
9 to 10 
7to9
31 to 39 
n.s.

















NOTES: n.s. = no estimates were significantly different from zero.
a. The baseline probability of adoption is the probability that, if a company does not have a profit-sharing plan already, one will be adopted in the current 
year. These numbers represent the population probabilities (after the sample estimates were weighted to account for oversampling of profit-sharing firms), 
b. Percentage change in adoption probability = (New prob.-Baseline prob.)/(Baseline prob.).
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tors' evaluations of the long-term prospects for profitability, while the 
profit margin may only reflect short-term performance. This would 
indicate that expectations of better long-term performance influence 
the decision to adopt profit sharing. By its very nature, profit-sharing- 
compensation may be easily decreased if the expected better perfor 
mance does not materialize, while a wage increase may be seen as an 
obligation that is more difficult for the company to rescind.
A strong note of caution on the interpretation of this result, however, 
is in order. Stock prices are affected by news about the expected future 
profits of the company, and the announcement of profit sharing may be 
taken as a positive sign of higher expected profits. Profit sharing may 
have been announced in the year preceding adoption, and therefore 
may have affected the stock price change prior to adoption. The 
announcement of profit-sharing provisions in union contracts was 
found to be associated with stock price increases by Florkowski and 
Shastri (1992). 9 For this dataset, whether the profit-sharing adoptions 
were announced, and if so, when, is not known. It is likely that most 
were not announced, as is the case with most employee ownership 
transactions (Blasi and Kruse 1991). 10 Announcements are more likely 
in union negotiations, and the influence of stock price changes was 
found to be very similar between plans that covered a majority of 
union members and those that did not. Whether this result reflects a 
cause, or an effect, of profit-sharing adoption cannot, however, be 
known for certain. Eliminating this variable from the equations pro 
duced no noteworthy differences in the estimates for other variables. 11
A third variable that predicts adoption of profit sharing is union 
presence. A union trend variable was included based on Bell and Neu- 
mark's (1993) finding, reproduced in table 1.1, that profit sharing in 
union contracts has been prevalent in the 1980s (after being nonexist 
ent in the major contracts of 1975). Having a union strongly increased 
the probability of cash plan adoption during this period (by 60-167 per 
cent), but had no significant effect on deferred plan adoption.
To test the possibility that a need for flexibility prompts firms to 
adopt profit sharing, two variables were constructed to represent the 
variance of the yearly changes in sales and the profit margin. 12 
Increased variability in the profit margin was weakly significant in two 
of the equations. The magnitude as well as the significance was weak: 
firms at the 75th percentile of this variable were only 0.6 percent more
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likely to adopt profit sharing than were firms at the 25th percentile, 
while firms at the 90th percentile were only 4.3 percent more likely to 
adopt than were firms at the 10th percentile.
Therefore the best predictors of profit-sharing adoption are improve 
ments in company performance (increases in profit margin and stock 
price) and union presence. The former result is consistent with the 
observation by Poole and Jenkins (1990) that profit sharing may be an 
effect of better performance as well as a potential cause. This clearly 
draws into question the studies that use simple statistical comparisons 
between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies on profitabil 
ity and other performance measures (to be reviewed in chapter 3). 
More generally, it calls into question the studies that use only cross- 
sectional data. If higher profits and profit expectations precede the 
adoption of profit sharing, it is not surprising that profits and other per 
formance measures will on average be higher after the adoption.
Just as notable are the variables that were not significant in predict 
ing profit-sharing adoption. The ability of firms to structure deferred 
profit-sharing plans so that a substantial amount of the assets can be 
invested in employer stock suggests that firms with need for capital 
will adopt such plans. The variables used to test for this possibility are 
the total value of interest payments (as a percentage of sales) and the 
debt/equity and debt/asset ratios Gong-term debt over total invested 
capital, and over gross assets), but none attracted a significant estimate.
Capital intensity was included as a potential predictor since it is a 
complement to worker skill levels, and changes in this variable may 
reflect changes in desired skills by the company. Using cross-section 
data, Jones and Pliskin (199la) found this to be a significant predictor 
of profit sharing, but changes in capital intensity were not found to 
influence profit-sharing adoption here.
A research and development (R&D) variable was tested based on 
the idea that innovative activity plausibly involves costly supervision 
and the importance of group cooperation, which the productivity the 
ory predicts will be associated with profit sharing. Recent changes in 
R&D expenditures, however, did not appear as significant predictors of 
the adoption of profit sharing. The same was true of the within-com- 
pany mean of R&D levels. 13 The idea that R&D activity is not associ 
ated with profit sharing is also supported by a recent compensation 
survey which found that most R&D workers are not covered by profit
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sharing (only 17-37 percent of various specialties are so covered) 
(Morkes 1991).
The 1/N problem suggests that profit sharing will be most effective 
in small firms, and prior research (Poole and Jenkins 1990) suggests 
that fast-growing firms are more likely to adopt profit sharing. Neither 
idea was supported here. The employment level in the year preceding 
adoption, and recent changes in employment and sales, were not sig 
nificant predictors of adoption.
It might be expected that companies facing pressure from rising 
compensation levels would turn to profit sharing as a way of increasing 
compensation without obligating the firm to a higher wage level. How 
ever, recent trends in labor costs per employee, both at the firm and 
industry levels, were not significant predictors of adoption.
A variety of other financial variables was tested with no significant 
findings. These included: alternative measures of the debt/equity ratio, 
advertising/revenues, current ratio, depreciation/assets, return on 
equity, and return on assets.
Prediction of Union and Occupation Participation
Profit sharing is not always extended to all employees within a com 
pany. Under the productivity, stability, or union avoidance theories, it 
may be targeted toward particular occupations or locations where it is 
felt to be most useful. Among the profit-sharing companies in this sur 
vey, only two-fifths (40.5 percent) include 100 percent of the employ 
ees in the profit sharing. As can be seen in table 1.3, in only 44.7 
percent of the unionized profit-sharing companies do more than half of 
the union members participate. An average of 75.8 percent of produc 
tion and service workers are covered within profit-sharing companies, 
compared to 86.5 percent of clerical and technical and 87.6 percent of 
professional and administrative employees.
For the firms that adopt profit sharing, what determines the partici 
pation of union members and the different occupational groups? Table 
2.4 presents the results predicting participation in profit sharing among 
all employees, and among these four groups (based on the full results 
in appendix table A2.4). Since these estimates of participation are
Table 2.4 Summary Results on Union and Occupational Participation in Profit Sharing
All figures based on specifications reported in appendix table A2.4.________________________
Effect of
Dependent variables
1. Probability of having majority of union
members participate in profit sharing"
2. Percent of all workers who participate in profit
sharing
3. Percent of clerical/technical workers
(nonexempt) who participate in profit sharing
4. Percent of professional/administrative
(exempt) workers who participate in profit
sharing
5. Percent of production/service workers
(nonexempt) workers who participate in profit
sharing
Indep. variable mean (s.d.) for line 1
10 percentage- 10 percentage- 10 percentage- 
point increase in point increase in point increase in 
Mean union percentage profl/adm. share prdn7service 

















10- year increase in 








(24.5) (14.1) (20.0) (H.6) 
Indep. variable mean (s.d.) for lines 2-5 24.9 25.4 48.1 15.9
(26.9) (13.6) (22.2) (12.2)
Variables never found significant in predicting participation in profit sharing by union and occupational status: 
Employment level (natural log) Interest payments/sales
Capital intensity (natural log of gross assets/employment) Selling, general, and administrative expenses/sales 
Profit margin Research and development expenses/sales 
Debt/equity ratio__________________________________________________________________
NOTES: n.s. = estimates were not significantly different from zero.
a. Probability effect in row one is based on mean values of variables from probit in column 1 of appendix table A2.4.
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restricted to profit-sharing firms (and to unionized profit-sharing firms 
for the union participation estimates), they should be seen as condi 
tional on a prior decision to adopt profit sharing. 14Unlike the previous 
estimates in this chapter, these do not attempt to predict the adoption of 
profit sharing. Rather, they employ 1990 data in attempting to describe 
the characteristics of profit-sharing companies that predict current cov 
erage of different employee types. 15
In what unionized companies are union members more likely to be 
included in profit sharing? As seen in row 1 of the summary in table 
2.4, the only significant predictor of having a majority of union mem 
bers participate in profit sharing is the percentage of the firm's employ 
ees who are unionized. An increase of 10 percentage points in the 
percent unionized is associated with a 6.5 percent increase in the prob 
ability of having a majority of union members participating in profit 
sharing. 16 The range of percentage unionized in this sample is 1 percent 
to 80 percent. For profit-sharing firms with only 1 percent of employ 
ees unionized, there is only a 21 percent probability that more than half 
will be covered by profit sharing; whereas the probability rises to 71 
percent if 80 percent of all employees are unionized. The occupational 
composition, capital/labor ratio, total employees, profit margin, and 
age of the oldest profit-sharing plan are not significant predictors of 
union participation in profit sharing.
What predicts the percentage of employees covered by profit shar 
ing within the firm? Row 2 of table 2.4 shows that the share of profes 
sional/administrative employees in the company is a strong predictor: a 
10 percentage-point increase in the share of these employees is associ 
ated with an increase of 4.4 percent in employees covered (while dou 
bling this share from its sample average of 25 percent is associated 
with 11 percent higher profit-sharing coverage) for the firm as a 
whole. 17 Also, a higher percentage unionized is associated with lower 
profit-sharing coverage: each increase of 10 points in unionization is 
associated with 2.2 points lower profit-sharing coverage (consistent 
with the results of Kim 1993). (While unionization tends to decrease 
overall coverage, it increases the likelihood that union members will be 
covered, as described above.) The age of profit sharing in the company 
is also a strong positive predictor: each 10 years of age is associated 
with an additional 4.2 percent of coverage within the firm.
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What predicts profit-sharing coverage of different occupational 
groups? The results in rows 3 to 5 indicate that the occupational com 
position of the company does make a difference in profit-sharing cov 
erage by employee groups. 18 A 10 percentage-point increase in the 
professional/administrative share in the company is associated with a 
6.4 percent increase in the profit-sharing coverage of professional/ 
administrative employees and a 10.5 percent increase in the profit- 
sharing coverage of production/service employees. A 10 percentage- 
point increase in the production/service share is associated with signif 
icant increases in the coverage of each occupational group. The influ 
ence of the clerical/technical share is not accounted for separately 
since (as defined) it is simply the remainder after the other two occupa 
tions have been measured. 19 Therefore an increase in the clerical/tech 
nical share can be viewed as coming at the expense of the other two 
occupational shares, indicating that companies with higher shares of 
clerical/technical workers are likely to have lower profit-sharing cover 
age of all employees and of each occupational group.
In line with the results on profit-sharing coverage of all workers, the 
percent unionized is found to exert a significant effect on coverage of 
professional/administrative and production/service workers. A 10 per 
centage-point increase in unionization is found to reduce coverage of 
these groups by, respectively, 1.9 percent and 3.8 percent. Finally, the 
age of profit sharing in the company is associated with higher coverage 
for each group, although sampling error can be ruled out only for pro 
fessional/administrative employees. The magnitude indicates that an 
extra 10 years of age is associated with 4.7 percentage points higher 
profit-sharing coverage for this group.
To briefly summarize, this chapter has found four principal variables 
predicting the adoption of profit-sharing plans: two reflecting company 
performance (increases in the profit margin and increases in the stock 
price), one reflecting variability (the variance of the change in the 
profit margin), and the other representing union presence. The results 
indicating that improvements in performance help predict plan adop 
tion (consistent with Poole and Jenkins 1990) cast serious doubt on 
cross-sectional comparisons of profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing 
companies. Unionization is associated with lower percentages of all 
employees covered, though a higher probability of having union mem 
bers covered. The occupational composition of profit-sharing compa-
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nies shows that higher proportions of professional/administrative and 
production/service employees are associated with greater coverage of 
each occupational group, meaning that firms with a higher proportion 
of clerical/technical employees will have lower profit-sharing coverage 
among each occupation. A fuller summary is presented in chapter 5.
NOTES
1. As discussed in chapter 1, employee stock ownership is another variety of collective incen 
tive scheme, and it has some important differences from profit sharing. Employee stock owner 
ship and other schemes such as gainsharing (group bonuses tied to cost or productivity measures) 
are distinguished from profit sharing, but their separate influences will be analyzed in chapter 3.
2. Czarnecki (1969) examines the union win rate over the 1961-66 period in companies with 
deferred profit-sharing plans in 1965. He finds the union win rate in profit-sharing companies to 
be 44.3 percent, compared to 59.8 percent among other union elections. The conclusion that profit 
sharing hurts union win rates is, however, subject to a serious question of causality: almost all of 
the elections took place prior to the measurement of profit sharing. The lower prevalence of profit 
sharing where unions won reflects the effects of collective bargaining in a context of union hostil 
ity toward profit sharing. The principal conclusion to be drawn is that profit sharing is less preva 
lent in workplaces which have been unionized.
3. This review is based on all published studies that could be located in books or in economic, 
personnel, and business journals (using searches up through June 1993 of the Business Periodicals 
Index and the computerized databases ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and Business Date 
line), and on unpublished studies made available by colleagues.
4. These estimates were made in the context of a simultaneous system, in which both profit 
sharing and profitability (return on assets) were treated as endogenous.
5. See Cardinal and Helburn (1986) for a comparison of management perceptions of profit 
sharing in union vs. nonunion firms.
6. The difference is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
7. However, these differences were not statistically significant at the 95 percent level.
8. The models were estimated only on the years in which firms did not have profit sharing 
already.
9. The effects of employee ownership announcements on stock prices have been more exten 
sively studied and are reviewed in Blasi and Kruse (1991: 181-183).
10. An indication that such announcements are rare comes from their absence in several years 
of searches on the Dow Jones newswire (Joseph Blasi, personal communication).
11. Also, use of the percentage change in stock price between t - 3 and t - 2, which is more 
likely to be fully exogenous, showed coefficients of negligible magnitude and significance.
12. Specifically, these are the variance of annual changes in In(sales) and ln(profit margin) 
over t - 5 to t - 1. Note that, since these represent the variance of the changes in logarithms, they 
effectively represent variance around a growth trend in other words, simple straight growth in 
sales or profits will not result in increased values of these variables. (Such straight growth is sepa 
rately tested by sales and profit margin variables.) Note also that the current period is not included 
in the calculation of the variance (/ - 5 to t - 1) so it does not include any possible effects of the 
adoption of profit sharing.
13. Results for this measure are not presented in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3 since it is not 
reported for utilities and most financial companies. Its inclusion therefore substantially restricts
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the sample. The mean value of R&D/sales was close to identical between new adopters and non 
profit-sharing firms (.014), but was significantly larger for old profit-sharing firms (.019).
14. Results including the non-profit-sharing firms did not produce noteworthy differences.
15. Ideally, one would have year-by-year data on which employees were covered, so that one 
could analyze employee coverage at the time of adoption, as well as changes in coverage as the 
plan matured. For this study, the benefits of such detailed data were judged to be outweighed by 
the reduced response rate entailed in asking for such data. Therefore only current coverage by 
employee type is analyzed here.
16. For example, the mean union density is 38 percent, and the mean probability of having a 
majority of union members participate in profit sharing is 43.5 percent. Increasing the union den 
sity by 10 points (e.g., to 48 percent) is associated with an increase in this probability of 6.5 per 
cent (e.g., to 50 percent).
17. This is based on column 6 of appendix table A2.4, using only profit-sharing firms. These 
results may therefore be seen as exploring the question of how firms, conditional on having 
decided to use profit sharing, choose to extend coverage to various employees.
18. The small sample size prevents the use of detailed industry controls. The regressions 
include seven broad industry controls to partially account for industry differences; nonetheless, 
the results will reflect both within-industry and between-industry effects.




Profit sharing has long been promoted as a way to improve com 
pany performance by tying the incentives of the employees more 
closely to those of the owners and managers. Such incentives are theo 
rized to encourage employees to put forth extra effort ("working 
harder"), or to develop ways to reduce costs or improve quality 
("working smarter"). As a group incentive, profit sharing is designed to 
encourage such activity in cooperation with other employees. Such 
cooperation can be productive in itself, and can encourage "peer pres 
sure" or "horizontal monitoring," so that employees encourage better 
performance by their fellow employees.
The productivity theory of profit sharing relies on the idea that 
supervision is costly. If it were costless, the behaviors that are desired 
under profit sharing could be directly measured and rewarded. 1 As 
noted in the previous chapter, several methods have been identified in 
economic theory to deal with the problem of costly supervision.
1. Piece rates. Where quantity and quality of output are easily 
observable and can be directly attributed to an individual, worker pay 
can be directly tied to output. Costly monitoring of quality and quan 
tity, the possibility of misuse of capital equipment, and difficulty in set 
ting the rates are drawbacks. 2 In addition, piece rates do not encourage 
cooperation among employees, which may be important for perfor 
mance in certain kinds of jobs.
2. Deferred compensation, in the form of a pension or an earnings 
profile in which workers receive less than what they produce early in 
their tenure and more than what they produce later in their tenure. Bet 
ter worker performance may be motivated by the fear of being fired 
and losing the deferred portion of compensation. This fear can moti 
vate higher performance even under incomplete monitoring. In return, 
to induce workers into such arrangements, total compensation over the 
working life needs to be higher than where compensation is not 
deferred.
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3. Efficiency wage. Rather than changing the type or timing of com 
pensation to deal with problems of costly supervision, employers may 
choose to pay an above-market "efficiency wage." This can motivate 
higher effort even under imperfect monitoring.
Profit sharing may be used as a substitute or complement for these 
methods when monitoring is costly. Relative to a fixed wage, profit 
sharing does provide more of a link between an individual's perfor 
mance and pay by allowing the worker to share in the extra value gen 
erated by his or her performance. This extra value, however, is shared 
with all other workers in the plan. If workers share profits equally, and 
there are N workers, each one will receive only 1/N of any increased 
profits going to workers. Clearly the individual incentive becomes 
weak, even negligible, as N grows large.
Other conditions must be present, therefore, for profit sharing to act 
as a spur to better performance. One of these conditions may be that 
group cooperation increases performance. By tying the economic 
reward to group performance, individuals have incentives not only to 
improve their own performance, but also to improve fellow workers' 
performance. This may be done in straightforward ways, such as by 
sharing ideas, or in subtle ways, through encouraging co-workers and 
ostracizing those who do not work hard. It may be much less costly 
and more effective to have "horizontal monitoring" done by co-work 
ers, rather than monitoring by supervisors.
Employees engaged in the routine day-to-day fulfillment of a task are 
usually in a position to detect inefficiencies in operations that diminish 
productivity. They are also likely to acquire important information con 
cerning the actual productive contributions of their co-workers. ... The 
information derived from such activity... is potentially very valuable to 
the firm as an input to production. Yet such information transfers will 
not be induced under an individual performance-based rewards system 
since it does not affect his own performance measures. . . .
But under the group system, the appropriate incentives are much more 
likely to be present. If there are indeed positive externalities associated 
with these information inputs and all the relevant group members are 
subject to the same incentives, then there is reason for the employee to 
identify his own interests with those of the firm and to furnish the inputs 
requisite to the firm's success (Nalbantian 1987: 26).
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While the possibility of information-sharing and horizontal monitor 
ing may slightly mitigate the 1/N problem through enlarging the indi 
vidual's range for affecting group performance, this problem would 
still seem to be a strong deterrent to individual incentives. The 1/N 
problem may be seen as a classic "prisoner's dilemma" from game the 
ory. If one worker puts forth better performance which increases profits 
while other workers maintain a constant baseline performance, the 
workers all share in the increased profits from the one worker's better 
performance; however, the one worker is likely to be worse off (assum 
ing the extra effort is personally costly and exceeds 1/N of the 
increased profits). Therefore, predicated on a lack of increased effort 
by other employees, the individual incentive for increased effort is 
likely to be outweighed by the costs of that effort. If, however, the 
"game" is repeated in an ongoing relationship (or if the continuation of 
the game is uncertain), workers can collectively establish an agreement 
to work harder, and the financial rewards from sharing in the increased 
profits might outweigh the individual costs from participating in the 
agreement. Among the many potential equilibria that may result in this 
situation, one is that the workers might establish a "cooperative equi 
librium" in which performance and profits are higher (see, e.g., Axel- 
rod 1984; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986; Tomer 1987).
A cooperative equilibrium is clearly one solution to prisoner's 
dilemma situations. Two major questions are: How does one get estab 
lished, and how is one maintained? Neither question has a clear-cut 
answer, and in fact there may be many answers to each. Factors such as 
group size, history, criteria for membership, personal connections, task 
interdependence, communication system, and physical environment 
may be important in establishing a willingness to cooperate for higher 
performance. The same factors may be important in maintaining the 
cooperative agreement, since after one is established there would con 
tinue to be an individual incentive to "defect" from the cooperative 
solution to share in the higher profits without putting forth the extra 
effort that other workers are putting forth. The "shirkers" from the 
cooperative agreement may be punished by fellow workers through 
nonpecuniary sanctions such as social ostracism, or by personal guilt 
or shame (Kandel and Lazear 1992; Bashir 1990). Laboratory experi 
ments on prisoner's dilemma situations show that cooperation is more 
common than would be predicted by simple models of self-interest,
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and is more likely when participants can begin to form a group identity 
by talking with each other before making their choices (summarized in 
Dawes and Thaler 1988; also see Kahneman and Thaler 1991). The 
empathy with co-workers that may be built through communication 
can help develop and enforce worker norms that support higher perfor 
mance (Kandel and Lazear 1992; Lazear 1992).
These considerations make it clear that a profit-sharing plan cannot 
simply be installed and expected to improve performance. "To get the 
productivity-enhancing effects, something more may be needed  
something akin to developing a corporate culture that emphasizes com 
pany spirit, promotes group cooperation, encourages social enforce 
ment mechanisms, and so forth" (Weitzman and Kruse 1990: 100). 
This is echoed by those who set up group incentive plans: Gross and 
Bacher (1993: 55) note the importance of a "supportive culture" in 
which "teamwork, trust, and involvement at all levels are important."
An additional consideration is that the direct financial stake in the 
group incentive may not be as important as a perception that the fruits 
of greater effort are being shared with employees. If implemented in 
the right way, group incentive schemes can provide a psychological as 
well as financial stake in group success.3 "Theories that suggest that 
workers' productivity is related to their sense of fair treatment imply 
that profit-sharing plans may still lead to an increase in productivity 
even when the individual's own effort has a negligible effect on prof 
its" (Stiglitz 1987: 66). Put another way, workers may directly value 
the existence of a pay-performance link (and possibly the group cohe 
sion it may foster) apart from the size of that link.4
Profit sharing also raises the issue of managerial incentives to moni 
tor workers. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argued that the optimal level 
of monitoring within an enterprise requires that the monitor receive the 
residual income (profits) from the activity being monitored. If profits 
are shared with workers, the incentive for monitoring workers is 
diluted, and both owners and workers are hurt by the lower efficiency 
that results. Therefore, owners should receive the full amount of profits 
in order that they (and their agents, the managers) will have the correct 
incentives for monitoring.
This argument relies on several assumptions, including that there 
are no principal-agent problems between owners and managers, and 
that the decrease in monitoring by management will not be accompa-
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nied by an increase in workers monitoring each other.5 As noted by 
Bonin and Putterman,
Alcbian and Demsetz's hypothesis is limited to the effects of a particular 
specification of property rights on incentives to monitor but not on the 
ability to observe accurately. ... It is possible, for example, that while 
concentrated residual claimancy creates heightened incentives to moni 
tor, this factor could be partly or wholly offset by reduced efficacy of 
monitoring when much information concerning workers' real productiv 
ities cannot be easily observed from "above" (1987:48).
One part of the argument for the importance of central monitoring is 
that more monitoring induces more optimal labor effort. Putterman and 
Skillman (1988) show how this is sensitive to the compensation 
scheme, workers' risk preferences, and the informational content of 
monitoring. In particular, monitoring may produce either an accurate 
or a "noisy" signal of effort. When the signal is accurate, increased lev 
els of monitoring will generally produce positive incentive effects. 
When, however, the signal is "noisy" that is, there is some error in 
measuring a worker's true effort increased monitoring may increase 
or reduce worker effort (depending on worker risk preferences and the 
compensation scheme). Putterman and Skillman conclude that
closing the story which says that a particular assignment of residual 
rights will best elicit the desired monitoring effort remains a difficult 
challenge, especially if monitoring is itself difficult to observe and there 
are reasons why the monitor or monitors might want to misrepresent 
their information (1988: 118).
An additional issue concerns the relationship between profit sharing 
and capital investment (Summers 1986; Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 
1987; Weitzman 1986). If employees collectively receive a predeter 
mined fixed share of profits, they will naturally share in any increase in 
profits from new capital investments, thereby decreasing the return on 
investment for the firm's owners.6 This decreased return would 
decrease the incentives for investment, implying that profit sharing 
would inhibit company growth. While the gains to employees, and 
losses to owners, may be dissipated through the attraction of new 
employees to the company, the adjustment lags may still represent a 
disincentive for owners to invest. This disincentive would be a func 
tion of having the profit share strictly tied to profits; as will be seen,
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this is rare in the United States. The discretionary component of most 
profit-sharing formulas in the United States (often in addition to a fixed 
percentage) adds a substantial amount of flexibility that may mute this 
disincentive.
A final issue addressed here is employee self-selection. The type of 
compensation system that a firm employs will clearly affect the type of 
employee it attracts and retains. If profit sharing attracts higher-quality 
employees, a finding that profit-sharing firms have higher productivity 
may have nothing to do with the incentive effects of profit sharing, but 
may simply reflect the higher labor quality of the firm. 7 A priori, it is 
not clear that profit sharing would attract high-quality or low-quality 
workers. Employees who desire to be paid according to performance 
are more likely to be more productive persons and should be attracted 
to firms that have performance-dependent compensation systems. 
Profit sharing may be a form of compensation that attracts higher-qual 
ity workers. However, such workers may instead be attracted to com 
pensation systems that are highly sensitive to individual performance, 
while lower-quality workers may be attracted to group-based systems 
in which the costs of shirking are shared with co-workers. An addi 
tional factor that would affect self-selection of employees is the degree 
of risk aversion those who are averse to income variability will pre 
sumably tend to avoid compensation systems like profit sharing that 
have variable payments.8
There is very little evidence on the self-selection of workers into 
group incentive systems. One piece of evidence on this issue strongly 
suggests that self-selection favors workers of average quality. Studying 
a company in which workers started with an individual incentive sys 
tem and moved into a group incentive system within several months, 
Weiss (1987) found that both the initially high and low performers 
were more likely to quit the company after their pay became tied to 
group incentives. Among those who stayed, the performance of the 
best and worst workers moved toward group averages, suggesting co- 
worker influence upon performance. This study shows that employee 
self-selection is a relevant concern in group incentive systems, but sug 
gests that labor quality imparts no general upward or downward bias to 
estimates of the effects of group incentive systems.
The Productivity Theory 51
Prior Research: Noneconometric Evidence
The relationship between profit sharing and economic performance 
has been addressed in a variety of studies. These range from employee 
and employer attitude surveys, to comparisons of simple statistics, to 
formal econometric studies that control for a variety of influences on 
productivity.
The attitude surveys and simple statistical comparisons will only be 
briefly reviewed here.9 When employees in profit-sharing plans are 
asked for general opinions of profit sharing, or about the effect of profit 
sharing on individual and company performance, they strongly tend to 
respond favorably (Bell and Hanson 1987; Colletti 1969; Jehring 1956; 
Opinion Research Corporation 1957; Industrial Participation Associa 
tion 1984; Poole and Jenkins 1990). Comparing expressed opinions 
between employees in profit-sharing plans and those who were not, the 
profit sharing employees were more likely to agree that employees "get 
their share of company growth," "get credit for company progress," 
and "gain from cost-cutting" (Opinion Research Corporation 1957). 
On the negative side, Bell and Hanson (1987) found that 42 percent of 
respondents from 12 British profit-sharing companies felt that profit 
sharing "can cause disappointment or resentment because profits can 
go down." Also, Blanchflower (1991) found that worker attitudes 
about the quality of industrial relations were no more favorable among 
profit-sharing participants than among all private sector workers in the 
United Kingdom.
Employers who have adopted and maintained profit-sharing plans, 
not surprisingly, strongly tend to view it favorably. When asked about 
the general success of profit sharing in their companies, strong majori 
ties view it as successful (Brower 1957; Knowlton 1954; Metzger 1966 
1975; New York Stock Exchange 1982; Nightingale 1980; Wider Share 
Ownership Council 1985; O'Dell and McAdams 1987; Smith 1986; 
Nickel 1990). Among managers familiar with flexible compensation 
plans, Mitchell and Broderick (1991) found that 43 percent agreed that 
cash profit sharing increases productivity, 51 percent agreed that it 
increases loyalty, 44 percent agreed that it creates demands for partici 
pation, and 50 percent agreed that it is difficult to administer (each of 
these percentages was slightly lower for deferred profit-sharing plans).
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Asked to compare profit sharing, ESOPs, gainsharing, and simple 
incentives, 28 percent (48 percent) saw profit sharing as the best alter 
native for raising productivity (loyalty).
Employees and employers in profit-sharing companies, therefore, 
have generally favorable views of profit sharing and its effects on per 
formance measures. Among the many biases in attitude surveys, the 
respondent selection bias is strong here: employees who have chosen 
to work in profit-sharing companies and employers who maintain 
profit-sharing plans are clearly likely to view it positively.
Two studies used regression analysis of employer opinions about 
economic performance, and one study used a path analysis of 
employee support for profit sharing. In a sample of 343 unionized Wis 
consin firms, Voos (1987) found that profit sharing had positive effects 
on employer opinions of firm performance, particularly on product 
quality and productivity. Using data on employer attitudes from 1,266 
British establishments in 1984, Blanchflower and Oswald (1988) use 
profit sharing and other variables to predict whether the company's 
financial performance was reported as "better than average." In two 
estimates they find that profit sharing was a positive predictor, but sam 
pling error could not be ruled out 10 They also note that there are no dif 
ferences associated with profit sharing in tabulations of managers' 
opinions of the "general state of relations between management and 
workers at this establishment." The study of employee support for 
profit sharing (Florkowski and Schuster 1992) found that perceptions 
of performance-reward contingencies and pay equity, but not of influ 
ence on decisionmaking, were significant determinants of support for 
profit sharing among 160 employees in three U.S. profit-sharing com 
panies.
Simple comparisons of performance statistics between profit-shar 
ing and non-profit-sharing companies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom have been done in six studies (Bell and Hanson 1987; 
Howard and Dietz 1969; Howard 1979; Jehring and Metzger 1960; 
Metzger and Colletti 1971; Metzger 1978). These cross-sectional com 
parisons strongly favor profit sharing, with profit-sharing firms having 
higher mean or median values on substantial majorities of the perfor 
mance measures. In a longitudinal comparison, Bell and Hanson 
(1987) found that companies that adopted profit sharing had relative 
improvement in seven of nine measures (compared to non-profit-shar-
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ing firms). A more intensive examination of the Bell and Hanson data 
is reported in Hanson and Watson (1990), who focus on four perfor 
mance measures: return on equity, return on sales, sales growth, and 
annual investor returns. Cross-sectional comparisons accounting for 
industry membership show that the profit-sharing companies had 
higher mean values of these measures over the 1978-85 period, while 
the longitudinal comparisons show improved performance for the first 
three measures but not for investor returns."
Several case studies of British enterprises that had either profit-shar 
ing or employee-shareholding schemes are reported by Poole and Jen- 
kins (1990). In examining behavioral measures, they find no clear 
evidence that these schemes reduce strikes or absenteeism, although 
they might reduce turnover (1990: 50). Examining case study material 
on economic performance, they conclude
[T]here is almost certainly a positive relationship between company 
profitability and whether or not a firm has adopted profit-sharing 
schemes. However, there remains considerable doubt about the direc 
tion of this relationship. In particular, our data suggest that an improved 
profits performance is frequently the trigger mechanism for the adoption 
of schemes. This, in turn, enables a company to continue an onward 
advance in terms of profitability. . . .
Ceteris paribus, firms introducing schemes can expect positive financial 
consequences, though these may well be indirect and mediated through 
organizational commitment and identification. But there is not a direct 
linear relationship here or any certainty that firms introducing schemes 
will inevitably reap substantial financial benefits. (1990: 95)
The simple performance comparisons are clearly consistent with the 
idea that profit sharing can improve economic performance, although 
other explanations are clearly plausible. Poole and Jenkins note the 
possibility of reverse causality: profit sharing may be causing higher 
performance, but may also be partially caused by higher performance. 
This possibility is reinforced by the finding of chapter 2 that increases 
in profits or expected profits helped predict the adoption of profit shar 
ing.
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Prior Research: Econometric Studies
The relationship of profit sharing to productivity has been addressed 
by studies using formal econometric techniques only within the last 12 
years. Common to these studies is the use of an objective productivity 
measure (such as value-added per employee), a measure of profit shar 
ing as an explanatory variable (such as a dummy, dollar figure, or per 
cent of compensation), and several other explanatory variables that 
may be important for productivity (particularly capital intensity). Most 
of the studies reviewed here use a production function to model the 
basic determinants of productivity. 12 Common problems of these stud 
ies include standard statistical difficulties of proper specification, the 
influence of other variables on the profit-sharing measures, the omis 
sion of variables that may themselves affect productivity and be asso 
ciated with the profit-sharing variable, and possible bias from the use 
of financial rather than physical output measures (Gerhart and Milkov- 
ich 1992).
Table 3.1 briefly describes 26 econometric studies that include a 
profit-sharing independent variable in a regression predicting produc 
tivity. 13 Six of these studies (numbers 10, 11, 16, 17, 19, 20) were of 
worker cooperatives, in which the authors attempted to separate the 
effects of profit sharing from other cooperative features (e.g., owner 
ship of assets, membership on boards of directors). One study com 
bined U.S. cooperatives with profit-sharing and ESOP firms (number 
8), while the remaining studies were of capitalist firms in the United 
Kingdom (numbers 1,4, 8, and 26), France (number 6), West Germany 
(numbers 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, and 14), Japan (18), Korea (23) and the 
United States (numbers 2, 9,15, 21,22, 24, and 25). Six studies report 
corrections for potential statistical bias from the factors that predict the 
presence of profit sharing (numbers 6,10, 11, 12, 13, 20, and 25), with 
generally similar results to those found in the other studies. 14 Several 
studies measured not just the direct effect of a profit-sharing variable 
on the productivity measure, but also the effect of profit sharing inter 
acted with capital, labor, and other variables (numbers 2, 4, 5, 9, 14, 
18,19, and 26).
Overall, the prior results from econometric studies strongly indicate 
positive relationships between productivity and profit sharing. There
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are 265 reported estimates on profit-sharing variables when interac 
tions or lags are not included. Of these 265 estimates, 8.7 percent take 
negative values, and nearly all of these are within the range of sam 
pling error,15 while 57.4 percent take positive values where random 
sampling error can be ruled out as an explanation. 16 If the true relation 
ship between profit sharing and productivity is zero, and these esti 
mates represent an unbiased sample of estimates of this relationship, 
the odds are infinitesimally small of finding such positive estimates (as 
indicated by a variety of meta-analyses) (Weitzman and Kruse 1990: 
138). There is clearly no guarantee that this is an unbiased sample of 
such estimates: as noted by Card (1990), both the stopping rules for 
specification search (Learner 1978) and publication bias (Berlin, Begg, 
and Louis 1989) may favor positive results where sampling error can 
be ruled out. 17 While providing no guarantee of unbiasedness, the wide 
range of data sources and empirical techniques employed, plus the fact 
that profit sharing was not the primary focus of several of the studies, 
makes it unlikely that the positive results are purely an artifact of stop 
ping rules and publication bias.
These studies indicate that profit sharing may be associated with 
increased productivity, but provide very little information on the cau 
sality and the mechanisms through which profit sharing may affect 
productivity. Most of these studies are cross-sectional, raising the pos 
sibility that profit sharing is reflecting rather than causing better perfor 
mance. Concerning the mechanisms, the idea that profit sharing 
enhances the value of labor's contribution to output is supported by the 
productivity specifications of Shepard (1986). Positive effects on 
worker behavior are also reported by Wilson and Peel (1991), who find 
that absenteeism and quits are significantly lower in firms with profit- 
sharing plans than in other firms. The idea that worker participation in 
decisions may increase the positive effects of profit sharing is sup 
ported by Cable and Fitzroy (1980) (who find a significant positive 
estimate on profit sharing only in "high-participation" firms) but not by 
Jones and Pliskin (1991) (who find no positive interactions between 
profit sharing and worker membership on boards of directors). The 
idea that it may be most productive in small companies is supported by 
Bradley and Smith (1991). 18 Cooke (1993) finds that profit sharing 
appears to have much greater effects in nonunion than in unionized set 
tings. (Among other possible explanations, he suggests that due to
Table 3.1 Econometric Studies of Profit Sharing
Authors of the 
studies
1. Bhargava 1991
2. Bradley and 
Smith 1991
3. Cable and 
Fitzroy 1980a, 
1980b
4. Cable and 
Wilson 1989
5. Cable and 
Wilson 1990






150 British firms with 
public stock, 1978 to 
1989
86 U.S. firms in computer 
industry with public 
stock, 1986-88
42 West German firms 
members of the AGB 
from 1974 to 1976
52 U.K. firms in 
engineering, from 1978 to 
1982
61 West German firms in 
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Dummy for firms with 
profit sharing, current and 
lagged
Dummy for profit- 
sharing firms, plus 
interactions wAabor
Total profits distributed 
to workers
Dummy for profit- 
sharing firms, interacted 
with firm characteristics
Dummy for profit- 
sharing firms, interacted 
with firm characteristics
Profit-sharing payments 
divided by base wage
Dummy for profit 
sharing, profit share/ 








































Estrin, and Jones 
1985
11. Estrin, Jones, 
and Svejnar 1987
12. Fitzroy and 
Kraftl986
13. Fitzroy and 
Kraft 1987
14. Fitzroy and 
Kraft 1992; Kraft 
1991
40 U.S. firms (period not 
reported)
1,173 U.S. manufacturing 
firms, 1989
440 French cooperatives 
in 1978; 550 French 
cooperatives in 1979
Cooperatives in France 
(550 in 1978-79), Italy 
(150 in 1976-80), and 
Britain (50 over 1948-68)
61 West German firms in 










Profits defined as 








Dummy for firms with 
profit sharing
Dummy for profit 
sharing/gainsharing, 
interacted with union 
status and work teams
Profits distributed to 
workers per head
Profits distributed to 
workers per head
Profits distributed to 
workers per head
Profits distributed to 
workers per head
Dummy for profit 
sharing, alone and 
































18. Jones and Kato 
1992b
19. Jones and 
Pliskin 199 Ib
20. Jones and 
Svejnar 1985
Source of data
3 U.S. profit-sharing 
companies (monthly 
data)
From 46 to 30 British 
cooperatives over the 
period 1948-68
50 British cooperatives in 
the retail sector in 1978
100 Japanese firms over 
1973-80 period
70 firms in clothing, 
footwear, and printing 
over the period 1923 to 
1968
316 Italian cooperatives 
from 1975 to 1978; 3 15 













Intercept and slope 
effects before and after 
the plan introduction or 
modification
Individual bonus to labor
Surplus distributed to 
workers as dividend
Profit-sharing bonus per 
employee, and divided by 
base wage, alone and 
interacted with capital, 
labor, and ESOP presence
Size of bonus and dummy 
for bonus, alone and 
interacted with capital, 
labor and employees on 
board








15 main effects 
59 interactions8
























22. Kruse 1988, 
1992
23. Lee and Rhee 
1992
24. Mitchell, 
Lewin, and Lawler 
1990
25. Shepard 1986, 
forthcoming
26. Wadhwani and 
Wall 1990
183 U.S. companies with 
public stock, 1986
2,976 U.S. companies 
with public stock, 1971- 
85
Industry data from South 
Korea, 1972-89
495 U.S. business units, 
1983-86
20 U.S. chemical firms 
from 1975 to 1982














Dummy, percent of 
workers covered, and 
bonus/labor costs
Dummy for firms with 
profit sharing; percent of 




Dummy for firms with 
profit sharing
Dummy for firms with 
profit sharing; profits 
distributed to workers per 
head; ratio of profit 
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a. For the study using lags (number 1), all 10 specifications indicate posidve effects of adopdng and maintaining profit sharing. For the eight studies using 
interactions, six (numbers 4, 5,9,14,19,26) indicate that profit sharing is associated with higher performance at mean values of the interacted variables 
(die productivity difference is 3 to 8 percent in study 4,20 to 30 percent in study 5, and 1.4 to 28.3 percent in study 14). Study 2 reports posidve associa 
tions only for small firms, and study 18 reports posidve effects only when profit sharing is associated with employee stock ownership, 
b. Estimates with industry controls.
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lower base pay in nonunion settings, the profit share may be a better 
motivator since it is a larger portion of total compensation.)
Finally, a study that does not measure productivity directly, but mea 
sures stock price response, is Florkowski and Shastri (1992). 19 They 
report on a study of 45 announcements of union contracts that included 
profit sharing over the 1979-88 period. These announcements were 
found to be associated with positive abnormal returns to shareholders. 
Such positive returns could reflect expectations of better overall eco 
nomic performance, a shareholder premium for sharing future income 
risk with employees, or simply a transfer from employees to sharehold 
ers if the profit sharing comes in lieu of higher wages or benefits 
(Abowd 1989). The positive returns were not found to be significantly 
higher when the contract included wage reductions or signalled the end 
of a strike, but were significantly higher when the firm was reported to 
be facing bankruptcy or plant shutdowns. The fact that returns were not 
significantly higher when wage reductions were announced points 
against a simple story of profit sharing signalling wealth transfers, but 
it is still very possible that profit sharing was viewed as substituting for 
more costly wage and benefit increases. This evidence is clearly con 
sistent, however, with the proposition that profit sharing improves 
overall performance.
Prior research thus indicates a good likelihood that profit sharing is 
positively related to productivity, but the causality has not been well 
disentangled (most studies share a weakness of not analyzing produc 
tivity before and after the adoption of profit sharing, leaving open the 
possibility that more successful firms are more likely to adopt profit 
sharing). In addition, these studies provide very little evidence on the 
mechanisms by which this may happen. This study will build upon this 
research by intensively analyzing the effects of profit-sharing adoption 
and presence, and the role played by different plan types, formulas, 
firm sizes, and information-sharing and personnel policies.
Simple Comparisons on Productivity Levels and Growth
To examine the productivity effects of profit sharing, two measures 
of productivity are employed in this study: sales per employee, and
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value-added per employee. The first measure is calculated in a straight 
forward way, while the second is not straightforward because it 
requires data on labor costs, which are not reported by most publicly 
held companies. Where labor cost data were not available, the value 
was imputed using industry compensation levels, sales, and employ 
ment levels. 20
Table 3.2 presents simple statistical comparisons on productivity 
levels and changes. Mean levels of the productivity measures for 1975 
and 1990 are at the top, with the within-industry comparisons on lines 
3 and 6. There it can be seen that profit-sharing firms had 4.0 percent to 
7.4 percent higher average productivity in 1975, and 1.0 percent to 3.5 
percent higher productivity in 1990, but random sampling error cannot 
be ruled out as an explanation of the differences.21
Comparisons of productivity growth are reported on lines 7 to 13. 22 
Over the sample period the average yearly growth rates for non-profit- 
sharing companies in the two measures were approximately 8.1 per 
cent and 7.6 percent. The growth rates for profit-sharing companies 
were slightly lower: 7.3 percent and 7.1 percent for the companies that 
adopted profit sharing before 1975, and 8.0 percent and 7.3 percent for 
those that adopted it after 1975. 23 (Note that the numbers on lines 7 to 9 
reflect inflation as well as pure productivity increases the inflation 
rate averaged 6.0-6.2 percent.)24
Comparisons of productivity growth between within-industry pairs 
will automatically control for any general productivity trends in an 
industry in a given year. The comparisons of non-profit-sharing com 
panies with pre-1975 ("old") adopters are reported on line 10, while 
lines 11 to 13 answer the question, "How did average yearly productiv 
ity growth compare between profit-sharing adopters and their non 
profit-sharing pairs prior to the adoption (line n), during the year of 
adoption fline 12), and after adoption (line 13)?"
The old profit-sharing firms had slower productivity growth than 
their pairs in the 1970s and 1980s. Line 10 shows that the average 
yearly productivity growth of old adopters was less than that of their 
pairs by 0.7 percent for sales/employee and 0.5 percent for value- 
added/employee. 25 This is not so for the new adopters. Productivity 
growth was, on average, slightly and insignificantly lower in the pre- 
adoption period (line 11), but higher in the year of adoption (line 12). 
When profit sharing was adopted, average sales/employee increased
Table 32 Simple Statistical Comparisons on Productivity
Productivity levels (means)
1.1975 No PS in 1975
2. PS in 1975
3. Paired difference
4. 1990 No PS in 1990
5. PS in 1990
6. Paired difference
Yearly productivity growth, / -
Nonpaired values
7. NPS
8. PS adopted before 1975
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NOTES: NPS = no profit sharing; PS = profit sharing. N = 247 for NPS companies, N = 103 for pre-1975 PS adopters, N = 128 for post-1975 adopters.
Paired differences represent value for PS company minus the value for its same-industry NPS pair for that year. Absolute values of f-statistics in
parentheses.
a.Trimmed means were calculated after removing the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of values.
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4.1 percent, and value-added/employee increased 2.3 percent, relative 
to the industry pairs; sampling error can be ruled out for the former dif 
ference. Once adopted, average yearly growth in sales/employee is 0.7 
percent lower, and in value-added/employee is equal, between the 
adopters and their pairs. While the 0.7 percent difference is not signifi 
cantly different from zero, the point estimate indicates that the 4.1 per 
cent jump in sales/employee when profit sharing is adopted is 
dissipated within six years (perhaps indicating a positive "honeymoon" 
effect that dies over time).
These results may clearly differ by type of plan. In this period, 45 
cash or combination plans were adopted and 61 deferred plans were 
adopted. The remainder of table 3.2 presents similar comparisons by 
type of plan (where cash plans include combination plans, since they 
both have cash components). The initial patterns are similar to those 
described above: the preadoption comparisons indicate lower produc 
tivity growth for the adopters, while productivity jumps up during the 
year of adoption (with these jumps being statistically significant at the 
90 percent level for deferred plans, but not for cash plans). The posta- 
doption growth comparisons are negative for cash plans (significantly 
so for the sales/employee measure, indicating that the initial upward 
jump is dissipated in two years), but insignificantly positive for 
deferred plans. The "honeymoon" effect may therefore be more impor 
tant for cash plans than for deferred plans.
Productivity growth among profit-sharing adopters (compared to 
their industry pairs) appears, therefore, to be slightly lower prior to 
adoption, to jump up during adoption, and to be flat or declining after 
adoption. This upward jump apparently exists for both cash and 
deferred plans, but the subsequent decline is apparent only for cash 
plans. These simple comparisons control for industry and year effects, 
but do not control for other important influences on productivity, most 
notably capital intensity. The comparisons would be biased if, for 
example, capital intensity tended to dramatically increase when profit 
sharing is adopted, indicating that the upward jump in sales/employee 
is due to forces other than profit sharing. These influences can and will 
be accounted for in the analysis that follows.
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Estimating the Productivity Effects of Profit Sharing
Following most prior econometric work, this study investigates the 
relationship between profit sharing and productivity using a production 
function framework. The framework will be briefly outlined here (with 
technical detail in appendix 3). Labor and capital are viewed as the two 
most important inputs to the production process, and the levels of these 
factors and their relation to each other are expected to be key influ 
ences on output. With longitudinal data on each firm, such as exists in 
this database, changes in capital and labor can be related to changes in 
output per worker, which subtracts out any constant unobserved fea 
tures that may make one firm more productive than another (such as 
particularly strong market placement, or high quality management).
The potential effects of profit sharing and other company policies on 
output per worker are accounted for after controlling for the effects of 
changes in labor and capital stocks. In this analysis, with up to 20 years 
of data on any firm, there may also be general time trend effects or 
industry growth effects; these are accounted for by the addition of time 
and industry variables to the unpaired estimates, or by looking at dif 
ferences between paired firms within the same industry and year.
Two possible ways in which profit sharing may affect productivity 
are examined here. First, profit sharing may have a simple effect on the 
productivity level, implying an upward or downward jump in produc 
tivity when profit sharing is adopted. Second, profit sharing may have 
an effect on productivity growth after adoption possibly a positive 
effect if employees gradually learn how better to cooperate and 
improve performance, and possibly a negative effect if workers' initial 
optimism is unfulfilled and they gradually return to preadoption levels 
of performance. Both the initial adoption effect and subsequent trend 
effect are reported here.
The potential effects of several other firm characteristics are 
included in all specifications. ESOPs, defined benefit pensions, and 
unions may all have independent effects on productivity, and their 
omission could lead to biased estimates of the effect of profit sharing. 26
A serious problem in estimation involves potential statistical bias 
from self-selection of profit-sharing status by companies. A classic 
experiment would randomly assign firms to profit-sharing or non-
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profit-sharing status, and then compare their performance to obtain 
unbiased estimates of the productivity effect of profit sharing. Random 
assignment of profit sharing in a classic experiment, as desirable as it 
may be for a researcher, is obviously not possible. In a field study, 
when the subjects have been able to select themselves into or out of the 
condition being studied, there is a strong possibility that the selection 
rule is itself related to the outcome being measured. 27 For example, if 
profit-sharing companies are found to have better performance, it may 
be that these companies would have had high performance even in the 
absence of profit sharing (suggested by Poole and Jenkins 1990).
Statistical bias from self-selection may be manifested in many ways. 
Four broad types of statistical bias from self-selection will be 
described here, and appendix 3 describes a variety of statistical meth 
ods to control for several of the biases. The simplest and clearest form 
of statistical bias from self-selection is when companies with pre-exist 
ing high productivity are more likely to select profit sharing. If this is 
the case, a cross-sectional comparison of profit-sharing and non-profit- 
sharing companies will show higher productivity among the profit- 
sharing group, but the profit sharing is not causing the higher produc 
tivity rather, the causality may be reversed. This simple form of sta 
tistical bias from self-selection is controlled by comparing preadoption 
and postadoption productivity levels, as is done here with the panel 
data.
Several forms of statistical bias from self-selection may exist even 
in comparing preadoption and postadoption outcomes. One is that the 
companies selecting profit sharing may have been on an upward 
growth path in productivity, and profit sharing may have played no role 
in stimulating the higher growth. 28 This is a particular problem if there 
are only single observations before and after the adoption; however, 
with multiple observations (as exist in this dataset) the preadoption and 
postadoption trends can be checked.
A third form of statistical bias from self-selection is that companies 
may be undergoing other changes at the time profit sharing is adopted, 
and any productivity changes may be due to these other changes rather 
than to profit sharing.29 Without controlling for these other changes, 
profit sharing may statistically reflect the productivity effects of these 
changes. This potential bias is partially addressed in this study by ask 
ing the firms about the existence and duration of other policies that
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may affect productivity, and by analyzing responses to an open-ended 
question about any significant changes in other policies that accompa 
nied profit-sharing adoption. There nonetheless remains the possibility 
that, at the time of profit-sharing adoption, the company was undergo 
ing other changes in financial and organizational structure that were 
responsible for any changes in productivity.
These three forms of statistical bias from self-selection, therefore, 
address ways in which profit sharing may mistakenly be concluded to 
have a true effect on productivity. A fourth broad form of statistical 
bias from self-selection addressed here posits that profit sharing may in 
fact have a true effect on productivity, but that this effect varies across 
firms. The incentive to adopt profit sharing is clearly strongest where it 
is expected to have the most impact reflecting, perhaps, a particular 
organizational structure, culture, or history into which profit sharing 
meshes well. This implies that, even though profit sharing may have 
helped fuel a productivity increase in some companies, the result can 
not be generalized (i.e., the effect would be much smaller or nonexist 
ent in other companies). This bias is made more plausible by the fact 
that these companies have continued to maintain profit sharing, 
whereas it may have been terminated before the survey date by compa 
nies in which the profit sharing made little difference.30 If this were the 
case, it would nonetheless be of interest that profit sharing helped pro 
ductivity in some companies, and investigation of the circumstances 
that created this effect would be valuable to study.
The first two forms of statistical bias from self-selection are easily 
addressed with panel data, while the second two are not. A variety of 
techniques were employed to statistically correct for such bias (dis 
cussed in appendix 3), using the factors that help predict profit-sharing 
adoption from chapter 2. There were no substantial differences in con 
clusions reached by any of these techniques (reflecting in part the diffi 
culty in finding variables that predicted profit-sharing adoption). For 
the two performance variables that appeared to predict adoption 
(change in stock price and change in profit margin in the two years pre 
ceding adoption), the profit-sharing effects on productivity were calcu 
lated separately for those experiencing positive and negative changes 
in stock price and profit margin, and the results were equivalent. From 
a variety of sources, therefore, statistical bias from self-selection does 
not appear to be strongly influencing these results.
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The results that are presented are restricted to the years 1977 to 
1991. Exclusion of 1970-76 observations was done for two reasons: 
(1) use of a selection term to correct for statistical bias, based on the 
variables predicting profit-sharing adoption (removing the first several 
years of the panel); and (2) substantial concern about the accuracy of 
data on adoptions reported this long ago (in particular, there are sharp 
upward spikes in reported ages of "15" or "20" years, which are likely 
to represent convenient targets for those who are not certain). Results 
employing the entire 1970-91 panel, without the selection term, were 
similar to those reported but indicated slightly lower and more dis 
persed effects of profit-sharing adoption (as would be expected if mea 
surement error is greater for the adoption dates of these earlier plans). 31
Do Profit-Sharing Adoption and Presence Affect Productivity?
A summary of the profit-sharing estimate from the productivity 
regressions is on b'nes 1 and 2 of table 3.3 (based on results in appen 
dix table A3.2). As shown in the first column, the adoption of profit 
sharing was accompanied by an estimated 4.4 percent increase in sales 
per employee, and random sampling error can be ruled out at a 99 per 
cent level of confidence. 32 The within-industry comparison, in column 
2, is almost identical for this productivity measure. 33 Columns 3 and 4 
measure productivity as value-added per employee, where it can be 
seen that the unpaired results are stronger for profit sharing (an esti 
mated 5.0 percent increase) and weaker for the within-industry pairs 
(3.5 percent, where sampling error can be ruled out only at the 90 per 
cent level).
The subsequent trend after profit sharing was adopted is estimated 
as slightly positive but not significantly different from zero in all four 
columns. Therefore one cannot confidently say that there is either a 
positive or negative trend effect associated with profit sharing. A sim 
ple trend effect may, however, be a misleading guide to the postadop- 
tion effects of profit sharing. The productivity effects may be nonlinear 
and may grow either stronger or weaker during the first several years 
after adoption. They may grow stronger if it takes time for employees 
to develop the cooperative effort that is theorized to lie behind a posi-
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live effect of profit sharing. There may be a negative effect, however, if 
initial enthusiasm for profit sharing is not maintained; perhaps the 
innovation raised hopes that were not fulfilled. The preadoption growth 
path should also be examined; it is possible that the firm was simply on 
an upward growth path when profit sharing was adopted, and profit 
sharing may have played little or no role in this.
To examine this, for the firms that adopted profit sharing within the 
sample period, estimates were made of the productivity effects in each 
of three preadoption and postadoption years. The productivity path 
revealed by such estimates is illustrated in figure 3.1 for each of the 
four productivity measures. 34 This figure illustrates the consistent find 
ing of an upward jump in productivity in the year that profit sharing is 
adopted, which is maintained above the levels predicted for nonadopt- 
ers in subsequent years.
Figure 3.1 
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Table 33 Summary Results on Productivity Growth and Profit Sharing
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2. Subsequent trend
Cash vs. deferred plans
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3. Year of adoption
4. Subsequent trend
Deferred profit sharing
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8. Subsequent trend
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11. Year of adoption 2.2 3.3 -1.6 4.4
12. Subsequent trend -1.7 2.4 -2.8 -5.1* 
Other plan formula
13. Year of adoption 1.6 2.9 0.7 1.6
14. Subsequent trend___________________-0.1_______-0.9________-0.4 -1.2
NOTES: Results based on coefficients from regressions listed in last column. All regressions include controls for capital and labor ratios, adoption and
presence of defined benefit plans and ESOPs, and union presence. The unpaired results (columns 1 and 3) contain controls for broad industry trends and
year effects. The paired results (columns 2 and 4) are paired differences between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies within industry and
year.
"'Significantly different from zero at 90 percent level **95 percent level ***99 percent level.
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This figure has two other findings of interest. First, each measure 
indicates a decrease in productivity two years prior to adoption, fol 
lowed by an increase in the preadoption year. This raises the possibility 
that profit sharing was adopted during a rebound from poor perfor 
mance, but leaves open the question of causation profit sharing may 
have helped cause the upward jump in productivity, or it may simply 
reflect a policy which happens to have been adopted during normal 
recovery from poor performance. If profit sharing were purely a symp 
tom of rebounding from poor performance, however, one would not 
expect performance to remain high in subsequent years. 35
Second, while each measure indicates continued productivity 
growth in the year following adoption, three of the four measures in 
figure 3.1 indicate a productivity decrease in the second year. If profit 
sharing is in fact a key cause of the productivity trends, such a decrease 
in the second year may indicate problems in maintaining an initial 
increase in worker performance. 36 However, none of these decreases is 
statistically significant, and they are all followed by further increases in 
productivity in the third year.
Does every adopter of profit sharing experience a productivity 
increase? This is certainly not the case. While the average productivity 
increase in the year of adoption is about 4 percent, between one-fourth 
and one-third of the adopters had no productivity increase beyond that 
predicted by the other factors in the equation. 37
Adoption of defined benefit pensions and ESOPs are both associated 
with small productivity increases (about 0.9 percent to 2.7 percent for 
defined benefit pensions, and 0.3 percent to 1.4 percent for ESOPs), 
but these estimates are not significantly different from zero (results in 
appendix table A3.2). Union presence is estimated to decrease growth 
in sales per employee by about 0.4 percent to 0.8 percent per year, but 
this effect is also not significantly different from zero. 38 The capital and 
labor terms of the production function were strong predictors of pro 
ductivity changes. 39
Additional tests were made measuring profit sharing as proportion 
of employees covered (columns 5-8 in appendix table A3.2). If profit 
sharing does have a positive productivity effect, one would expect this 
effect to be larger as a greater proportion of employees is covered. The 
practicality of estimating this effect, however, is limited by its low 
variance: over 50 percent of the profit-sharing companies include 90
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percent or more of their employees in profit sharing. Results from mea 
suring profit sharing in this way were similar but slightly weaker.40
The finding from table 3.2, that sales/employee jumps upward when 
profit sharing is adopted, is replicated here when controlling for capi 
tal, labor, deferred benefit plans, ESOPs, union presence, and the sam 
ple selection term. The adoption effect is slightly weaker when profit 
sharing is measured as proportion covered. It is notable that the esti 
mated increase in productivity when profit sharing is adopted an 
average of 4.3 percent across the four estimates is remarkably close 
to the 4.4 percent median estimate of effect sizes from other studies. 
The studies surveyed in Weitzman and Kruse (1990) were analyzed for 
the estimated productivity differentials associated with profit shar 
ing the median estimate was 4.4 percent (with a mean of 7.4 percent, 
and lower and upper quartiles of 2.5 percent and 11.0 percent). As 
noted there, "Such estimates strike us as reasonable they are neither 
so small as to be negligible, nor so large as to be implausible when 
adjustment costs are considered" (1990: 138-9).
Do Cash and Deferred Plans Have Different Effects?
It is often theorized that cash plans will be more effective motivators 
for employees, since they provide more immediate rewards. This is 
supported by the expressed motives in table 2.1, where the average 
expressed importance of "motivating existing employees" was slightly 
higher for firms maintaining any cash plans than for firms maintaining 
only deferred plans.41
This theory is supported by the results summarized in table 3.3 
(based on results from appendix table A3.3), that separate profit shar 
ing into cash plans and deferred plans.42 The adoption of cash profit 
sharing is predicted to increase sales per employee by 3.5 percent and 
6.5 percent in the first two estimates (line 3), both effects being signifi 
cant at the 95 percent level. The estimated adoption effects are similar 
in size (3.6 percent and 4.3 percent) when productivity is measured as 
value-added/employee, but sampling error cannot be ruled out for the 
latter result. The postadoption trend effects are close to zero, and can 
not be statistically distinguished from zero.
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None of the estimates on adoption of deferred plans indicate a sig 
nificant change in productivity. The first three columns indicate posi 
tive effects of 0.9 percent to 1.8 percent from adopting deferred profit 
sharing, while the fourth column indicates a small decrease; the trend 
effects are all positive but sampling error can be ruled out for only one 
of them (column 3).43
Does the Profit-Sharing Formula Matter?
There is no set formula among profit-sharing plans for how the com 
pany's profit-sharing contribution should be tied to profits. Several 
common formulas follow, along with the percentage of respondents 
using these formulas from the Profit Sharing Council of America 
(PSCA 1989), and the percentage of participants in deferred plans that 
use these formulas (BLS 1990):
PSCA BLS
Specific percentage of profits 17% 10% 
Specific percentage of profits in excess of amount reserved
for return on stockholder equity 11 % 
Sliding percentage based on profits, sales, or return on
assets 18% 
Percentage of participants' pay 12% 
Specific percentage of profits plus a discretionary amount 7% 
Discretionary amount 46% 40%
Tying the formula to a specific percentage of profits is clearly the 
most straightforward way to link employee rewards to the performance 
of the firm and should, therefore, have the greatest effect on employ 
ees.
The lack of a formula where the employer can simply determine a 
discretionary amount is popular, and is not straightforward to ana 
lyze. There is no guarantee that higher profits will result in higher 
profit-sharing payments, so that the incentive effect would appear very 
weak. In any given period, a firm maximizing short-run profits for
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investors would clearly have an incentive to provide no profit-sharing 
payment to employees. The fact that these plans are maintained, how 
ever, clearly indicates that firms see them as useful and do make contri 
butions to them. There may be a strong relationship between profits 
and contributions to these plans, so that these may clearly be de facto 
profit-sharing plans even if there is no formula tying payments to prof 
its. As will be discussed, it may be that the discretion allows managers 
to provide a better reward for employee performance (subtracting out 
influences on profits from other sources).
The formula that appears least consistent with profit sharing is mak 
ing profit-sharing payments a fixed percentage of participants' pay. 
Taken literally, this implies that "profit-sharing" payments have the 
same relationship to profits as do fixed wages, so that there is nothing 
distinctive about them as a form of compensation. Presumably these 
are called "profit-sharing" payments so that they may be cut more eas 
ily than wages when the company is undergoing financial difficulties. 
This implies, however, only a very weak relationship to profits. Any 
productivity effect would therefore be expected to be much weaker or 
nonexistent.
Profit-sharing firms in the survey being analyzed here were asked 
for the method by which profit-sharing payments were determined. 
The breakdown of methods (for 163 plans in 124 companies reporting) 
was the following:
1. Specific percentage of profits 19.6%
2. Specific percentage of profits in excess of amount reserved for
dividends or retained earnings 3.7%
3. Fully discretionary 22.1 %
4. Specific percentage of profits plus discretionary amount 4.3%
5. Specific percentage of participants' pay 30.1 %
6. Other 34.4%
(Total exceeds 100 percent because more than one method could be listed for each plan)
These responses were classified into four categories so that the rela 
tionship to productivity could be analyzed: (a) payments linked to spe 
cific percentage of profits (1, 2, and 4 from above); (b) payments that 
are fully discretionary (3 from above); (c) payments that are a specific
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percentage of pay (5 from above); and (d) "other" methods (6 from 
above, where the variety prevented any neat classification).
Of the profit-sharing firms, 90 provided data on yearly profit-sharing 
contributions as a percentage of participants' pay. The mean value 
across all reported years was 7.4 percent, with a median of 4.0 percent. 
Correlations between year-to-year changes in contributions and 
changes in profits per employee were calculated. As expected, this cor 
relation was close to zero when a percent-of-pay plan was in place (r = 
-.001). Also as expected, the correlation was positive when a percent- 
of-profits plan was in place (r=.102); somewhat unexpectedly, the cor 
relation was higher for discretionary plans (r=.220).44 Therefore dis 
cretionary plans do appear to operate as de facto profit-sharing plans.
The results of estimating separate productivity effects for different 
formulas are summarized in table 3.3 (based on results presented in 
appendix table A3.4).45 These are based on: 30 companies that main 
tained percent-of-profit plans (15 adopted in sample period), 20 com 
panies that maintained discretionary plans (11 adopted in sample 
period), 23 companies that maintained percent-of-pay plans (12 
adopted in sample period), and 46 companies that maintained plans 
based on other formulas (27 adopted in sample period). Clearly the 
small number of plan adoptions in the sample period limits the ability 
to obtain consistent estimates.
Plan adoption tends to be positively related to productivity for all 
methods (rows 7, 9, 11, and 13), with the only negative estimate 
appearing for percent-of-pay plans (in row 11, column 3). However, 
sampling error cannot be ruled out for most of the estimates. The most 
favorable results appear for discretionary plans: in three of the esti 
mates, the adoption of discretionary plans is associated with significant 
increases in productivity (of 7.7 percent to 10.5 percent). The only 
other statistically significant estimate is for the adoption of percent-of- 
profits plans (an estimate of 7.9 percent in row 7, column 3). Adoption 
of plans with percent-of-pay or other formulas, and the postadoption 
trends, are never associated with significant productivity changes.
With the small number of observations for any plan formula, the 
results are somewhat sensitive to different specifications. In particular, 
expanding the sample slightly by deleting the selection terms for the 
different plan formulas produces results somewhat more favorable to 
percent-of-profits plans. 46
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The pattern of results suggests that percent-of-pay plans do not have 
positive effects on productivity, since there is one negative estimate 
and no significant positive estimates. This is consistent with theory on 
a positive motivational role for profit sharing, since a fixed percent-of- 
pay has little or no relationship to profits. There are stronger indica 
tions that adoptions of percent-of-profit plans and discretionary plans 
have positive productivity effects. The results are most favorable, 
somewhat surprisingly, for discretionary plans. The lack of a specific 
formula may seem to represent a strong drawback for profit-sharing 
plans, since it leaves open the possibility that firms will share very lit 
tle with employees even when employees may have contributed to 
high profits. It is nonetheless possible that the employer's discretion 
may be used to more accurately reward employee efforts, in an atmo 
sphere of high trust. As argued by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1993), 
almost every objective performance measure is subject to contamina 
tion from influences other than the performance it is designed to mea 
sure. In the case of profit sharing, company profits are clearly 
influenced by a large variety of factors other than employee perfor 
mance, such as capital investment, imports, managerial decisions, and 
regulations. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy note that while
an ideal performance measure would reflect an employee's contribution 
to firm value,.. unfortunately, for most employees, contribution to firm 
value is not objectively measurable. ... [I]t sometimes can be subjec 
tively assessed by managers and supervisors who are well placed to 
observe the subtleties of the employee's behavior and opportunities.. . 
[A]n implicit contract based on subjective performance assessments 
may augment or replace an explicit contract based on objective perfor 
mance measurements (1993: 2).
If payments are at the discretion of the employer, there is no written 
contract that can be legally enforced. Noting that "trust between work 
ers and supervisors is essential if subjective performance assessment 
systems are to be successful," Baker and his colleagues show how an 
implicit contract based on subjective assessments can be enforced by 
the firm's concern about its reputation in the labor market. In the con 
text of profit sharing, this implies that companies with high employee 
trust may be able to use discretionary payments to encourage and 
maintain high employee effort and commitment. The high effort and
78 The Productivity Theory
employee trust would be threatened if the employer took advantage of 
the discretion to, for example, pay very little in a year when employees 
have contributed to higher profits.47
This raises two opposing interpretations of the strong upward jump 
in productivity when profit sharing with discretionary payments is 
adopted (before employees have had a chance to observe the com 
pany's pattern of profit-sharing contributions). A first possible interpre 
tation is that, since profit-sharing plans with no formula should not be 
good motivators, it is likely that the profit-sharing variables are simply 
reflecting productivity increases that are due to other factors (as is 
clearly possible with all estimates reported in this chapter). A second 
possible interpretation is that, in a company where there is an atmo 
sphere of trust between employees and employers at the time of adop 
tion, the lack of a profit-sharing formula may not be a hindrance to 
positive effects on employee behavior and relations (i.e., the 
announced profit sharing may build on past trust to make employees 
optimistic about the company's use of profit sharing to reward employ 
ees for better performance).
Does Company Size Matter?
The effect of a group incentive system such as profit sharing is 
strongly predicted to depend upon the size of the group. As described 
earlier, such systems have a 1/N problem (with N representing group 
size), in which the direct individual reward from better individual per 
formance becomes more diluted as the work group grows larger. For 
the group incentive to have a positive effect on group performance, 
some form of cooperative solution to this problem, relying on 
increased monitoring of co-workers and group identification, would 
appear to be necessary. Game theory is silent on how such a solution 
may be established; in a business, it plausibly involves changes in per 
sonnel policies, information-sharing, and employee relations to 
increase employee identification with co-workers and the company.
The establishment of such a cooperative solution may be easier in a 
small company, in which any one employee is more likely to have per 
sonal contact with top managers and with a greater proportion of the
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workforce. Personnel policies may be more quickly established and 
adapted to maintain employee identification with co-workers and the 
company. In combination with the 1/N problem, this consideration pre 
dicts that profit sharing is more likely to have a positive effect on per 
formance in small companies.
To the extent that personnel policies and information-sharing have 
large fixed costs, the establishment and maintenance of such policies 
may be done more easily and costlessly in a large company. In addi 
tion, larger companies may have more experienced employee relations 
staffs who are better able to coordinate profit sharing with other per 
sonnel policies. Finally, to the extent that worker behavior is affected 
not by the size of the performance-pay link, but instead by the exist 
ence of such a link, company size may not be a crucial variable large 
size may not be a strong disadvantage as predicted by the 1/N problem.
To examine the relationship of profit sharing and work group size, 
the sample of profit-sharing adopters was split into five groups. These 
groups were defined by employment size at the time of profit-sharing 
adoption, for which the lowest decile, lower quartile, median, and 
upper quartile were, respectively, 775, 1681, 4599, and 17,600. These 
four cut-offs were used to create five groups, and the adoption and 
presence of profit sharing were interacted with group membership. In 
addition, the terms of the production function were interacted with 
group membership, to allow different production functions by group 
size. Because there were very few cases in which paired firms fell into 
the same employment size class, reliable results for the paired sample 
could not be obtained.
The employment size class results are summarized in table 3.4 
(based on results in appendix table A3.5). In the smallest size class, the 
productivity effect of profit-sharing adoption is large and highly signif 
icant (11.1 percent and 17.2 percent, where sampling error can be ruled 
out at the 99 percent level). The subsequent presence of profit sharing, 
however, is not estimated to have any significant effect on productivity 
growth. The second and fourth size classes show no significant esti 
mates of profit-sharing adoption or subsequent trend, while the third 
size class shows a weakly significant estimate of a 4.2 percent increase 
in sales per employee when profit sharing is adopted, and a 2.2 percent 
trend in value-added per employee. The fifth and largest size class
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Yearly growth in sales Yearly growth in value- 
per employee added per employee
Within- Within- 
industry industry 
Unpaired pairs Unpaired pairs 
Contribution size (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimated productivity effects 
(percent)
PS plans with low mean employer contributions
Year of adoption 1.4 -1.9 2.1 -1.9
Subsequent trend 0.8 -1.4 0.8 -3.2
PS plans with high mean employer contributions
Year of adoption 13.1*** 10.7* 7.3* 10.0
Subsequent trend 4.4** -0.3 2.9 -1.1*
For those reporting profit-sharing contribution as a percentage of participant 
payroll, the mean figure for each company was calculated. The median of these 
figures was 3.62 percent. A mean contribution less (greater) than 3.62 percent 
was designated as a "low" ("high") mean employer contribution.
NOTES: All regressions include controls for capital and labor ratios, adoption and presence of defined benefit plans and ESOPs, and union presence. The 
unpaired results (columns 1, 2, 3, 5) contain controls for broad industry trends and year effects. The paired results (columns 4, 6) are paired differences 
between profit-sharing and nonprofit-sharing companies within industry and year. Paired results could not be computed for size classes due to inadequate 
observations. For regression results, see appendix tables A3.5 and A3.6. 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence **95 percent confidence level ***99 percent confidence level.
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shows significant effects of profit-sharing adoption of 6.9 percent and 
5.8 percent.
The result that profit-sharing adoption is estimated to have the 
strongest productivity effects in the smallest size class is consistent 
with the above considerations about the 1/N problem and the relative 
ease of establishing a cooperative solution in a small work group. The 
result that smaller, but still highly significant, productivity effects are 
estimated in the largest size class is not consistent with these consider 
ations. It may be that, as noted above, there are fixed costs in estab 
lishing and maintaining personnel policies conducive to a positive 
effect of profit sharing; therefore large companies may be more likely 
to have these in place or be able to adopt them along with profit shar 
ing. In addition, the larger companies may have more experienced 
employee relations staffs. Finally, as discussed above, it may be that 
the existence of profit sharing creates a psychological stake in the 
company apart from the direct financial stake, so that increased 
employer size may not be a strong liability. It is possible that these 
productivity jumps may be traced to profit-sharing adoption. Nonethe 
less, given the minute contingency between employee effort and profit 
share in large companies, and the small proportion of fellow workers 
with whom an employee would interact, it is somewhat difficult to 
believe that adoption of profit sharing would cause productivity to 
increase by over 6 percent in such very large firms.
Does Size of the Profit Share Matter?
The size of the profit share in relation to other employee compensa 
tion should clearly be an important factor in the impact of profit shar 
ing upon workplace relations and performance. A profit share that, for 
example, averages less than 1 percent of employee compensation is 
unlikely to be taken seriously by employees as an incentive for 
increased effort, monitoring, and cooperation with co-workers.
What size of profit share is necessary to improve employee perfor 
mance is an open question. For this study, profit-sharing firms were 
asked to provide the size of the employer's profit-sharing contribution 
as a percentage of participant payroll for the years 1975-90. Of respon-
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dents, 71 firms provided three or more years' worth of data. The aver 
age contribution was calculated for each of these 71 firms. Of these 71 
average contributions, the mean was 4.95 percent, the median was 3.63 
percent, and the upper and lower quartiles were 1.98 percent and 7.35 
percent.
To examine the relationship between productivity and bonus size, 
one could simply enter the yearly bonus size as an explanatory variable 
in the productivity equation. This approach, however, would be 
strongly plagued by a statistical bias of simultaneity (reflecting reverse 
causality): an increase in productivity will clearly lead to larger 
bonuses in a given year, whether or not the bonus size has any direct 
effect on productivity. What is desired is a measure of company policy 
regarding size of contributions does the company intend profit shares 
to be a large chunk of employee compensation? To minimize the 
simultaneity bias, profit-sharing firms were divided into two groups: 
those with "high" and "low" average contributions (as percentages of 
payroll, with separate selection terms for these two groups). The cut 
off between these two groups was defined as the median average con 
tribution of 3.63 percent i.e., a high-contribution firm was defined as 
one that provided, on average, profit-sharing contributions exceeding 
3.63 percent of participants' payroll. By not focusing on each year's 
bonus size and by using separate selection terms for the two groups, 
the simultaneity bias is minimized, and the membership in high- or 
low-contribution groups comes closer to a measure of company policy 
on size of profit shares in relation to compensation.48
If profit sharing does positively affect productivity, the effect is 
clearly expected to be larger where it represents a higher percentage of 
pay. The results summarized in table 3.4 (based on estimates in appen 
dix table A3.6) are consistent with this expectation. The adoption of a 
low-contribution plan is never estimated to have a significant associa 
tion with productivity change, while the adoption of a high-contribu 
tion plan is estimated to have significant associations with 7 percent to 
13 percent increases in productivity in columns 3 to 5 (and a nonsignif 
icant 10 percent increase in column 6). A strong positive postadoption 
association with productivity growth is found in column 3, but not in 
the other columns (in fact, a significant negative trend is found in col 
umn 6).
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Therefore the limited available data on size of profit-sharing contri 
bution is consistent with the expectation that a policy of larger contri 
butions will have more positive productivity effects. No significant 
effects were detected for either the adoption or presence of a low-con 
tribution plan, and the signs of several of these estimates were nega 
tive. In contrast, the adoption effects were all large and positive for 
high-contribution plans.
Is Profit Sharing a Proxy for Other Company Policies?
A serious problem with nonexperimental data is that the variable of 
interest may be strongly correlated with, and may act as a proxy for, 
other variables that affect the observed outcome. Firms that adopt 
profit sharing may also adopt a variety of other policies designed to 
improve company performance. There are two fundamental ways in 
which these other policies may affect company performance, by hav 
ing: (1) direct effects on performance, or (2) interactive effects with 
profit sharing.
If profit-sharing firms adopt other policies that have direct effects on 
performance but are not measured in the equation, profit sharing may 
act as a proxy for these variables and attract a positive significant esti 
mate even if profit sharing itself has no effect on performance. (The 
estimated profit-sharing effect may be unduly high because of bias 
from the omitted variables.) In addition, profit sharing may be associ 
ated with differences in managerial quality, representing another possi 
ble omitted variable. This potential bias is a standard criticism of the 
positive results for profit sharing represented by the studies in table 
3.1.
This section will address whether profit sharing is simply reflecting 
other company policies or management changes that may in fact be the 
important influences on productivity, while the following sections will 
address whether such policies interact with profit sharing to influence 
performance.
The use of longitudinal data to analyze yearly changes in productiv 
ity levels will automatically control for the effects of any company 
characteristics, such as constant high-quality management, that affect
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productivity levels but do not change over time. The obvious case in 
which managerial quality may not be constant is where there is a sig 
nificant change in management personnel. Profit-sharing firms in this 
study were asked, "Was the profit-sharing plan adopted following a 
change in management personnel?" Of the 122 respondents, four (3.3 
percent) answered affirmatively. This makes it highly unlikely that the 
profit-sharing adoption variable is measuring significant changes in 
managerial quality.
The policies identified here as being particularly likely to compete 
or interact with profit sharing are those that seek to increase involve 
ment of the employee in the company by tapping employee ideas, 
opinions, and decisionmaking skills. There has been substantial exper 
imentation with such policies over the 1970s and 1980s (see, e.g., 
Lawler, Ledford, and Mohrman 1989; and Eaton and Voos 1992). Such 
policies may improve company performance both directly through 
making use of employee information and skills and indirectly by 
increasing employee identification with the company, which may 
reduce turnover and improve both quality and quantity of work.
Survey respondents were asked about the presence, age, and cover 
age of seven company policies. Two policies that solicit employee 
ideas and opinions are employee surveys and suggestion systems. 
Three policies that seek to change the structure of work are job enrich 
ment, self-managed work teams, and employee involvement programs 
such as quality circles.49 Gainsharing plans represent an alternative 
group incentive system, typically increasing employee involvement in 
production decisions and tying employee bonuses not to overall com 
pany performance but to more narrowly-defined group performance. 50 
Finally, a formal policy of employment security attempts to increase 
employee identification with the company and willingness to share 
information. 51 The definitions provided to survey respondents of these 
seven policies were based on the General Accounting Office's 1987 
survey of employee involvement efforts in Fortune 1000 firms. These 
definitions are presented in table 3.5, with the percentages of profit- 
sharing and non-profit-sharing firms who maintain these policies in 
table 1.3. 52
Tests of the effects of the adoption and presence of these policies are 
presented in appendix table A3.8 (with descriptive statistics in appen 
dix table A3.7). 53 Results are presented both with simple measures of
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Table 3.5 Definitions of Personnel Policies
The term in capital letters is the one used in the tables presented here, followed by the term pre 
sented to survey respondents, and the definition made available to respondents. (Definitions are 
based largely upon the 1987 General Accounting Office survey of employee involvement in For 
tune 1000 companies.)
SURVEY: Attitude survey feedback. Use of employee attitude survey results, not simply as an 
employee opinion poll, but rather as part of a larger problemsolving process in which survey data 
are used to encourage, structure, and measure the effectiveness of employee participation.
JOB ENRICHMENT: Job enrichment and redesign. Design of work that is intended to increase 
worker performance and job satisfaction by increasing skill variety, autonomy, significance and 
identity of the task, and performance feedback.
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT: Employee involvement groups, such as Quality Circles or 
other formal committees. Structured type of employee participation groups in which groups of 
volunteers from a particular work area meet regularly to identify and suggest improvements to 
work-related problems. The goals are improved quality and performance: there is no direct 
reward, group problemsolving training is provided, and the groups' only power is to suggest 
changes to management.
AUTO. WORKTEAM: Self-managed work teams. Also termed autonomous work groups, 
semi-autonomous work groups, self-regulating work teams, or simply work teams. The work 
group (in some cases acting without a supervisor) is responsible for the whole product or service, 
and makes decisions about task assignments and work methods. The team may be responsible for 
its own support services such as maintenance, purchasing, and quality control, and may perform 
certain personnel functions such as hiring and firing team members and determining pay 
increases.
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY: Company policy designed to prevent layoffs.
SUGGESTING SYSTEM: Company system of soliciting employee suggestions for improved 
performance.
GAINSHARING: Productivity-related Group Bonuses. Plans based on a formula that shares 
some portion of gains in productivity, quality, cost effectiveness, or other performance indicators. 
The gains are shared in the form of bonuses with all employees in an organization (such as a 
plant). It typically includes a system of employee suggestion committees. It differs from profit 
sharing or an ESOP in that the basis of the formulas is some set of local performance measures, 
not company profits. Examples include the Scanlon Plan, the Improshare Plan, the Rucker Plan, 
and various custom-designed plans.
For each policy, survey respondents were asked about its presence and age, as well as percent 
age of corporate employees and (for profit-sharing companies) of profit-sharing participants who 
participate. The percentage figures were categorized as None (0 percent), Some (1-40 percent), 
About half (41-60 percent), Most (61-99 percent), or All (100 percent). "Proportion covered" for 
table 3.16, and columns 5-8 of tables 3.13 and 3.14, were computed from these five categories as, 
respectively, .00, .20, .50, .80, and 1.0.
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each policy's existence (in columns 1-4), and with proportions of 
employees covered by each policy (in columns 5 to 8).
The results are not summarized in a separate table because they are 
so easily summarized in text: the profit-sharing estimates change negli 
gibly with the addition of the other policy variables. 54 Estimates on the 
personnel policies are of interest in themselves. Across the eight col 
umns, there are no estimates indicating a significant positive effect of 
adoption or presence of these seven policies. One negative estimate 
attains the standard level of significance at which sampling error is 
ruled out (adoption of job enrichment in column 4), but in the absence 
of a clear pattern this is very weak evidence.55 There is no clear evi 
dence of productivity effects for these individual policies.56
Does Information-Sharing Enhance Profit-sharing Effects?
While sharing sensitive business information with employees may 
have positive or negative consequences for the firm (see, e.g., Kleiner 
and Bouillon 1988, 1991), it is commonly believed that profit-sharing 
plans have more positive effects when the companies make extra 
efforts to share information with employees. Such information-sharing 
is a plausible part of establishing and maintaining worker norms in the 
cooperative solution to the problem of diluted individual incentives.
Survey respondents were asked, "About how many corporation 
employees, excluding top management, are routinely provided with: a. 
Information about the company's overall operating results; b. Informa 
tion on business plans and goals; and c. Information on competitors' 
relative performance?"57 From this the approximate proportions of 
employees provided with such information were constructed. 58 As can 
be seen in table 1.3, profit-sharing companies, on average, provided 
more of this information to their employees (85.3 percent compared to 
83.4 percent for operating results, 61.8 percent compared to 57.5 per 
cent for business plans and goals, and 30.4 percent compared to 24.6 
percent for competitors' performance), but none of the paired differ 
ences indicated that sampling error could be ruled out.
The key question examined in this section is whether information- 
sharing interacts with profit sharing in affecting company perfor-
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mance. 59 The three information-sharing variables are interacted with 
profit sharing and added to the standard productivity equations. The 
results, in appendix table A3.9, include profit-sharing adoption and 
presence without the interactions; therefore the interaction estimates 
represent productivity effects on top of the "main" (noninteracted) 
effect60
As with the personnel policy results, a summary can easily be pre 
sented in text. Interactions of the first two types of information-sharing 
with profit sharing have no significant associations with productivity 
growth. The third type of information-sharing on competitors' perfor 
mance has an intriguing interaction with profit-sharing adoption in 
significantly increasing sales per employee, but no significant relation 
ship with value-added per employee. This is the type of information 
that is least likely to be shared with employees by any firms, and with 
which there is the largest association with profit sharing as noted in 
table 1.3, the average percentage of employees provided with this 
information is 4.6 percent higher for profit-sharing than for non-profit- 
sharing firms. There is greater dispersion on this variable than on the 
first two types of information-sharing: of the firms that adopted profit 
sharing in the sample period, 96 percent shared each of the first two 
types of information with at least some employees, while only 70 per 
cent shared information on competitors' performance with at least 
some employees. The results here provide some weak evidence that the 
productivity increases are greater for the profit-sharing adopters that 
share information with employees on competitors' performance. Given 
that this result is strongly significant in only one of the four estimates, 
and that the estimated effect sizes vary considerably, it should not be 
taken as strong evidence.61
The lack of strong evidence that sharing these three types of infor 
mation enhances the effects of profit sharing can be interpreted in sev 
eral ways. First, and most obviously, it may be that information- 
sharing does not enhance the effects of profit sharing. Second, it is pos 
sible that the information measured here is superfluous; the size of the 
profit share is an important signal of company performance, and there 
are many informal ways in which employees gain company perfor 
mance information in their daily work (through news reports, union 
negotiations, existence and severity of layoffs, etc.). Third, it is clearly 
possible that more detailed measures of information sharing includ-
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ing not only different types of information but also different mecha 
nisms for its distribution would produce different results.
Does Profit Sharing Interact with Other Personnel Policies?
Profit sharing may need to be combined with other personnel poli 
cies to create group cooperation for improved company performance. 
Theory suggests the need for other policies to counteract individual 
disincentives in a group incentive plan, and case study material often 
emphasizes the importance of combining profit sharing with such poli 
cies (see, e.g., Gross and Bacher 1993; Doherty, Nord, and McAdams 
1989 for gainsharing case studies; more generally, see Huselid 1992 
and Ichniowski 1992 on synergy among human resource policies). In 
general, the prescribed policies seek to tap the ideas and skills of 
employees, thereby increasing the involvement and identification of 
the employee in the workplace and company. The results of Fitzroy 
and Kraft (1987) support the idea that worker participation in decisions 
may enhance the productivity effects of profit sharing, while Quarrey 
and Rosen (1986), U.S. GAO (1987), and Rooney (1992) suggest that 
such participation may enhance the performance of ESOP companies.
Two types of data are used here to address the possibility of interac 
tions between profit sharing and other policies. First, the seven person 
nel policies that were earlier analyzed as potential "omitted variables" 
in the productivity equations are tested for interactions with profit shar 
ing in affecting performance. Second, profit-sharing companies were 
asked what other changes in personnel policies and compensation were 
made when profit sharing was adopted.
Profit-sharing companies were asked, for each of the seven person 
nel policies, what approximate percentage of the profit-sharing partici 
pants were covered by this policy. The mean percentages covered 
(including zeros for those without the policy) are presented in table 1.3 
(e.g., among profit-sharing companies, an unweighted average of 21.6 
percent of profit-sharing participants are covered by employee sur 
veys). The proportion covered was interacted with the presence of both 
profit sharing and the personnel policy for each company in each year, 
and this was used to create variables for both the adoption and trend
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effects of combining profit sharing with a particular policy.62 For exam 
ple, the adoption of the interaction between employee surveys and 
profit sharing indicates that both were present in the given year, while 
at least one was not present in the preceding year. In addition to these 
interactions, the simple profit-sharing adoption and presence variables 
were included in the specifications.63
Results on personnel policy interactions with the profit-sharing vari 
ables are presented in appendix table A3.10. Once again, these are not 
separately summarized in a table because the bottom line is simple: 
there is very little support for the idea that these policies interact with 
profit sharing in affecting company performance. The simple (non- 
interacted) profit-sharing adoption estimates are similar in magnitude 
and significance levels to the results without personnel policy interac 
tions, and the majority of estimates do not indicate that these policies 
add to, or subtract from, the main effect. Employee involvement is the 
only policy that may interact positively with profit sharing, since it 
shows one weakly significant estimate (in column 2) and the other esti 
mates are all positive (in columns 1, 3, and 4, unlike the pattern for all 
other interactions).
Positive effects of such an interaction is consistent with case study 
material and prescriptive literature emphasizing the importance of 
drawing workers into decisionmaking, but the results here must be 
regarded as very weak. There are two negative estimates of adopting 
profit sharing with an employment security policy, probably indicating 
that these policies were adopted when the firms were undergoing finan 
cial stress.
A finding reported earlier is that the positive adoption effects of 
profit sharing are concentrated among the very smallest and very larg 
est firms. What personnel policies were in effect in these firms at the 
time of adoption? A comparison revealed no strong differences among 
the different size classes, with the exception that employee involve 
ment programs were somewhat more prevalent among the largest 
adopters.64 This again suggests that the 1/N problem may be overcome 
in large companies through a combination with other policies to gain 
greater employee input; however, the general lack of differences in 
policies among firm sizes casts further doubt on the idea that these pol 
icies have important interactions with profit sharing.
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The presence of error in measuring the age or substance of these 
policies will bias the estimates toward zero. If there were a "true" posi 
tive effect of the interaction of profit sharing with a particular policy, 
though, it is likely that the pattern of estimates would remain positive. 
This pattern remains positive only for the employee involvement esti 
mates; none of the others are uniformly positive across all four esti 
mates, suggesting it is unlikely that a true positive effect is being 
mismeasured.65
The second method for testing interactions between profit sharing 
and personnel policies relied on the survey question to profit-sharing 
respondents:
When the profit-sharing plan was established, were any significant 
changes made in personnel policies or other compensation? (If yes: 
Please describe these changes.)
As shown in table 1.3, one-sixth (17.3 percent) of the profit-sharing 
respondents replied yes, one-fourth (26.0 percent) could not answer, 
and the remainder (56.7 percent) replied no.
The profit-sharing adoption and presence variables were interacted 
with two dummy variables indicating "yes" and "no" responses to the 
above question (excluding those who could not answer). The resulting 
variables were used in the productivity specifications in place of the 
standard profit-sharing variables, and the results are summarized in 
table 3.6.
Estimated productivity growth is higher for profit-sharing adoption 
when significant changes had been made in personnel policies or other 
compensation. When such changes were made, the initial productivity 
effect of profit sharing is estimated as 6.1 percent to 7.5 percent (all 
significantly different from zero at 90 percent level), while the corre 
sponding estimates when such changes were not made were 0.8 per 
cent to 3.7 percent (only two of which were significantly different from 
zero). All estimates for postadoption trends in productivity were esti 
mated as positive for both groups, though were not strongly significant.
It appears that the productivity increase is higher when profit-shar 
ing adoption is accompanied by other significant changes. What is the
Table 3.6 Summary Results on Significant Changes Accompanying Profit Sharing_________________
Profit-sharing companies were asked, "When the profit-sharing plan was estabh'shed, were any significant changes made in personnel 
policies or other compensation?" "Yes" and "no" answers are interacted with profit-sharing adoption and subsequent trend.
Yearly growth in sales per employee
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NOTES: All regressions include controls for capital and labor ratios, adoption and presence of defined benefit plans and ESOPs, and union presence. The 
unpaired results (columns 1 and 3) contain controls for broad industry trends and year effects. The paired results (columns 2 and 4) are paired differences 
between profit-sharing and nonprofit-sharing companies within industry and year. Based on regressions presented in appendix table A3.11. 
*Significantly different from zero at 90 percent confidence level **95 percent confidence level ***99 percent confidence level.
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nature of these other changes? The 37 open-ended answers that were 
solicited from the respondents were coded in the following categories:
Change in incentive plans
1. Replaced a different incentive plan 7
2. Added another incentive plan 2
3. Combined or extended existing incentive plans 6 
Changes in wages or benefits
4. Replaced pension plan 2
5. Established in lieu of wage increase 2
6. Part of effort to reduce fixed costs 3
7. Improvement in other benefit 1
8. Technical changes in other benefits 6
9. Part of labor negotiations 3 
Other
10. Part of new training program 1
11. Part of new "working smarter" philosophy 1
12. Company went public 1
13. Company recovering from bankruptcy 1
14. Part of a merger 1
This distribution of responses provides no clear pattern concerning 
the types of changes that may enhance the effectiveness of profit shar 
ing. Changes in existing incentive plans were reported by 15 of the 
respondents (categories 1, 2, and 3 above). Changes in wages or bene 
fits were reported by 17, with four of these changes representing unam 
biguous sacrifices by employees (categories 4 and 5). The combination 
of profit sharing with changes in noncompensation policies is clear 
only for the two companies in categories 10 and 11. While these 
responses provide a useful portrait of the circumstances under which 
profit sharing is adopted, there is no clear answer to the question of 
what types of policies may enhance the performance of profit sharing.
Summary and conclusions regarding the productivity theory will be 
presented in chapter 5.
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NOTES
1. If worker effort is public knowledge, profit sharing that is proportionate to individual effort 
can produce excess incentives (Sen 1966; Israelsen 1980). For further discussion of alternatives 
under costly supervision, see Parsons (1986), Calvo (1987), Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988), 
and Lazear (1992).
2. See Lawler (1971) for a summary of studies showing the development of adversarial rela 
tions between system designers and employees when piece rate systems are put into place.
3. "[I]n the absence of any relationship between the success of the organization and the pay of 
individuals, an important part of the business experience for the individual is missing. Everything 
known about motivation clearly points out that it is greatest when people have both a psychologi 
cal and a financial stake in the organization's success" (Lawler 1987: 85).
4. An additional perspective on the dilution of individual incentives through the 1/N problem 
concerns the perception of the actual performance-pay link. Brickley and Hevert (1991) use pros 
pect theory to argue that employees may systematically overweight the likelihood that their 
actions will affect firm value. While this may mitigate the 1/N problem in small groups, it would 
seem less plausible in groups of thousands of employees.
5. Alchian and Demsetz mention the "public good" benefits of loyalty and "team spirit," but 
these play no role in their analysis.
6. This problem is in some respects parallel to the theorized disincentive for investment within 
a labor-managed firm (Furubotn and Pejovich 1970; summarized by Bonin and Putterman 1987). 
In such a firm, if workers cannot receive the capitalized value of the firm's investments upon leav 
ing the firm, there will be a tendency to favor investments with a short-run payoff. Such a labor- 
managed firm may underinvest because the investment returns would be shared with future 
employees, while the capitalist profit-sharing firm may underinvest because the investment 
returns are shared with current employees.
7. If the higher labor quality can be traced to the profit-sharing plan, this may be a strong argu 
ment for individual firms to adopt profit sharing, though the advantage would clearly decline as 
other firms adopted profit sharing.
8. An employee's calculation of income risk would include not only the risk from variability 
of profit-sharing payments, but also the risk of layoff. If profit- sharing companies are less likely 
to close, or are otherwise less likely to lay workers off in the face of demand shocks (as predicted 
by the stability theory, to be explored in the following chapter), then risk-averse workers may 
instead be attracted to profit-sharing companies. For a discussion of compensation and risk, see 
Parsons (1986).
9. See Weitzman and Kruse (1990) for a summary of findings. For additional research findings 
see Profit Sharing Research Foundation (1989). For a more general review of employee attitudes 
under profit sharing, employee ownership, quality circles, and autonomous work groups, see 
Kelly and Kelly (1991).
10. Their regression controls for size, industry demand, percent labor costs, and unionism. 
The ^-statistics on the profit- sharing variables were 1.4 and 1.6.
11. The authors note that average investor returns were significantly higher for the preadop- 
tion group than for other non-profit-sharing companies, and suggest that the "market may have 
anticipated a positive productivity effect" (though there is no information on when profit sharing 
was announced) (1990:180).
12. Such as Cobb-Douglas, constant elasticity of substitution (CES), or translog functions.
13. This table is updated and adapted from table 4 in Weitzman and Kruse (1990). It does not 
include studies of productivity-gainsharing plans such as Scanlon and Rucker plans (Schuster
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1983, 1984), and IMPROSHARE (Fein 1981, 1983; Globerson and Parsons 1987; Kaufman 
1992). For gainsharing case studies see the meta-analysis in Bullock and Tubbs (1990), as well as 
Robertson and Osuorah (1991), Markham et al. (1992), Masternak (1991/92), Masternak and 
Ross (1992), Gowen (1990), and Hansen and Watson (1990). This review is based on all pub 
lished studies that could be located in books or in economic, personnel, and business journals 
(using searches up through June 1993 of the Business Periodicals Index and the computerized 
databases ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and Business Dateline), and on unpublished 
studies made available by colleagues.
14. These studies used instrumental variable techniques to account for the endogeneity of 
profit-sharing status. Several studies used instrumental variables for the labor and/or capital stock, 
although not for profit sharing (numbers 1, 4,18, and 25).
15. Only two negative coefficients have /-statistics lower than -2, as found by Carstensen, 
Gerlach, and Hubler (1992) in their estimates with industry controls, when they use profit share 
divided by profits in predicting value-added. The authors note that this measure is contaminated 
by the influence of productivity on the denominator of the measure, and the opposite result is 
obtained (with significant positive coefficients) when profit sharing is measured as profit share per 
employee.
16. Each of these coefficients have /-statistics greater than 2, indicating that there is less than a 
5 percent chance that the true coefficient is zero and the estimate is due to random sampling error. 
The overall positive results are also reflected in the specifications with interactions and lagged 
values (see note at bottom of table 3.1).
17. Of the 26 studies, 16 had been or are being published.
18. Additional evidence comes from Smith (Forthcoming), who examines financial perfor 
mance of Italian cooperatives and finds it to be higher among firms which stress production 
knowledge of employees, high quality products, and specialized corporate alliances.
19. Stock market reactions have often been studied in announcements of managerial compen 
sation plans (see, e.g., Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease 1985, and Tehranian and Waeglenin 1985).
20. Standard and Poor's CompuStat reports labor expenses for less than one-fourth of the 
companies. Value-added is the value of final output minus the value of nonlabor inputs. Com 
puStat reports "cost of goods sold" which includes labor and rental expense as well as material 
inputs. Since labor and rental expense are part of value-added, these data were required for calcu 
lation of value-added as Sales - (cost of goods sold - labor costs - rental expense). Labor costs 
were imputed in the following way. Average compensation per employee for the industry was cal 
culated from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data. For the firms reporting labor 
costs, independent variables used to predict ln(total labor costs) in the firm in year / were the log 
arithm of average industry compensation in t and / - 1, logarithm of sales in t and t - 1, logarithm 
of employment in t and t - 1, and eight industry dummies. This regression used 3283 observations, 
and had an /^-squared of .982. The coefficients on these variables were then used to predict labor 
costs in the firms for which labor costs were not reported. This number was used in the above 
equation for the calculation of value-added.
21. None of the /-statistics indicate statistical significance at even a 90 percent level. It is 
clearly possible that profit-sharing plans existed in 1975 that were terminated before the survey 
date and were therefore not recorded in this survey. Thus either the non-profit-sharing or profit- 
sharing groups may be misclassified as not having profit sharing in earlier years. While this intro 
duces measurement error in the comparisons, it is not likely to produce any systematic biases. 
Data on terminated plans were not collected due to a substantial concern about the quality of the 
data. It is unusual for respondents to the phone survey to have been in their positions for more 
than a few years; therefore their direct knowledge about earlier-terminated plans would be sus-
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pect, and a request to look up old records on terminated plans would have resulted in greatly 
diminished response rates.
22. These values represent trimmed means, where the highest 1 percent and lowest 1 percent 
of values have been excluded so that the means are not unduly influenced by these outliers.
23. A1975 cut-off point was chosen for the comparisons since it allows a comparison of sev 
eral preadoption and post- adoption values for the adopters.
24. Average yearly growth in the GNP deflator was 6.0 percent, and in the Consumer Price 
Index was 6.2 percent
25. Though only the former difference is statistically significant at the 90 percent level.
26. For research on the productivity effects of ESOPs see Conte and Svejnar (1990), of pen 
sions see Alien and Clark (1987) and Gustman and Mitchell (1992), and of unions see Hirsch 
(1991). All specifications account for the adoption and subsequent trend effects of defined benefit 
pensions and ESOPs, and the trend effects of unions. The variables representing defined benefit 
plans and ESOPs were constructed from the 1988 Form 5500 pension tapes, which include both 
the beginning year and the number of participants in these plans. The proportion covered by each 
plan is projected back to the beginning dates of the plans an assumption which will result in 
some downward bias of the coefficients if there is mismeasurement of the true proportion cov 
ered, but is unlikely to produce systematic error. Companies were only asked about union status at 
the survey date; the gains from identifying changes in union status were felt to be very small.
27. Treatments of selection bias in economic studies include Heckman (1976, 1979, 1990), 
Maddala (1983), Heckman and Robb (1985), Manski (1989), and Heckman and Hotz (1989).
28. This is known as a selection-maturation interaction (Cook and Campbell 1979).
29. Referred to as an interaction between selection and history, or "local history" (Cook and 
Campbell 1979).
30. The survey did not ask about terminated plans and policies, due to substantial concern 
about biases and inaccuracies in reporting on benefits and policies that no longer exist (particu 
larly if they were not terminated recently and the respondent may not have been with the company 
or in a position to know of the policy). Future survey data from these companies can, however, be 
used to create a more reliable database that includes terminated plans.
31. Taking all reported ages as accurate, the estimated adoption effects range from 2.3 percent 
to 4.1 percent (to be compared with row 1 of table 3.3). Removing plans with reported ages of 15 
or 20 years produces a wider range of estimates: 3.0 percent to 5.5 percent (all statistically signif 
icant at p <.05).
32. The value of using panel data, which subtracts out constant firm factors that may affect 
productivity, is illustrated by comparing these results with simple cross-sectional estimates. Using 
the same explanatory variables specified as levels rather than as yearly changes, cross-sectional 
regressions for each year produce an average productivity difference of 6.0 percent between 
profit-sharing and non-profit- sharing firms, representing an upward bias due to the effect of con 
stant firm factors.
33. For the paired results, the value of each variable for the non-profit-sharing firm was sub 
tracted from the value for the profit-sharing firm, so that a positive value indicates that the profit- 
sharing firm exceeds its pair on this variable. This technique was also employed by Freeman and 
Kleiner (1990) in their study of union drives.
The sample size is substantially smaller for the paired regressions, primarily because each 
observation represents a pair of firms rather than a single firm.
34. This figure is based on the variables and samples used in regressions 1 to 4 of appendix 
table A3.2, but with separate dummy variables for each of the three preadoption and postadoption 
years.
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35. The statistical regression threat to validity is that outliers will tend to return to mean values 
over time, and policies adopted when performance is especially high or low may have no role in 
the return to mean values. Such a threat is unlikely in this case, since the productivity jump is not 
returning the adopter to mean values, but is putting the adopter at a higher-than-predicted level 
which does not subsequently return to low levels. It is nonetheless possible that profit sharing was 
adopted along with other changes that keep productivity at high levels.
The regression threat is also discounted by the finding that the especially poor performers in 
year t -2 did not have especially high productivity jumps in the adoption year; in fact, the adop 
tion-year productivity increases were similar between those adopters above and below the median 
productivity change in / - 2.
Productivity changes in years t- 2 and t - I were used to explain profit-sharing adoption with 
the other independent variables in the specifications of chapter 2 and were never statistically sig 
nificant predictors.
36. This could possibly indicate a "Hawthorne effect," in which changes in performance are 
due to the novelty of a new treatment rather than to its substance.
37. The basic productivity specifications were run without the profit-sharing variables, and the 
residuals were analyzed for years in which profit sharing was adopted. In the four specifications, 
the percentages of profit-sharing adopters with positive residuals were, respectively: 69.5 percent, 
72.7 percent, 60.0 percent, and 68.2 percent. Of the adopters, the lower quartile of residuals at the 
time of adoption ranged from -1.1 percent to -3.7 percent, while the upper quartile ranged from 
10.2 percent to 12.2 percent. In other words, approximately one-fourth of adopters had productiv 
ity increases exceeding 10 percent, while one-fourth had productivity changes worse than -2 per 
cent.
The dispersion of the residual was equivalent between the entire sample and the observations 
representing profit-sharing adoption. For regression 1, the standard deviation of the residual for 
the entire sample was .101, and the inter-quartile range was .103 (from -.051 to .052), compared 
to figures of, respectively, .115 and .126 for the profit-sharing adoption observations.
This technique has the advantage of providing a conservative estimate of the effect of profit 
sharing, since any collinearity between profit-sharing and other variables is attributed to the other 
variables. The mean residuals for profit-sharing adopters in their year of adoption were: 3.9 per 
cent, 4.0 percent, 4.0 percent, and 3.4 percent.
38. Hirsch (1991) finds that slower growth in productivity among unionized firms in the 1970s 
and 1980s is mostly due to industry differences; he concludes that "we cannot reject the hypothe 
sis that unions, on average, have little direct effect on productivity and productivity growth" 
(1991: 111).
39. Coefficients on the terms including labor will be somewhat biased if there is measurement 
error in employment levels, since employment also appears in the denominator in the dependent 
variable. This does not, however, bias the profit-sharing coefficients; results for the variables of 
interest were equivalent when employment levels were not in the denominator of the dependent 
variable.
40. This contrasts with my results for deferred plans in Kruse (1992), in which proportion 
covered resulted in higher coefficients than did simple dummies. This difference may be partly 
explained by the much smaller variance in proportion covered in this sample: the mean proportion 
covered in the plans analyzed in Kruse (1992) was 40.7 percent, with very few firms having 100 
percent coverage, while the firms in this sample have a mean proportion covered of 78.5 percent 
and nearly half report 100 percent coverage. The smaller variance in this sample allows for less 
precise estimates; also, the data are based on self-reports rather than administrative records, intro 
ducing a downward bias due to measurement error. It is also possible that, in firms with less than 
total coverage, profit sharing has been extended to key employees whose participation is expected
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to affect firm performance, so that total coverage is not needed for strong effects. Nonetheless this 
result is at variance with my past research and the expectation that, if the productivity theory is 
correct, broader coverage should produce larger effects.
41. See Wray (1993) for an overview of cash plans in the United States.
42. As in table 3.2, combination plans are included with cash plans since they both contain 
cash elements which provide immediate rewards to employees. The reported regressions include 
separate inverse Mill's selection terms for cash and deferred plans.
43. These magnitudes are lower than those from my previous analysis of deferred plans using 
administrative data and similar specifications (Kruse 1992), in which the estimated effects of plan 
adoption were in the range of .025 to .028. The results presented here are based on a smaller sam 
ple size, and are more prone to a downward bias from measurement error.
The difference between results for cash and deferred plans may reflect in part the stronger 
relation to profits among the former. For companies reporting the profit share as a percentage of 
participant payroll, the correlation between the change in profit share and the change in company 
profits per employee is .191 for cash plans (n = 203), and .063 for deferred plans (n = 281).
44. The sample sizes are, respectively, 105, 152, and 92. If contributions were closely tied 
only to profits/employees, the correlation should be close to 1.0. The existence of other factors in 
the formula, and the use of other measures of profitability (including thresholds that must be met 
before contributions are made), account for the low correlations. When profit margin rather than 
profits/employees is used, the correlation for percent-of- profits plans is .124, for discretionary 
plans is .096, and for percent-of-pay plans is .061.
45. The regressions contain separate inverse Mill's selection terms for each of the plan formu 
las. None of the coefficients on these terms was statistically significant.
46. None of the selection terms attracted significant coefficients. Without these terms, three 
regressions show estimated effects of 5.7 percent to 8.1 percent (significant at p <.10), with only 
one significant coefficient for discretionary plans (10.4 percent), and a significant negative coeffi 
cient for percent-of-pay plans (-6.6 percent).
47. As noted earlier, an advantage of discretionary plans to employers is that profits due 
wholly to other factors (e.g., new capital investment) can be excluded from consideration. A per- 
cent-of-profits plan has the risk of discouraging new capital investment, since some of the gains 
will have to be shared with employees.
48. As noted in appendix 3, the simultaneity bias can also be addressed through instrumental 
variables. As before, however, instrumental variables estimates produced implausibly large esti 
mates of profit-sharing's effect.
49. For reviews of theory and research on worker participation experiments, see Gershenfeld 
(1987), and Levine and D' Andrea Tyson (1990). For their relationship to unions see Eaton (1992) 
and Eaton and Voos (1992). For research on higher-level employee participation in the form of 
workers' councils, see Freeman and Rogers (Forthcoming) and Addison, Kraft, and Wagner 
(Forthcoming).
50. For studies of gainsharing see the meta-analysis in Bullock and Tubbs (1990), as well as 
Schuster (1983 1984), Robertson and Osuorah (1991), Markham et al. (1992), Masternak (19917 
92), Masternak and Ross (1992), Gowen (1990), and Hanson and Watson (1990).
51. For a general discussion of employment security strategies, see Dyer, Foltman, and Milk- 
ovich (1985). For discussion of the relationship between employment security and firm perfor 
mance, see Osterman (1987) and Ichniowski (1992).
52. The percentages in table 1.3 exclude "don't know" responses. Those who responded "don't 
know" for the existence of the policies were: 2.4 percent for attitude survey feedback, 5.6 percent 
for suggestion system, 5.2 percent for job enrichment, 3.8 percent for employee involvement 
groups, 4.0 percent for self-managed workteams, 2.0 percent for employment security, and 4.2
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percent for productivity-related group bonuses. Also, the percentages of those responding that 
they had the policy but did not know its age were, respectively, 3.6 percent, 6.6 percent, 4.0 per 
cent, 4.4 percent, 3.0 percent, 1.2 percent, and 5.4 percent
53. While the rates of response on the individual policy questions were high (see previous 
note), a substantial number of the respondents answered "don't know" on the existence or age of 
at least one of the policy questions. Excluding these respondents greatly diminishes the sample 
size for the regressions. Given the earlier-noted dispersion in outcomes for profit-sharing adopt 
ers, changes in the sample size can have substantial effects on the profit-sharing coefficients (with 
much higher or lower coefficients, due not to the added variables but to the change in sample). To 
maintain the sample size for comparability with previous results without providing bias to the 
reported coefficients, the "don't know" responses were coded as separate dummy variables for the 
regressions reported in appendix table A3.S. The coefficients on the "don't know" variables, 
which are not reported here, were uniformly small and statistically insignificant. An additional 
complication is that the reported ages of the personnel policies showed sharp spikes at 5 and 10 
years, undoubtedly representing convenient focal points for those who are not sure about the age. 
Regressions were run treating these alternatively as valid values, and as missing values; results 
between the two sets of regressions were similar, and the latter results are presented here.
54. F-tests reveal that there were no significant changes in profit-sharing coefficients from the 
results presented in appendix table A3.2.
55. With 112 coefficients across the eight regressions, it is expected that about six would be 
randomly "significant" at the 95 percent level. In the absence of a clear pattern, very little impor 
tance should be attached to one "significant" coefficient.
56. Clearly the attempt to measure the effects of these policies is limited by error in measuring 
the age, coverage, or substance of the policies. To focus on respondents who would be more 
knowledgeable about these policies, the sample was restricted first to Vice-Presidents of Human 
Resources, and then expanded to include Directors of Employee Benefits, with a similar lack of 
noteworthy patterns for the personnel policy coefficients. Even among this more knowledgeable 
group, it is clear that the substance of the policies may differ greatly among firms, creating sub 
stantial measurement error.
These results cast doubt on the idea that any one of these policies in isolation can be expected 
to have an impact on productivity. However, it remains possible that some combination of these 
with other human resource policies may have consequences for firm performance. For evidence 
that such a combination may improve company performance, see Ichniowski (1990) and Huselid 
(1992). For discussion of how human resource policies can interact for better labor-management 
relations and higher performance, see Ichniowski (1992).
57. These questions were taken directly from the GAO survey of employee involvement in 
Fortune 1000 firms.
58. The answer options were "none" (0 percent), "some" (1-40 percent), "about half (41-60 
percent), "most" (61-99 percent) or "all" (100 percent). The proportions assigned to each of the 
five categories were, respectively, 0, .20, .50, .80, and 1.0. While the use of categories produces 
some measurement error, this should not be systematic error. Following the GAO survey, catego 
ries rather than "exact" percentages were used to encourage a higher response rate.
59. This is separate from the question of whether information- sharing itself affects company 
performance. Kleiner and Bouillon (1991) find that sharing of sensitive information is associated 
with lower profitability. The information- sharing measures in this study had no significant direct 
relationship with level or growth of either productivity measure.
60. When the three types of information-sharing are interacted with profit sharing and 
included in the same regression, there is obviously high multicollinearity among these variables, 
which raises standard errors and makes estimates less precise. To reduce the multicollinearity
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bias, each information-sharing interaction was entered separately in regressions. The results were 
very similar.
61. To reduce multicollinearity, the interaction terms for the first two types of information 
were removed. The regression coefficients for the competitors' performance interaction term were 
.054, .ISO, .033, and .065, with the second of these being significant only at rx.10. Reducing mul 
ticollinearity therefore weakens the case that sharing this type of information has strong interac 
tion effects with profit sharing.
62. The interaction was first-differenced, so that the "adoption" of this interaction may signify 
either the adoption of profit sharing when the policy is present, or the adoption of the policy when 
profit sharing is present (separate tests on these situations produced no noteworthy differences in 
results). The trend effect of the interaction simply indicates that both profit sharing and the policy 
were in effect in that year. Note that the personnel policy variable is defined as the proportion of 
profit-sharing participants covered by this policy at the time of the survey the technique 
employed here extrapolates this proportion back through the time that both profit sharing and the 
policy were in effect. The measurement error thereby created will bias the coefficients toward 
zero. Concerns about data quality and response rate precluded asking for detail on personnel pol 
icy coverage of profit-sharing participants in earlier years.
63. In addition, tests were made using separate inverse Mill's ratios for the presence of each 
interaction in each year, but these provided consistently negligible coefficients and were dropped 
in the final specifications.
64. Among the adopters in the largest size class, an average of 24.5 percent of profit-sharing 
employees were covered by employee involvement programs which existed at the time of profit- 
sharing adoption, compared to 12.5 percent among adopters across the other size classes (and 
compared to 12.6 percent of employees covered in non-profit-sharing firms in the largest size 
class). Interaction terms revealed that the large adopters using employee involvement programs 
for profit-sharing employees did have larger productivity increases, but the statistical significance 
was weak for most of these interactions, and the estimated productivity increases were still signif 
icant for the adopters that did not use employee involvement.
65. The multicollinearity of these variables will increase the standard errors of the coeffi 
cients. To reduce multicollinearity, the interactions were entered individually in the specifications, 




Economic instability is a problem of modern capitalist economies. 
While simple neoclassical economic models predict that market econo 
mies will always be at or close to full employment of all resources, 
underutilization of resources in market-based economies has been 
apparent both in business cycles and in more severe episodes such as 
the 1930s depression. A major aim of government economic policies in 
Western economies in the twentieth century has been to stabilize the 
economy and avoid the economic and social costs of unemployment. A 
variety of policies have been employed for this purpose, ranging from 
broad monetary and fiscal stimuli to labor market policies such as 
unemployment compensation and support for job training.
A key element of the simple economic models that predict full 
employment is mobility and price flexibility for all factors, including 
labor. If there are unemployed workers, they should be able to bid 
down wages until all are employed. If the unemployment is prolonged, 
one culprit may be "sticky wages" that do not decrease to encourage 
additional hiring. 1 According to this logic, forms of compensation that 
provide downward flexibility such as profit sharing should encour 
age employers to retain and hire workers. This flexibility has been one 
of the arguments for profit sharing. 2 Downward flexibility in wages 
was, though, not part of the "Keynesian revolution" in economic pol 
icy that developed in the 1930s depression Keynes in fact warned 
that wage decreases could work against economic recovery by decreas 
ing aggregate purchasing power (1964: 257-71).
Profit sharing may have stabilizing potential apart from downward 
flexibility in compensation. Martin Weitzman developed the theory of 
the "share economy," in which widespread use of profit sharing would 
help inoculate the economy against instability and unemployment 
(1983, 1984, 1985, 1986). The key element of this theory is that firms 
will essentially ignore the profit share when making employment deci 
sions in the short run rather, they will base such decisions only upon 
the fixed wage that must be paid to each worker. The conclusion is that
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firms with substantial profit sharing will not only have a strong incen 
tive to retain workers when business shocks occur, but also an incen 
tive in equilibrium to snatch up any unemployed workers who may 
appear in the labor market.
This theory received wide attention in the business press and aca 
demic publications and conventions in the 1980s. After reviewing the 
theory and several objections, this chapter will review existing empiri 
cal work and present new evidence.
The fundamentals of this theory will be described here, with a fuller 
explanation in appendix 4. Employment decisions of firms are based 
on the value of the worker's output in relation to the cost of the worker. 
A profit-maximizing firm will employ labor up to the point where the 
value of the last labor hour (the marginal revenue product) is no less 
than the wage that must be paid. For a fixed-wage firm with a wage of 
$10/hour (representing the marginal cost of a labor hour), a firm will 
employ such labor only if the value of the worker's output exceeds $107 
hour.3 When a negative business shock reduces the value of the work 
er's output below $10/hour, workers will be laid off or their hours 
reduced.
The stability theory of profit sharing posits that the view of labor's 
cost is different in a profit-sharing firm. A profit-maximizing firm with 
a profit-sharing plan is interested in retaining and hiring workers as 
long as the value of the worker's output exceeds the base wage, rather 
than the worker's total remuneration (base wage plus profit share). The 
profit share is essentially ignored by the employer when making the 
employment decision, since profits are maximized by employing work 
ers whenever the value of their output exceeds the base wage. This can 
be seen through the following example. Say that workers are paid a 
base wage of $9 per hour, and the employer pays 25 percent of profits 
to the workers representing, on average, an extra $1 per hour in profit 
share for each worker (so that average pay is $10 per hour). Initially, 
the company's product demand is high enough that the value of each 
labor hour is at least $10/hour. If the company's product demand drops 
so that the value of the last labor hour is only $9.60, a firm that paid a 
wage of $10 per hour would lay some workers off, or reduce hours. 
But the profit-sharing firm would retain workers since the last labor 
hour still contributes $.60 to profits (i.e., $9.60 minus the $9 base 
wage, with 15 cents of the difference going to workers under the profit-
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sharing plan). Because of the reduced product demand, both the com 
pany and the workers are earning fewer profits than previously, but 
employment has remained stable.
The same incentive that impels the firm to retain workers in bad 
times will also cause it to look hard for workers during normal times. 
Under the example here, while a fixed-wage firm paying $10/hour will 
hire new workers only if the value of their output exceeds $10/hour, a 
profit-sharing firm will want to hire new workers if the value of their 
output exceeds $9/hour. Profit-sharing firms will have this incentive in 
the short run, but such excessive hiring will not be possible in the long 
run. While employers ignore the profit share in their short-run employ 
ment decisions, workers do not. As more workers are hired, the profit 
share established by the employer must be divided among a larger 
number of workers, decreasing its value to any one worker. Workers 
base their labor supply decisions not on the base wage, but on total 
compensation. When the total compensation falls below the market 
level, profit-sharing firms will have difficulty attracting and retaining 
workers. These firms in the long run will adjust their base wage and 
profit share so that the expected total compensation paid to workers 
will equal the value of the last worker's output, but the firms maintain 
an incentive in the short run to hire any worker as long as the worker's 
output exceeds the base wage.
The different incentives for fixed-wage and profit-sharing firms are 
illustrated in figure 4.1 (adapted from Nordhaus 1986). The curve 
labeled Demand represents the value of worker output from an addi 
tional labor hour (the marginal revenue product, or MRP, which is 
assumed to be the same in the two types of firms). A conventional 
fixed-wage firm, in the top left diagram, will hire workers up to the 
point where the MRP equals the fixed wage, with LQ workers hired. 
Compare this with a profit-sharing firm, in the top right diagram, which 
has the same average compensation, but pays half of this in a base 
wage and half as a profit share. The demand curve is identical, and the 
profit-sharing firm has an incentive to operate at point B, where the 
MRP equals the base wage and L, workers are hired.4 Under full 
employment, however, the firm must operate at point A, with L0 work 
ers, due to the lack of labor availability when compensation is below 
the market level. While the profit-sharing firm has no incentive in equi-
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librium to change the compensation parameters, it would h'ke to hire 
more labor at the current compensation parameters.
Figure 4.1 
Employment Incentives for Fixed-Wage and Profit-Sharing Firms






Labor Demand Under Negative Demand Shock
\Demand 
Demand*
 0 ^2 *M
LQ = initial employment levels
LI = desired employment by profit-sharing firm
LZ = desired employment levels after negative shock
Demand = labor demand curve (marginal revenue product of labor)
Demand1" = new labor demand curve after decline in product demand
w = wage in a fixed-wage firm
w' = base wage in a profit-sharing firm
c = total compensation in a profit-sharing firm
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This incentive to hire more workers is the driving force in the share 
economy theory. If new workers enter the labor market, the fixed-wage 
firm would be indifferent about hiring them until the new workers 
could bid wages down sufficiently. However, the profit-sharing firm, 
desiring more than LQ workers, would quickly snatch them up:
A share system looks very much like a labor-shortage economy. Share 
firms ever hungry for labor are always on the prowl cruising around 
like vacuum cleaners on wheels, searching in nooks and crannies for 
extra workers to pull in at existing compensation parameter values 
(Weitzman 1984: 98-9).
Therefore, in full-employment equilibrium, compensation and 
employment levels of the two types of firms are similar. The behavioral 
differences occur when there is reduced demand for the company's 
products (shifting the labor demand curve inward). A key result of this 
theory is that profit sharing induces greater employment and output 
stability than does a system with short-run fixed wages. If wages 
remain fixed, a negative demand shock (shifting the labor demand 
curve inward to Demand* in the bottom two diagrams of figure 4.1) 
leads to layoffs in a fixed-wage firm, with a resulting employment level 
of LZ (in the bottom left diagram). However, the similar shock does not 
lead to layoffs in a profit-sharing firm, where the new desired L^ is still 
greater than the old L,. Layoffs will occur only if the new L2 is less than 
the old Io, and even then they will be smaller than layoffs by the fixed- 
wage firm. Employee compensation in the profit-sharing firm is 
decreased, but this decrease is not driving the incentive to retain work 
ers; rather, the lower fixed cost of labor hours perceived by the firm is 
driving this incentive.
While this theory predicts that profit sharing will be associated with 
fewer layoffs, one must also consider voluntary labor turnover. By 
decreasing employee compensation, a negative demand shock may 
cause workers to seek work elsewhere or drop out of the labor force. In 
the case of an idiosyncratic demand shock that affects only one or a 
few firms, the short-run employment change is likely to be less in a 
profit-sharing firm than in a fixed-wage firm. Due to the lowered com 
pensation in the affected firm, some workers will seek work elsewhere 
at the market compensation level, and the firm's compensation level 
will gradually increase to the market level as workers leave and the
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firm adjusts its base wage or profit-sharing rule. It is likely that volun 
tary turnover will occur more slowly than would layoffs (due to worker 
mobility and information costs), so that the short-run change in 
employment is likely to be less for profit-sharing firms. (The adjust 
ment path of employment and compensation also depends on the speed 
of readjustment of pay parameters.)
In the case of a general negative demand shock, the short-run 
employment changes are also likely to be smaller for profit-sharing 
firms. As explained above, the profit-sharing firms are likely to have 
fewer or no layoffs. In the extreme case of an equal demand shock 
among all firms in a share economy, the decrease in average compensa 
tion would be the same across all firms, and there would be no incen 
tive for workers to voluntarily switch firms (although some may leave 
the labor force). In the case of an unequal demand shock, however, 
workers will choose to switch from the harder-hit firms to the firms 
that are less hard hit, due to the relatively higher average compensation 
in the latter. The former will experience an employment decrease, and 
the latter an employment increase, with near-full employment being 
maintained. For the individual firm, any decrease in employment under 
profit sharing is likely to be less than under the wage system since 
there will be fewer layoffs in the former, and the lowered average com 
pensation in the former reduces the extent to which workers can gain 
through voluntary job-switching. (Again, the timing of the change 
would depend on the speed of turnover and readjustment of pay param 
eters.)
How do the systems respond to a positive demand shock? In the 
case of a positive demand shock starting from full employment, the 
behavior would be similar. Additional hiring by any type of firm is 
only possible if employee compensation is increased, luring new work 
ers into the workforce. Intuitively, a positive demand shock creates a 
temporary excess demand for labor in a fixed-wage economy to match 
the permanent excess demand for labor in a profit-sharing economy, so 
that the employment behavior is similar. If the positive demand shock 
represented a recovery from a previous negative demand shock, the 
theory's prediction is that profit-sharing firms would hire back fewer 
workers than would fixed-wage firms, simply because profit-sharing 
firms laid off fewer to begin with.
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The stability theory therefore predicts that a profit-sharing economy 
will have more employment stability with negative shocks and recov 
ery from negative shocks than will a fixed-wage economy, and similar 
behavior under new positive shocks. In a mixed profit-sharing/fixed- 
wage economy this conclusion should remain true, since the microeco- 
nomic incentives for each type of firm remain the same. The issue is 
complicated by the possibility that, given a general negative demand 
shock, some workers may leave profit-sharing firms to search for jobs 
at the fixed-wage firms that maintain higher compensation in the short 
run; this would be mitigated, however, by the increased unemployment 
from the fixed-wage firm layoffs. Also, in this situation a profit-sharing 
firm may be more likely to see an employment increase, since it would 
stand willing to hire the workers laid off by the fixed-wage firms.
This theory has engendered a substantial amount of debate. There 
have been five major objections. First, employed workers will resist 
the hiring of new workers, since the pay of employed workers would 
be decreased (Summers 1986). Second, as mentioned in chapter 3, 
employers may be reluctant to invest in new capital since some of the 
resulting profits would have to be shared with workers (Summers 
1986; Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 1987). Third, if labor productivity 
depends on worker compensation, as predicted by some efficiency 
wage theories, the excess demand for labor property would be lost 
since hiring new workers would lower the productivity of all workers 
(Levine 1987, 1989). Fourth, if tax incentives are granted for profit 
sharing, employers and employees may design "cosmetic" schemes to 
gain tax advantages without the desirable properties of "true" profit- 
sharing (Estrin, Jones, and Svejnar 1987). Finally, in full-employment 
equilibrium firms may regard average compensation as the cost of an 
extra labor hour (due to the labor supply constraint), which would 
eliminate excess demand for labor (Nordhaus 1988). (For responses to 
several of these criticisms see Weitzman 1986 and 1988.)5
There are two key propositions that emerge from the theory of the 
share economy:
1. Firms do not view profit-sharing payments as part of the short-run 
marginal cost of labor in making their employment decisions; and
2. Firms that pay part of their compensation in the form of profit 
shares will have greater employment stability than non-profit-
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sharing firms, particularly with regard to negative demand 
shocks.
Prior Research
Research on these two propositions of the stability theory is not as 
extensive as research on the productivity theory. The fifteen empirical 
studies are summarized in table 4.1.6 In the studies that use firm or 
aggregate data (except Gerhart 1991; and Kraft 1991), the level or 
change in employment is used as the dependent variable. Tests of prop 
osition 1 have used the profit-sharing bonus/wage ratio (B/W) as an 
explanatory variable, whereas tests of proposition 2 have used the sim 
ple existence of profit sharing, or percent of workers covered, as 
explanatory variables.
Proposition 1, that profit shares are not viewed as part of the mar 
ginal cost of employing labor, has been addressed in two studies with 
aggregate data on the Japanese bonus system (with favorable evidence 
provided by Freeman and Weitzman 1987, and unfavorable evidence 
from Estrin, Grout, and Wadhwani 1987). Also, six studies have 
employed firm-level datasets from Great Britain, France, and the 
United States (with favorable evidence from Bradley, Estrin, and Tay- 
lor 1990; Estrin and Wilson 1989; and Kruse 1991b; unfavorable evi 
dence from Wadhwani and Wall 1990; and Fitzroy and Vaughan- 
Whitehead 1989; and mixed evidence from Jones and Pliskin (199la).
Proposition 2, that profit-sharing firms will have greater stability, 
has been addressed in nine studies. Bell and Neumark (1993) analyze 
profit sharing in U.S. union contracts, finding that the adoption of a 
profit-sharing provision is associated with higher employment growth 
and lower variability than previously, though the possibility of no 
change in behavior cannot be rejected. Chelius and Smith (1990) find 
that in response to sales decreases, U.S. profit-sharing small businesses 
have smaller employment decreases than do comparable non-profit- 
sharing firms. Also, they find that workers who were in a profit-sharing 
plan were less likely to report having been laid off in the previous year, 
controlling for individual characteristics and industry employment 
trends. Kraft (1991) finds that West German firms with profit-sharing
Table 4.1
Study
Profit Sharing and Employment Stability Studies
Data source
Unit of 




U.S. publicly traded 








Large British retail 
chains (one with PS)
(1) U.S. small 
businesses
(2) Quality of 
Employment Survey















Dummy for PS 
negotiated in union 
contract
PS dummy and B/W
PS dummy and B/W 
(cash and deferred 
plans)
PS dummy
PS dummy and B/W
Weakly favorable: adoption of PS in 
union contract associated with higher 
employment growth and lower 
employment variability, though effects 
not statistically significant
Mixed: PS firm had higher 
employment than others, and B/W 
positively related to employment 
changes, but similar employment 
changes over the business cycle
Generally favorable: PS firms have 
smaller employment decreases when 
sales decline; result is stronger for PS 
dummy than for B/W
Favorable: workers in PS plans were 
less likely to be laid off in previous year
Generally favorable: authors reject 
hypothesis that PS payments are part of 














Data source analysis n




manufacturing firms Firm 116
U.S. publicly traded 
firms Firm 516
Exempt employees, 
U.S. business units Firm 156
British firms in 
printing, footwear, 
and clothing Firm 127
West German firms Firm 62
Profit-sharing 
Time period measures
PS dummy and B/W 
1971-85 (both cash and 
(balanced) deferred plans)
1983-85 PS dummy and profit 
(balanced) share per worker
1971-87 
(balanced) PS dummy
1981-85 B/W, net of human 
(unbalanced) capital and job factors
1890-1975 
(unbalanced) PS dummy and B/W
1977, 1979 PS dummy
Main results
Mixed: B/W more responsive than W 
to changes in profits, mixed results on 
stability (PS increases employment 
when profits/L is used as demand 
measure)
Mixed: profit share per worker 
negatively related to employment, but 
cash PS firms maintain higher 
employment in downturn
Mixed: pre/post comparisons for 
profit-sharing adopters found greater 
postadoption stability only in 5- and 6- 
year comparisons
Favorable: higher B/W associated with 
lower variability of exempt 
employment, controlling for variability 
of firm performance
Mixed: PS dummy associated with 
lower employment, but B/W 
coefficient sensitive to whether 
measures of worker part are included
Favorable: PS firms had lower 
dismissal rate
U.S. publicly 
Kruse 1991a traded firms Firm
U.S. publicly 
Kruse 1991b traded firms Firm
Wadhwaniand British publicly 







PS dummy, and 




PS dummy and B/W
Generally favorable: PS associated 
with more stability in the face of 
negative demand shocks in 
manufacturing, but not in 
nonmanufacturing
Generally favorable: PS payments, 
unlike wages and defined benefit 
payments, do not appear to be treated as 
part of marginal cost of labor
Unfavorable: Both PS measures 
statistically insignificant, but 
magnitudes indicate B/W depresses 
employment more than wages do
Aggregate data
Estrin, Grout,
andWadhwani Japanese aggregate Aggregate
1987 data economy 1959-83 B/W
Unfavorable: wages and bonuses have 
slightly positive, insignificant 
coefficients, when controlling for 










and manuf. 1959-83 B/W
Favorable: Bonus appears to have 
profit-sharing components, and, unlike 
wages, relates positively to 
employment (controlling for output 
changes)
NOTES: PS = profit sharing, B/W = profit-sharing bonus/wage, W = wage.
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plans in 1977 and 1979 had lower dismissal rates. Mixed evidence is 
provided by Finseth (1988), using a sample of U.S. publicly traded 
manufacturing firms, while unfavorable evidence is provided by Brad 
ley, Estrin, and Taylor (1990), who study one British profit-sharing 
firm relative to four competitors. Smaller employment decreases in 
economic downturns were detected by Fitzroy and Vaughan-White- 
head (1989) for French firms with cash profit-sharing plans. Looking at 
employment changes in relation to aggregate and industry measures of 
economic activity, reveals a similar pattern of smaller decreases during 
downturns (Kruse 1991a) for U.S. publicly traded manufacturing 
firms, although not for nonmanufacturing firms. This data source was 
examined (using a repeated ANOVA technique) by Florkowski (1991), 
comparing firm stability before and after the adoption of a deferred 
profit-sharing plan; his findings were that greater postadoption stability 
was detected only for the five- and six-year comparisons, concentrated 
among firms that adopted profit-sharing between the two recessions of 
the period. Finally, Gerhart (1991) used data on exempt employees 
from 156 business units over the 1981-85 period. Organizations that 
had a higher average ratio of bonus to base pay for exempt employees 
had lower variability for exempt employment (controlling for variabil 
ity in profits, sales, total assets, and stockholders' equity).
Prior research produces no clear conclusion on the relationship of 
employment and profit sharing. While the productivity theory lends 
itself to fairly standard tests using a production function, there has 
been a much greater variety of techniques used to examine the stability 
theory. Almost all of the studies that directly measure stability find 
some evidence of profit sharing being associated with greater stability, 
though the studies on how the profit share is treated in employment 
decisions are more mixed. Whether these differences in employment 
behavior are in fact due to profit sharing, or to other company charac 
teristics, is a key question.
Does Profit Sharing Imply Lower Wages?
The driving force behind the share economy theory is that the per 
ceived short-run cost of labor is lower for profit-sharing firms than for
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fixed-wage firms in other words, profit sharing substitutes for a por 
tion of fixed wages and benefits. If, however, the profit share is simply 
added to the fixed wages and benefits i.e., it is simply "gravy" no 
employment benefits would be predicted. This is complicated some 
what by higher pay which may result from higher company productiv 
ity, if the productivity theory applies. As will be discussed later, the 
profit share is only considered "gravy" if it is added to regular pay for 
the same level of employee performance; if however, employee perfor 
mance is higher, then the profit share may substitute for regular pay in 
compensating the higher performance (so that the stability theory may 
still apply).
There are very few studies on the relative earnings of profit-sharing 
participants. Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990) use a 1974 compen 
sation survey by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and find that total com 
pensation per hour and wage per hour are higher in firms with profit- 
sharing bonus payments.7 In a 1988 survey, the U.S. Chamber of Com 
merce (1989) found similar results for nonmanufacturing firms, but not 
for manufacturing firms. For nonmanufacturing firms, compensation 
other than the profit share (adjusted for industry differences) averaged 
$14.06 for profit-sharing firms and $13.53 for non-profit-sharing firms. 
In contrast, excluding the profit share, manufacturing profit-sharing 
firms had average compensation of $14.89, compared to $15.08 for 
non-profit-sharing firms.8 This would imply potentially stabilizing 
effects of profit sharing in manufacturing but not in nonmanufacturing.
Limited evidence on the substitution between profit sharing and 
other wages and benefits comes from union contracts. Mitchell, Lewin, 
and Lawler document the extent of profit sharing in concession bar 
gaining: 36 percent of the U.S. union contracts with profit-sharing pro 
visions in the 1981-88 period included first-year wage decreases, while 
only 14 percent of contracts without profit sharing involved first-year 
wage decreases.9 Bell and Neumark (1993) found that, among manu 
facturing workers covered by negotiated contracts that included profit 
sharing in the 1979-88 period, over half of the workers also had wage 
concessions in 1982, 1983, and 1986, but not in other years. 10 Subse 
quent to adoption of contracts with profit sharing, they find that labor 
costs grew more slowly relative both to industry trends and preadop- 
tion firm trends. The association with concessions has clearly wors 
ened the image of profit sharing in the eyes of unionists. 11 Finally,
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limited evidence from the United Kingdom and Germany goes against 
the idea of a trade-off between profit sharing and other pay. Average 
pay in British engineering and metalworking firms, excluding the 
profit share, was higher in profit-sharing firms for four of the five years 
between 1978 and 1982 (Estrin and Wilson 1989). Similarly, German 
evidence indicates that profit sharing is associated with higher individ 
ual wages (Hart and Hubler 1991; Hubler 1993) and higher average 
pay in manufacturing firms (Carstensen, Gerlach, and Hubler 1992).
The relative pay of profit-sharing companies is examined here in 
several different ways. To adjust for industry differences, each com 
pany's average compensation was divided by its industry average com 
pensation. 12 Because fewer than half of the firms with public stock 
report their total labor expenses, the calculations of average compensa 
tion per worker are based on a substantially restricted sample. Due to 
the small sample size, for most of the comparisons in this section it is 
not possible to rule out random sampling error; the results are pre 
sented simply as indicative, without any strong claims about compen 
sation patterns in profit-sharing firms.
Table 4.2 examines just those firms reporting both labor expenses 
and profit share in the 1975-90 period (number of firms = 30, with 254 
observations). Including the profit share, total compensation was 
slightly higher than industry averages among all profit-sharing compa 
nies (indicated by both the mean and median values), while excluding 
the profit share leads to compensation slightly below the industry aver 
age. 13 Separate computations for the manufacturing and nonmanufac- 
turing companies indicate that the average compensation levels (both 
with and without profit share) for profit-sharing firms are lower than 
industry averages for manufacturing firms, but higher for nonmanufac- 
turing firms.
Yearly growth in average compensation (relative to the industry) is 
presented on the right side of table 4.2. There it can be seen that the 
growth levels of these companies were slightly lower than industry 
averages: within these profit-sharing companies, mean yearly growth 
of all compensation lagged 0.03 percent behind industry averages, 
while mean yearly growth of compensation excluding the profit share 
lagged 0.10 percent behind industry averages.
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Table 4.2 Compensation in Profit-Sharing Companies, With and
Without Profit Share, as Percent of Industry Average 
______Compensation___________________________ 
Sample: 30 companies reporting both profit share and labor expenses within 1975-90. 
All figures are on per employee basis.
Levels Yearly growth
Median Mean Median Mean
N
All
compensation 102.7 103.8 (25.4) 254 -0.20 -0.03 (5.7) 216 
Excluding
profit share 97.3 97.6 (22.2) 254 -0.26 -0.10 (5.4) 216
NOTES: Compensation is calculated as a percentage of industry average compensation per 
employee, for each year, from the National Income and Product Accounts. The upper and lower 
1 percent of the levels and growth variables have been trimmed.
A different approach is taken in table 4.3, which includes all firms 
reporting labor expenses in any year of the period (not just those 
reporting the profit share). 14 The levels and growth of compensation are 
reported for three groups: non-profit-sharing companies, "old" profit- 
sharing companies (in which profit sharing was adopted prior to 1975), 
and "new" profit-sharing companies (in which profit sharing was 
adopted in 1975 or later). For the new profit-sharing companies, fig 
ures are presented for preadoption, year before adoption, year of adop 
tion, and postadoption (only for companies that report labor expenses 
both before and after adoption). This enables one to examine the possi 
bility that high-compensation firms, or firms with faster growth in 
compensation, were more or less likely to adopt profit sharing.
A striking finding from table 4.3 is that the old profit-sharing (old 
PS) firms had higher levels of compensation than did either the non 
profit-sharing (non-PS) or post-1975 adopter (new PS) firms. Mean 
compensation for the old PS firms was 108.2 percent of the industry 
average across the entire period (line 5), compared to 95.1 percent for 
the non-PS firms (line 4), and 98.7 percent for preadoption and 96.3 
percent for postadoption for the new PS firms (Hues 6 and 9). The dif 
ference between average preadoption and postadoption compensation 
is reported on line 10, where the mean of 0.9 percent and median of 1.9 
percent indicates that total compensation (relative to industry aver 
ages) rose slightly after adoption. 15 Given that this slight rise in total










































































































NOTES: Compensation is calculated as a percentage of industry average compensation per employee, for each year, from the National Income and Prod 
uct Accounts. The upper and lower 1 percent of the compensation levels and growth variables have been trimmed. 
PS = profit sharing.
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compensation is less than the average value of profit sharing for this 
sample (the mean and median profit shares are approximately 3.5 per 
cent of payroll), it appears that at least some of the profit share is com 
ing at the expense of existing compensation for the post-1975 adopters. 
For the old PS firms, the much higher mean and median compensation 
levels makes it appear that profit sharing may simply be added on to 
existing compensation.
There appears to be very little difference in average compensation 
growth among the three groups of firms. The old PS firms had mean 
growth of compensation exceeding industry growth by 0.4 percent per 
year (line 5), compared to 0.3 percent per year for the non-PS firms 
(line 4). For the adopters, the preadoption and postadoption growth 
means were 0.4 percent per year Qines 6 and 9), although mean com 
pensation growth in the adoption year and prior year was lower (lines 7 
and 8), possibly indicating that profit sharing was adopted during times 
of financial stress.
Therefore there may be a fundamental difference between old and 
new PS firms: the old PS firms appear to pay better than industry aver 
ages, while the new PS firms do not.
Pay levels are obviously subject to many influences. Estimates were 
made of the relationship of profit sharing to 1991 compensation and to 
compensation growth over the full period, after controlling for the 
effects of unionization, defined benefit plans, and ESOPs. 16 A summary 
of key results is presented in table 4.4 (based on estimates presented in 
appendix table A4.1). The results are similar to those presented in table 
4.3. Relative to non-profit-sharing companies, the presence of old 
profit sharing is associated with 11-14 percent higher compensation in 
1991 (similar to table 4.3), while the presence of new profit sharing is 
associated with 7-9 percent lower compensation (unlike the pattern 
from table 4.3). Unionization of the workforce is associated with 
higher levels of compensation (consistent with the large literature sur 
veyed by Lewis (1986), but this effect depends on whether a majority 
of union members are covered by profit sharing. If not, the union wage 
effect (for average union coverage) is 9.0 percent. However, if a major 
ity of union members is covered by profit sharing, the union wage 
effect is only 2.0 percent. It is likely that this largely reflects the adop 
tion of profit sharing in exchange for union wage and benefit conces 
sions in the early and mid-1980s. 17
Table 4.4 Summary Results on Compensation and Profit Sharing
Based on regressions presented in appendix table A4.1. Compensation is measured as the company's labor expenses per employee, which is 
divided by the industry's average compensation per employee (calculated from National Income and Product Accounts data). Controls in 
regressions include defined benefit plans and ESOPs.
1991 compensation levels
Estimated difference in 1991 compensation associated with
Presence of pre-1975 PS8
Presence of post-1975 PSa
Average proportion unionized 
If majority of union members are covered by PSb 
If majority of union members are not covered by PSb
Estimated difference in 1991 nonpension compensation 
associated with
Presence of cash/combination PS plan
Presence of deferred PS plan8
Average proportion unionized 
If majority of union members are covered by PSb 










Estimated difference in yearly compensation growth associated with
Presence of pre-1975 PSa
Post-1975 PS plan8
Year of adoption 


























NOTES: The majority of these estimates are not significantly different from zero, due in part to the small number of firms reporting labor expenses. The
estimates should therefore be seen only as indicative. PS = profit sharing.
a. Profit-sharing estimates are relative to nonprofit-sharing companies.
b. Union estimates based on difference between nonunion company (0 percent coverage) and average union coverage (35 percent).
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The results of analyzing compensation growth across the entire 
period are summarized on the right side of table 4.4. There it can be 
seen that the presence of old PS had a slight negative effect (-0.1 per 
cent per year), while the initial adoption of profit sharing was associ 
ated with a small decrease (-0.3 percent) in the adoption year, a 1.7 
percent increase in the following year, and a 0.7 percent increase in 
subsequent years. 18 The increases after the adoption year may clearly 
be related to higher company productivity of adopters, as explored in 
chapter 3. 19
On the bottom of table 4.4 are summaries of results that analyze 
non-pension compensation (as a proportion of industry average com 
pensation), and divide profit-sharing plans into cash/combination plans 
vs. deferred plans to examine whether there are distinct effects of these 
plans on nonpension compensation. As can be seen, the presence of 
cash/combination plans is associated with slightly higher overall com 
pensation, while the presence of deferred plans is associated with 
slightly lower compensation. When a majority of union members is not 
covered by profit sharing, the union effect on nonpension compensa 
tion is estimated at 5.7 percent (for average levels of coverage), while 
the effect is estimated as slightly negative (-3.1 percent) if a majority is 
covered (again reflecting the union wage concessions of the early 
1980s). The adoptions of both cash/combination and deferred profit- 
sharing plans are accompanied by a slight decrease in overall compen 
sation, and postadoption trends are positive for cash/combination plans 
but negative for deferred plans (again possibly reflecting larger pro 
ductivity gains among companies adopting cash plans).
Does profit sharing imply lower wages or other benefits? The princi 
pal conclusion from the variety of evidence presented here is that there 
may be a substantial difference between old and new profit-sharing 
companies. The old profit-sharing companies had average compensa 
tion levels over the 1970-90 period that were higher when compared to 
the industry, new profit-sharing companies, and non-profit-sharing 
companies. This provides little evidence that profit sharing traded off 
against other wages and benefits for these companies it may have 
been "gravy" for the employees (consistent with the analysis of 1974 
data in Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990). Compensation growth kept 
up with industry averages for these companies.
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For new profit-sharing companies, on the other hand, several pieces 
of evidence point to more of a trade-off between profit sharing and 
other compensation. Average compensation levels in these companies 
are lower than industry averages, as indicated by both simple compari 
sons and regressions. While the adoption of profit sharing in this sam 
ple is associated with an initial slight decline in compensation, the 
subsequent positive trend leads most of the adopters to have an 
increase in average compensation levels between pre- and postadop- 
tion periods (with a mean increase of 0.9 percent and a median of 1.9 
percent). The overall increase in average compensation levels may 
reflect the sharing of benefits from higher productivity, as found in 
chapter 3. For the stability theory, the key element is whether base pay, 
excluding profit share, has increased or decreased. Since the average 
compensation increase is smaller than the typical profit share, it 
appears likely that regular fixed pay (relative to industry trends) may 
have slightly declined in a number of firms. The relationship of these 
compensation changes to the stability theory will be discussed and 
tested below. (Again, it should be cautioned that, due to the restricted 
sample of companies reporting compensation data, these results should 
be seen as indicative but not strong.)
Do Profit-sharing Contributions Act Like Wages?
Proposition 1 of the stability theory is that profit-sharing payments 
are fundamentally different from straight wages in affecting employ 
ment. An increase in wage rates will increase the cost of the last labor 
hour employed (the marginal cost of labor), leading to lower employ 
ment levels. If profit-sharing payments are simply "disguised 
wages" that is, the employer views them as a standard cost of 
employing labor then such payments should act like wages in affect 
ing employment. If, on the other hand, the employer views them not as 
a cost of employing labor, but as a "tax" on profits, then they should 
not affect employment levels in the same way as straight wages. 20 As 
displayed in table 4.1, this proposition has been addressed in eight 
studies, with mixed results.
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The proposition that profit-sharing payments do not behave in the 
same way as other wages and benefits is tested using a standard labor 
demand function, relating employment levels to the cost of labor, aug 
mented to separate profit sharing from other compensation. This 
enables one to compare the employment effects of base wages to 
profit-sharing payments.21 The base compensation measure is defined 
as the (change in) average value of all compensation minus profit-shar 
ing payments (including not just wage and salary payments, but all 
compensation other than profit-sharing payments).22 The profit-sharing 
measure is defined as the change in the company's profit-sharing con 
tribution as a percentage of participant payroll. Since the average com 
pensation measure is defined across all employees, the profit-sharing 
measure is only meaningful when all or nearly all employees are par 
ticipants. Therefore, profit-sharing companies with fewer than 90 per 
cent of employees covered have been excluded. The profit-sharing 
portion of compensation, which is used as an explanatory variable, suf 
fers from a serious bias due to the fact that good performance by the 
firm may increase both the profit share and the employment level, 
causing a spurious positive association between the two; this bias is 
corrected using the variables to predict profit-sharing adoption from 
chapter 2* Finally, the estimates account for each company's change 
in output (measured as the change in sales adjusted for inventory 
changes) and time and industry effects. 24
Results were calculated for five samples of firms. The first sample 
includes only those firms that reported both labor expenses and profit- 
sharing contribution in a given year. The remaining samples use pre 
dictions of labor expenses and profit-sharing contributions to impute 
values for these variables in four (progressively larger) samples: all 
firms reporting the profit-sharing contribution for a given year; all 
profit-sharing firms reporting labor expenses in a given year; all profit- 
sharing firms; and finally, all profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing 
firms.
The results (presented in appendix table A4.2) generally accord with 
theoretical expectations, with some exceptions. The company's output 
change is strongly positively related to employment changes, as 
expected. Increases in base compensation are negatively related to 
employment change in all but one estimate, with magnitudes generally 
in line with past studies (see Hamermesh 1993 for a survey and Kruse
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19915 for a similar sample). The estimates are only significantly differ 
ent from zero, though, in the two largest samples. The key variable of 
interest is the change in the profit-sharing contribution, which attracts a 
positive estimate in each column. Are the estimates equal between 
profit sharing and base compensation changes? A test for equality 
between the base compensation and profit-sharing estimates (reported 
on the last row of appendix table A4.2), shows that the hypothesis of 
no difference can be rejected at the 95 percent level for the largest two 
samples.
These results appear generally favorable for proposition 1 of the sta 
bility theory: profit-sharing payments do not appear to act like wages 
in affecting desired employment levels. Exploration of alternative 
methods for removing bias from the profit-sharing estimates, however, 
revealed that the results were quite sensitive. 25 While these results are 
generally favorable to the stability theory, no firm conclusion is drawn 
here regarding proposition 1.
Estimating the Stability Effects of Profit Sharing
Are profit-sharing firms more stable? The second proposition of 
Weitzman's stability theory of profit sharing is that profit sharing will 
increase the stability of employment. The theory predicts that, in the 
long run, an economy of profit-sharing firms will have compensation 
and employment levels equivalent to those in a fixed-wage economy. 
Starting from an equilibrium setting, the predicted response to positive 
demand shocks is equivalent for both economies; they both need to 
increase compensation to draw more workers into the labor force. The 
predicted response to negative demand shocks, however, is different: 
fixed-wage firms see the current compensation per worker as part of 
the cost of the last labor hour (the marginal cost of labor), and must lay 
off workers, while profit-sharing firms view only the (lower) base com 
pensation as part of the cost of the last labor hour, and will be less 
likely to lay off workers (as illustrated in figure 4.1). In response to a 
subsequent positive shock that restores the previous level of demand 
and costs, the profit-sharing firms would also hire back fewer workers 
than would fixed-wage firms to return to the equilibrium position.
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Simple comparisons of employment growth and stability are pre 
sented in table 4.5, with comparisons between non-profit-sharing and 
old and new profit-sharing firms, again using 1975 adoption as a cutoff 
between the two profit-sharing groups.26 Average yearly employment 
growth was 0.9 percent for non-profit-sharing firms (line 1), and 2.9 
percent for old profit-sharing (old PS) firms (line 2). For new profit- 
sharing (new PS) firms, average employment growth was 1.7 percent 
prior to adoption, -0.5 percent during the year of adoption, and 2.2 per 
cent after adoption (lines 3 to 5). These comparisons are made for the 
paired differences in lines 6 to 9, and broken out for periods of rising 
and falling unemployment in lines 10 to 17. In both rising and falling 
unemployment, the old PS firms had higher average employment 
growth than did their non-profit-sharing pairs. This was also true for 
postadoption growth of new PS firms; however, prior to adoption and 
during the year of adoption, the new PS firms had inferior employment 
growth compared to their pairs when unemployment was rising.
This suggests that, prior to adoption, profit-sharing adopters may 
have been more sensitive to recessionary shocks than their pairs. The 
employment variability of firms is examined on the right side of table 
4.S. 27 The variability of employment is slightly higher for non-profit- 
sharing companies (by comparing line 1 to lines 2 and 5), but the vari 
ability of adopters is equivalent between pre- and postadoption peri 
ods. The paired differences on lines 6 to 9 show that the old PS firms 
had, on average, lower variability of employment than did their same- 
industry pairs, while the profit-sharing adopters had a slight decline in 
relative variability between preadoption and postadoption periods.
The simple comparisons suggest that profit sharing is associated 
with higher employment growth, and that firms adopting profit sharing 
were less stable prior to adoption (both in overall variability and in 
responses to recessionary shocks). Employment behavior is here ana 
lyzed more intensively with regressions that control for growth trends, 
and separately examine positive and negative demand shocks using 
several measures of such shocks.
There are potentially important differences in compensation 
between old profit-sharing firms and new adopters in particular, the 
profit share is more likely to be added onto regular compensation for 
old profit-sharing firms, and more likely to substitute for other com 
pensation for new adopters (as revealed in tables 4.3 and 4.4). Since
Table 4.5 Simple Comparisons on Employment Growth and Variability




2. Old (pre-1975) PS
New (post-1975) PS
3. Preadoption
4. Year of adoption
5. Postadoption
Paired differences between PS and NFS
6. Old (pre-1975) adopters
New (post-1975) adopters
7. Preadoption
8. Year of adoption
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Periods of falling unemployment
14. Old (pre-1975) adopters 2.5 (3.11) 911 
New (post-1975) adopters
15. Preadoption 2.1 (2.49) 676
16. Year of adoption 3.7(1.13) 70
17. Postadoption 1.5 (1.21) 444
NOTES: Absolute values of /-statistics, testing whether paired difference equals zero, in parentheses. PS = profit sharing; NPS = nonprofit-sharing. 
Paired differences represent value for PS company minus the value for its same-industry NPS pair.
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this distinction is crucial for the theory, the separate responses of old 
profit-sharing firms and new adopters are broken out in most of the 
estimates. This has the added advantage that the employment 
responses of new adopters can be compared before and after the adop 
tion of profit sharing giving an indication of whether the adopters 
were particularly stable or unstable beforehand. To obtain estimates on 
how firms responded to negative shocks prior to adoption, the adopters 
sample is restricted to firms that adopted after the 1973-75 recession. 
In addition (as with the estimates for proposition 1), the sample of 
profit-sharing firms is restricted to those that had all or nearly all (90 
percent or more) of their employees participating in profit sharing, so 
that variations in overall company employment would be likely to 
affect profit-sharing participants. 28
As with the productivity tests, estimates were made both from the 
entire sample (with industry variables to control for general industry 
growth and decline),29 and then for the within-industry paired data. To 
allow for the possibility that defined benefit pension plans may have 
effects on employment changes, and to control for any potential bias 
created by their omission, the estimates include defined benefit plans 
interacted with the demand shocks. To control for differential employ 
ment growth, variables were included to capture growth trends of old 
profit-sharing firms and new adopters (with separate terms for pre- and 
postadoption periods). Several methods were used to control for poten 
tial selection bias,30 and several extreme values of employment 
changes were trimmed. 31
Demand shocks are measured with two economy wide and one com 
pany-specific measure: (1) change in the national unemployment rate, 
(2) percentage change in Gross National Product, and (3) percentage 
change in the company's sales. 32 The values for the first two measures, 
and descriptive statistics for sales changes are given in appendix table 
A4.3.
Why not use just the company's sales changes, since these are most 
specific to the company? Ideally, the demand shocks will measure 
inward shifts of the demand curve for the company's product. Sales 
changes would appear to be the most specific to the company, but may 
suffer from the following problem. The stability theory predicts not 
only that employment will be more stable under profit sharing, but that 
output will be more stable. When faced with negative demand shocks,
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profit-sharing firms are predicted to be more likely to keep employ 
ment and output stable while cutting prices to sell the output. The prob 
lem with using sales changes as a demand measure is that it is 
impossible to distinguish changes in prices from changes in output. If 
sales changes primarily reflect output changes (as in a competitive 
market, or in an industry where price changes are highly correlated 
across firms and are picked up by industry terms), then under the sta 
bility theory, even if output and employment are more stable in the 
profit-sharing firm, there may be no estimated effect of profit sharing 
on employment stability (because the output-employment relationship 
is the same between the two types of firms). 33 If, in contrast, sales 
changes combine both output changes and company-specific price 
changes, then there should be an estimated effect of profit sharing on 
employment stability. This would be the case in an imperfectly com 
petitive market where, based on several assumptions about the struc 
ture of costs and demand curves, it is estimated that the effect of sales 
changes on employment changes for profit-sharing firms would be 
approximately half the size of that for a non-profit-sharing firm. 34
Since the stability theory predicts that both employment and output 
will be more stable under profit sharing, sales changes may or may not 
be an appropriate measure of demand shocks for the stability theory, 
which is why two economywide measures are also used (with the 
industry paired differences controlling for differential sensitivity to 
demand shocks by industry).
Finally, it is necessary to discuss the appropriate method of examin 
ing employment responses to demand shocks. As can be seen in figure 
4.1, the relationship between profit sharing and demand shocks is not a 
simple linear one. According to the stability theory, the profit-sharing 
firm has a "cushion" of employees it will maintain in a demand shock 
(representing the difference between L0 and Lj the excess demand for 
labor); once this cushion is exhausted by a severe demand shock, it 
will lay off workers at a pace just as rapid as that of the non-profit- 
sharing firm. Therefore the relationship between profit sharing and 
employment changes is discontinuous and depends on the degree to 
which the profit share substitutes for regular compensation (i.e., the 
gap between c and w1 in figure 4.1). If a subsequent positive shock 
restores the previous level of demand, the profit-sharing firm will hire 
back fewer people, since it laid off fewer to begin with. If starting from
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an initial equilibrium position, an increase in demand should cause the 
responses to be the same between the two types of firms, since labor 
would be available on the same conditions. However, the theory pre 
dicts that profit-sharing firms are generally more willing than fixed- 
wage firms to hire workers, so the employment response to a positive 
shock in a time of unemployment may be even stronger for a profit- 
sharing firm.
A full test of the stability theory therefore requires an estimate of the 
predicted nonlinear relationship between demand shocks and employ 
ment responses. A more complete discussion of the complicated rela 
tionship between profit sharing and demand shocks is given in 
appendix 4, where it is noted that the information required for a full 
test is not available (in particular, the degree to which profit sharing 
substitutes for fixed compensation, and an accurate measure of demand 
shocks which distinguishes whether they represent recovery from pre 
vious negative shocks). Some estimates will be reported which attempt 
to approximate the conditions for a full test of the theory. Most of the 
estimates presented, however, follows previous research by relying on 
a simpler test of whether profit-sharing firms respond differently from 
non-profit-sharing firms to positive and negative demand shocks. 
Because the stability theory's predictions about behavior under nega 
tive shocks are more straightforward, more attention will be paid to the 
employment responses to negative shocks.
Does Profit Sharing Increase Stability of Employment?
Summary results on several employment stability tests are presented 
in table 4.6 (based on estimates in appendix table A4.5). The employ 
ment sensitivity of non-profit-sharing firms is presented on line 1, 
where it can be seen that a 1 percent increase in GNP35 is associated 
with a 1.3 percent increase in company employment (column 1), while 
a 1 percent decrease in GNP is associated with a 1.2 percent decrease 
in employment (column S). 36 For old profit-sharing firms (that adopted 
profit sharing prior to 1975), line 2 shows a slightly lower sensitivity to 
GNP increases, and a slightly higher sensitivity to GNP decreases (nei-
Table 4.6 Summary Results on Employment Stability
^^ _______ ______ __y__ * *L _ *:_ ___ ___ _ _
Numbers represent estimated change in company employment for a 1 percent change in GNP, or in company sales.
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NOTES: Columns 1,3, 5, and 7 are based on regressions 3 and 5 of the indicated tables. Columns 2,4,6, and 8 are based on paired results in regressions
4 and 6 of indicated tables.
a. Assuming 37 percent of firm's workers are unionized (representing sample average for unionized firms).
***Difference between pre- and postadoption response is significant at p <.01.
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ther of which were significantly different from the non-profit-sharing 
effects). 37
Comparisons of employment stability before and after adoption of 
profit sharing are presented on lines 3 and 4. Compared to non-profit- 
sharing firms, under a positive shock the adopters were slightly less 
likely to increase employment prior to adoption (line 3), and slightly 
more likely after adoption 0ine 4). The notable difference appears for a 
1 percent decline in GNP: prior to adoption the predicted employment 
decrease was 2.2 percent, and after adoption was very close to zero 
(column 3, lines 3 and 4). This change in sensitivity (unlike most of the 
other estimates to be reviewed), is significantly different from zero (at 
the 99 percent level). This same pattern is observed (but is no longer 
statistically significant) in the paired results in column 4, where the 
predicted employment decrease goes from a preadoption value of -1.9 
percent to a postadoption value of -1.2 percent. 38
These results may be more easily seen in figures 4.2 and 4.3, which 
give the predicted employment paths of non-profit-sharing firms, and 
old and new profit-sharing firms (under the assumption that the new 
profit-sharing firms adopted it in 1978). There are two things to note. 
First, the profit-sharing firms are faster-growing, with the new profit- 
sharing firms showing faster growth both before and after the adoption. 
Second, the sensitivity to negative shocks is seen by comparing the 
1973-75 recession to the 1980-82 recession. In the earlier recession, all 
three types of firms show employment declines, but the new profit- 
sharing firms (prior to adoption) show the steepest decline. 39 In the 
1980-82 period, after adoption, the new profit-sharing firms show no 
decline while the other two groups do show declines.
This appears to indicate that the new profit-sharing firms were par 
ticularly susceptible to negative shocks prior to adoption, and much 
less so afterwards. The results for the estimate on paired data are dis 
played in figure 4.3, which show a slightly different story.40 The new 
profit-sharing firms are again seen to have a steeper employment 
decline than the old profit-sharing firms in the 1973-75 recession, but 
the two groups show equivalent declines in the 1980-82 recession.41 
Similarly, between the two periods the new profit-sharing firms show a 
slight improvement relative to the non-profit-sharing firms. The pattern 
makes it appear that the adopters were especially sensitive to negative 
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When demand shocks are measured by increases and decreases in 
company sales (summarized in columns 5 to 8 of table 4.6), there are 
no significant estimates indicating greater or less employment stability 
among profit-sharing firms, either compared to non-profit-sharing 
firms or to preadoption behavior. The decreased sensitivity to negative 
aggregate shocks but not to negative sales shocks implies that sales 
were more stable after adoption of profit sharing.
These estimates rely on a simple test of whether profit-sharing firms 
have different responses to demand shocks than do non-profit-sharing 
firms. As discussed in the preceding section and in appendix 4, the 
actual relationship predicted by the stability theory is a discontinuous 
nonlinear one, depending in part on whether or not the firm is recover 
ing from a prior negative shock. A full test of the stability theory 
requires information on the degree to which the profit share substitutes 
for regular compensation, the relationship between wage levels and 
desired employment, and prior negative shocks. Using several pieces 
of data to make assumptions about these relationships, the results from 
an approximation of a full test are presented in appendix table A4.6.42
Three main conclusions may be drawn from these approximations 
of full tests. (1) Employment behavior of profit-sharing firms generally 
appears to be different from that of non-profit-sharing firms.43 
(2) Profit-sharing employment responses to demand shocks were 
favorable, compared to non-profit-sharing responses, when firms were 
not recovering from a prior negative shock.44 Specifically, the profit- 
sharing firms had stronger employment responses to positive shocks, 
and smaller responses to negative shocks than did the non-profit-shar 
ing firms, and the pattern was generally favorable for the stability the 
ory.45 (3) The situation was more mixed when firms were recovering 
from a prior negative shock, with profit-sharing firms having a favor 
able smaller response to further negative shocks and generally equal or 
larger responses to positive shocks, though this latter finding does not 
fit the theory since the theorized response should have been smaller.46
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Unions, Profit Sharing, and Employment Stability
The proportion of a company's workforce that is unionized may 
have direct effects on employment stability, through union effects on 
labor costs and rules governing employment adjustments within the 
firm. While there have been a number of studies of union effects on 
turnover and temporary layoffs, only Leonard (1986) has directly 
examined the cyclical sensitivity of unionized vs. non-unionized firms. 
His findings were that blue-collar employment in unionized plants in 
California was less sensitive to changes in GNP than it was in non 
union plants, and that there was little difference in termination and 
new-hire rates.
Results on the relationship of unionism to demand shocks, and the 
potential effects of having a majority of union members covered by 
profit sharing, are summarized in table 4.6 (based on full results in 
appendix table A4.7). 47 The estimated employment responses of non 
profit-sharing firms are given on line 5 (for nonunion firms), and line 6 
(for union firms with average unionization). With respect to changes in 
GNP, unionized firms have less favorable behavior: they have stronger 
employment cutbacks when GNP decreases, and smaller employment 
increases when GNP increases, than do nonunion firms. These differ 
ences, however, are not estimated as statistically significant, and there 
is no difference in sensitivity to company sales increases and 
decreases.
Does union participation in profit sharing make a difference in com 
pany employment responses? The results of table 4.4 indicate that 
average pay is lower when a majority of union members participate in 
profit sharing (essentially eliminating the union wage advantage), but 
this may be counterbalanced by greater employment stability for these 
union members. As summarized in table 4.6, there were no profit-shar 
ing results that could be confidently established as significantly differ 
ent from zero. For new profit-sharing firms, the pre- and postadoption 
estimates showed a favorable decrease in sensitivity to negative shocks 
(for example, prior to adoption the employment decline for a 1 percent 
GNP decline was 1.5 percent to 1.6 percent, and after adoption was 1.0 
percent to 1.5 percent, for a firm with average unionization and a 
majority of employees covered by profit sharing). However, since this
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decline in sensitivity is never statistically significant, it is not a strong 
result
Compensation Levels and Profit-sharing Effects on Stability
A clear prediction of the stability theory is that profit sharing will 
have stabilizing effects only if the profit share substitutes (at least in 
part) for regular fixed pay. If it does not, there is no difference in 
employer views of the cost of maintaining profit-sharing and non 
profit-sharing employees during business downturns.
Ideally one would have a measure of what total compensation levels 
would have been for each profit-sharing firm in the absence of profit 
sharing. Lacking this, there are two types of comparisons that can be 
made. First, for the profit-sharing adopters, a longitudinal comparison 
can be made between the preadoption and postadoption average com 
pensation levels (adjusted for industry trends). Such a comparison in 
table 4.3 showed that the median increase in compensation was almost 
2 percent. Second, for the old profit-sharing firms, the only comparison 
possible is a cross-sectional one with the non-profit-sharing firms. The 
simple comparisons in table 4.3 show that the mean and median com 
pensation levels are higher than industry averages among the old 
profit-sharing firms.
Two methods are used here to examine the relationship of pay to sta 
bilizing effects of profit sharing. First, an attempt is made to separate 
companies in which profit sharing appears to substitute for base pay 
from those in which it appears to add on to base pay. Second, to correct 
for the effect that increased productivity may have on worker pay (if 
the productivity theory applies), the potential stabilizing effects are 
examined in relation to whether unit labor costs (labor expenses/out 
put) have increased or decreased. These calculations are necessarily 
restricted to the firms that reported labor expenses, and the resulting 
small sample sizes imply that the results can only be seen as indicative.
There is no neat method of determining whether profit sharing sub 
stitutes for other compensation, or is a pure add-on. The following 
method should be seen as a rough approximation. For new profit-shar 
ing companies, where the mean and median increases in compensation
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per employee (relative to the industry) were close to 2.0 percent, profit 
sharing was designated as "substituting" for regular compensation if 
the increase was less than 2.0 percent (and otherwise "adding" to regu 
lar compensation). Since the median profit share as a percent of payroll 
was 3.65 percent, compensation rises of less than 2 percent are likely 
to represent a cut in other compensation, while rises of more than 2 
percent represent little or no such cut.48 Such before/after comparisons 
are not available for the old profit-sharing companies; therefore for 
these companies the compensation ratio was averaged across all years 
for which the company reported labor expenses, to create a measure of 
whether a company, on average, paid better or worse than its industry. 
If this figure indicated that a profit-sharing company exceeded industry 
averages by more than 2 percent, then the profit sharing was desig 
nated to be "substituting" for regular compensation (and otherwise 
"adding" to regular compensation).49
The results of using this approximation of whether profit sharing 
substitutes or adds on to regular pay are summarized in columns 1 and 
2 of table 4.7. 50 Some support for the stability theory is provided by the 
results for new profit-sharing companies, though not for old profit- 
sharing companies. Focusing on the new profit-sharing companies, 
those in which profit sharing "substituted" for base pay had employ 
ment decreases of only 0.1 percent after adoption, compared to 0.4 per 
cent before adoption, in response to a 1 percent sales decline (column 
2, rows 3 and 4 of table 4.7). The postadoption response is significantly 
different from the non-profit-sharing employment response (0.7 per 
cent decline), but the pre/post difference is not statistically significant. 
The corresponding figures for companies where the profit share was 
more likely to be an add-on are a 0.8 percent decline prior to adoption, 
and a 0.9 percent decline after adoption. The pattern for old profit-shar 
ing firms is the opposite: in response to a 1 percent sales decline, those 
that paid less than 102 percent of the industry average pay had slightly 
stronger employment responses (0.8 percent decline) than the higher- 
paying profit-sharing firms (0.5 percent decline) (lines 2 and 5 of col 
umn 2). Neither of these responses, though, was significantly different 
from the non-profit-sharing response.
Some support for the stability theory is therefore provided by the 
pattern of responses to negative shocks for new profit-sharing firms, 
though not for old profit-sharing firms. A flaw in looking at pay levels
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Table 4.7 Summary Results on Compensation Levels and Employment 
______Changes_______________________________ 
Numbers represent estimated change in company employment for a 1 percent change 
in company sales.
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NOTES: **Significantly different from non-profit-sharing response at the 95 percent level, 
a. Based on column 1 of appendix table A4.8. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular 
pay if average compensation in old PS firm is less than 102 percent of industry average, or if 
average compensation in new PS firm went up by less than 2 percent. Profit sharing assumed to 
"add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold. The ratio of company to industry com 
pensation per employee is determined for each year, and the ratio is averaged across all years for 
old PS companies. For adopters, it is averaged across all preadopdon, and then across postadop- 
tion years, to determine if average compensation increased.
b. Based on column 2 of appendix table A4.8. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular 
pay in relation to output if average unit labor costs in old PS firm are lower than industry aver 
age, or if average unit labor costs in new PS firm, relative to industry, declined. Profit sharing 
assumed to "add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold. The ratio of company to 
industry unit labor costs is determined for each year, and the ratio is averaged across all years for 
old PS companies. For adopters, it is averaged across all preadoption, and then across postadop- 
tion, year, to determine if average unit labor costs increased. Unit labor costs are measured as 
(labor expenses)/(sales+inventory change). See text for further discussion.
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is that they are plausibly related to worker productivity if there is a 
positive productivity effect of profit sharing (as explored in chapter 3), 
this should increase worker pay. An increase in worker pay after the 
adoption of profit sharing may not indicate that profit sharing is simply 
"gravy" on top of base pay; instead, it may reflect a return to increased 
effort and productivity by the workers. The appropriate measure is not 
necessarily pay per worker, but pay per unit of worker performance 
(either quantity or quality of work). Even if overall pay (base pay plus 
profit share) per worker has increased, the increased performance may 
mean that base pay relative to worker performance has declined. To 
use a simple illustration: if worker performance has increased by 10 
percent, and has helped create a 10 percent profit-sharing bonus on top 
of base pay, the worker's base pay in relation to his or her performance 
has declined. Therefore the profit share is "substituting" for fixed pay 
in relation to the worker's performance. In this case, profit sharing may 
still have a stabilizing effect: the employer would have a strong incen 
tive to maintain the workforce under a decline in product demand (pro 
vided the higher performance is maintained).
This means that the productivity and stability theories are not neces 
sarily at odds with each other. If profit sharing does increase productiv 
ity and pay levels, the stability theory may still apply. In looking at 
whether profit sharing substitutes for base pay, how can one control for 
the effects of higher productivity on pay? One method is to calculate 
labor expenses as a proportion of the value of output (producing a mea 
sure of unit labor costs). Profit sharing may increase productivity (out 
put per employee) as well as pay (compensation per employee), but 
unit labor costs (compensation/output) will only increase if the pay 
increase exceeds the productivity increase. Therefore the change in 
unit labor costs is a separate measure of whether profit sharing is sub 
stituting for, or adding onto, base pay.51
Support for the stability theory is stronger when pay substitution is 
measured in this way (table 4.7, columns 3 and 4). Where profit shar 
ing appears to have substituted for base pay in relation to output, the 
employment response to negative shocks were much better after adop 
tion than before. The preadoption response to a 1 percent sales decline 
was -0.9 percent (compared to -0.7 percent for non-profit-sharing 
firms), and after adoption was only -0.1 percent, with the change being 
statistically significant (lines 1, 3, and 4 of column 4). For the old
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profit-sharing firms, the response to negative shocks was insignifi 
cantly lower, but to positive shocks was significantly higher, compared 
to non-profit-sharing firms (line 2). In contrast, where profit sharing 
appears to have added on to regular pay in relation to output, there are 
no significant differences between profit-sharing and non-profit-shar 
ing employment responses (except for a much lower postadoption 
response to positive shocks, as shown in line 7).
It definitely appears that compensation is an important variable in 
the stability effects of profit sharing. Both methods indicated that, 
when profit shares appear to partially substitute for base compensation, 
profit-sharing adopters had smaller employment cutbacks after adop 
tion than before in response to negative demand shocks. 52 This was not 
true of companies where the profit share appeared to add on to regular 
compensation. While consistent with the stability theory, this result 
should only be seen as indicative due to the small number of firms 
reporting sufficient compensation data.
Stability Effects of Cash and Deferred Plans, Different Plan 
Formulas, and Occupational Participation
Several other features of profit sharing may make a difference in the 
stability effects, including the type of plan and the type of employees 
covered.
There may be differences in the stabilizing effects of profit sharing 
according to how the profit share is distributed. Since deferred profit 
sharing is a form of pension plan, employers may see contributions to 
such plans as more of a company obligation to ensure retirement secu 
rity, so that they are less likely to be cut in business downturns.53
Profit-sharing plans were divided into those that have a cash compo 
nent (including combination plans where a portion may be deferred), 
and those with totally deferred payments. The results (in appendix 
table A4.9) do not paint a clear picture of stabilizing effects for either 
type of plan. There is no consistent pattern for old cash or deferred 
plans of greater or less responsiveness to negative shocks. For new 
plans, adoption of deferred plans is associated with significant declines 
in responsiveness to negative aggregate shocks in two of the specifica-
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tions (consistent with my results for deferred plans in Kruse 1991a), 
but there was no significant change in responsiveness associated with 
sales changes or with cash plans.
The formula that a profit-sharing company uses to determine the 
profit share may have a strong relation to the potential stability effects. 
The stability theory that Weitzman developed assumes that the profit 
share is based on a prespecified percent of company profits. It may also 
be argued to apply when the profit share is discretionary, since a discre 
tionary contribution should not be seen by employers as part of the 
short-run marginal cost of labor (but may be seen by employers and 
employees as part of long-run expected compensation). The stability 
theory clearly does not apply when the profit share is a fixed percent of 
participants' pay, since in this case the profit share is viewed as part of 
the marginal cost of labor.
As for the productivity specifications, companies reporting plan for 
mulas were divided into several groups: percent-of-profits, discretion 
ary, percent-of-pay, and "other" formula. Results for the stabilizing 
effects of each type of plan are reported in appendix table A4.10,54 and 
are weakly consistent with the stability theory. Only for percent-of- 
profits plans do the estimates consistently indicate smaller employment 
responses to negative shocks (line 4). The one estimate where sam 
pling error may (weakly) be ruled out indicates that firms with such 
plans have a predicted employment cutback of only 0.4 percent, com 
pared to 0.7 percent for non-profit-sharing firms, in response to a 1 per 
cent decrease in sales Qines 2 and 4, column 6). For no other plan 
formulas are there significant estimates of profit-sharing effects on 
employment responses, or consistent patterns across the various esti 
mates. The story with respect to positive shocks is similar: the esti 
mates for percent-of-profits plans all indicate greater employment 
responses to positive shocks (but none where sampling error can be 
ruled out), while the estimates for other formulas show no consistent 
pattern of higher or lower responsiveness. Overall, the more favorable 
results for percent-of-profits plans is consistent with the stability the 
ory, although the results are not strong. 55
Finally, what is the relation between occupational composition and 
the stability effects of profit sharing? The survey asked companies to 
break their employees into three categories: clerical and technical 
(nonexempt), production and service (nonexempt), and professional
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and administrative (exempt). They were further asked for the propor 
tion of employees covered by profit sharing within each group, and the 
overall numbers show that coverage was lowest among production and 
service workers (table 1.3). 56 The proportions of employees in each 
occupation group, and these proportions interacted with the proportion 
covered by profit sharing, were separately examined for their relation 
ship to positive and negative shocks. 57 The results (in appendix table 
A4.11) show less sensitivity to decreases in GNP for each occupational 
group between the pre-and postadoption periods (where sampling error 
can be ruled out for the professional/administrative employees); also, 
they show less sensitivity to decreases in company sales for all but pro 
fessional/administrative workers (but sampling error cannot be ruled 
out for any of the differences). Therefore there is no strong evidence 
that profit sharing is particularly good or bad for any occupational 
group.58
Summary and conclusions regarding these tests of the stability the 
ory will be presented in the final chapter.
NOTES
1. For a discussion of wage flexibility in the United States, see Mitchell (1985).
2. For example, the Senate Finance Subcommittee report asserted that, "When wages remain 
rigid, the flexibility necessary to effect a balance between selling prices and consumer buying is 
missing and our economic system is stalemated" (U.S. Senate 1939: 63).
3. This simple model elides the complications introduced by firm-specific skills, firm insur 
ance of risk-averse workers, and incomplete supervision.
4. Firms maximize profits by setting the MRP of labor equal to the marginal cost (MC) of 
labor. In graph 1 of figure 4.1, the MC of labor is simply the wage, so the firm maximizes profits 
at the point where the two curves intersect. In graph 2, the MC of labor lies between the w' and 
MRP lines (since workers share in the profits, or the difference between MRP and w"), and inter 
sects those two lines at point B. Unlike in the fixed-wage firm, the MC curve slopes downward, 
reflecting the decreased labor cost per employee as more employees are hired and the profit share 
is split among a larger number.
5. For further discussion and theoretical treatment, see Burton (1986); Blinder (1986a, 
1986b); Nuti (1987); Mitchell (1987); Cooper (1988); Fitzroy (1988); Fung (1989); John (1991); 
Bensaid and Gary-Bobo (1991); Eckalbar (1992); and LaCivita and Pirog (1992). For a practitio 
ner's view see Parks (1990).
6. This review is based on all published studies that could be located in books or in econom 
ics, personnel, and business journals (using searches up through June 1993 of the Business Peri 
odicals Index and the computerized databases ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and 
Business Dateline), and on unpublished studies made available by colleagues.
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7. Each extra dollar of bonus was associated with higher compensation of $1.24 and $.39 per 
hour for nonoffice and office workers, respectively, and with higher straight-time wages of $.83 
and $.27.
8. The profit share added $.43 to average compensation in manufacturing firms, and $.47 in 
nonmanufacturing firms.
9. There were 133 contracts with, and 1,666 contracts without, profit sharing. The prevalence 
of cost-of-living-adjustment freezes or eliminations were also higher among contracts with profit 
sharing (Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 1990: 25).
10. Wage concessions were defined as nominal wage freezes or declines in the first year of the 
contract. For further information on their data see table 1.1 and the accompanying text and notes 
in chapter 1. Also, Florkowski and Shastri (1992) find that among 45 announced union contracts 
with profit-sharing provisions over the 1979-88 period, 60 percent were accompanied by 
announced wage reductions.
11. One additional piece of evidence on the relationship of profit sharing to unionization 
comes from Cardinal and Helburn (1986), who find that a variety of fringe benefits are equally 
likely to be offered in unionized and nonunion profit-sharing firms.
12. Company average compensation was defined as (labor expenses)/(totaI employees), while 
industry average compensation was defined as (total compensation)/(total full-time and part-time 
employees) from the National Income and Product Accounts tables 6.4 and 6.6. Both include pay 
roll taxes. Note that differences between company and industry average yearly pay may be due to 
differences in pay per hour, or to the proportion of part-time workers (e.g., a company paying only 
80 percent of industry average yearly pay may simply be hiring a higher proportion of part-time 
workers.
13. The profit share in the industry average cannot be excluded, due to lack of data.
14. The upper and lower 1 percent of values, across the entire sample, have been excluded to 
eliminate the potential influence of outliers.
15. This slight rise in compensation would be expected if profit sharing is accompanied by 
higher productivity, as explored in chapter 3. This measure of the difference between average pre- 
and postadoption compensation levels gives equal weight to each of the 42 companies, while the 
numbers on lines 6-8 represent total observations, giving greater weight to companies that 
reported labor expenses more often.
16. The regressions used company labor expenses per employee divided by industry average 
compensation per employee as the dependent variable. To fully control for industry effects, the 
independent variables should also be adjusted for mean industry values. The limited number of 
observations, however, prevents this.
Regressions were also run using the occupational composition of the workforce to explain 
average compensation levels, using a smaller sample size due to nonresponse on occupational 
composition. One of these is presented in column 3 of appendix table A4.1. The results for the 
variables of interest were very similar.
17. See Katz and Meltz (1991) for comparison of auto workers' pay in the United States 
(where profit sharing was negotiated as part of wage concessions) and Canada (where it was not).
18. Due in large part to the small sample size, very few of the estimates are significantly dif 
ferent from zero at conventional levels. In the full results presented in appendix table A4.1, the 
only significant coefficient in regression 3 is a surprising negative coefficient on the adoption of a 
defined benefit plan (implying a 5 percent compensation cut), but this should be discounted 
because it is based on only four companies which adopted such plans in this period. For summa 
ries of evidence on the relationship between pay and pensions, see Gustman and Mitchell (1992) 
and Gunderson, Hyatt, and Pesando (1992).
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19. The estimated associations between productivity growth and profit-sharing adoption were 
similar between the full sample and this restricted subsample.
20. Just as it is possible that profit shares may act like fixed wages in affecting employment, 
wages may have an element of profit sharing by being affected by company profitability (as pos 
ited by rent-sharing theories in labor economics). For a review and some evidence, see Blanch- 
flower, Oswald, and Sanfey (1992).
21. The labor demand function estimated here is:
ln(L) = po + p^lnOv) -i- p2*(bAv) + &*Q + PV*
where
L = employment level
w = base wage
b = size of profit-sharing bonus
Q = measure of company's output
X = other explanatory variables.
The coefficient PJ measures the conventional wage elasticity of labor demand, while the coef 
ficient p2 measures the responsiveness of employment to bonus payments, holding wages con 
stant. If P2 is negative, and equal to or greater than pj in magnitude, then profit-sharing payments 
would appear to behave like wages in affecting labor demanded; whereas if P2 is positive, or neg 
ative but smaller in magnitude than P], then profit-sharing payments would not appear to have the 
same negative effects as wages. The other explanatory variables would include the costs of other 
inputs, particularly the cost of capital. To be valid, this specification must account for the potential 
endogeneity of profit-sharing payments; such payments are likely to be influenced by factors that 
also affect labor demand. This study uses the above equation in first-difference form to exploit the 
panel data by removing any constant firm effects.
22. A complication is introduced by the fact that CompuStat reports only total labor expenses, 
so that this must be divided by total employment to arrive at an average compensation figure. 
However, any measurement error in employment will bias the coefficient, since the change in 
employment is the dependent variable. To correct for this, average compensation is instrumented 
on average industry compensation (from the National Income Product Accounts) for the current 
and two prior years (as in Kruse 1991b).
23. To correct for the endogeneity of the profit-sharing variable, it was instrumented on the 
variables from regression 5 of appendix table A2.2, excluding the profit margin and stock price 
variables (due to concerns about their exogeneity). As will be discussed, the results were sensitive 
to the choice of instruments.
24. Several experiments were made with cost-of-capital measures, following Kruse (199Ib). 
As in the previous study, the coefficients on these measures were never significantly different 
from zero, and their inclusion made negligible difference in the parameters of interest. To main 
tain the highest sample size, these measures were omitted from the final results presented.
25. In Kruse (1991b), I used industry benefits as a percent of industry wages and salaries (cur 
rent and two lagged values) as instruments for employer contributions to deferred profit-sharing 
plans; the results generally supported the stability theory. When the same instruments were used 
here they produced generally negative coefficients for the profit-sharing variable in this sample. 
Such instruments may not be applicable because cash profit-sharing payments are not included as 
part of the definition of benefits at the industry level; even so, the result makes a firm conclusion 
impossible. The sample here is too small to separate meaningfully profit sharing by type of plan; 
to maintain the highest response rate, firms were not asked to distinguish the size of cash vs. 
deferred contributions.
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An additional instrument used in Kruse (1991b) was the percentage of company employees in 
deferred profit sharing in a given year, as reported on the Form 5500 for years 1980-86. Since 
year-to-year variation in percentage covered was not collected for this study, the variable was not 
used here to predict yearly changes in profit-sharing payments.
26. The 1975 cutoff has the advantage that preadoption employment behavior is analyzed both 
for years of expanding economic activity (1971-73) and contracting economic activity (1973-75). 
Experiments were made using other cutoffs in the 1970s and 1980 (in part, to account for misre- 
porting of plan age, as discussed in chapter 3), but the results were not sensitive. Misreporting of 
plan age is not likely to be as large a problem here as for the productivity specifications, since the 
primary productivity estimates focused on immediate effects in adoption year, whereas the stabil 
ity estimates do not.
27. Variability is defined as each company's standard deviation of yearly change in ^(employ 
ment), which may be interpreted as the dispersion of employment around a growth trend.
28. One alternative would be to include all firms and measure profit sharing as proportion of 
employees covered. This assumes, however, that if the stability theory is correct, a firm with 50 
percent of employees covered would show twice the stability of a firm with 25 percent covered. 
Such an assumption is risky, since the variation among noncovered employees could easily be 
larger in the former firm. To avoid this, the sample was restricted to firms with all or nearly all 
employees in profit sharing. For 16 firms which did not report the percentage covered, the per 
centage was imputed from predictions based on age of plan, unionization, and industry member 
ship; this added four firms to the 90 percent* sample. Results excluding these firms were very 
similar.
29. The industry controls comprise 25 industry dummies and separate time trends.
30. As with the productivity specifications, several inverse Mill's ratios were tested and found 
to have insignificant coefficients and negligible effects on the coefficients of interest. The reported 
results include no selection terms.
31. Prior to trimming, the range of the yearly employment change variable (change in 
ln(employment)) was -4.77 to 4.64, implying, at the extremes, 100-fold changes in employment 
between years. The potentially stabilizing effects of profit sharing are likely to be swamped by the 
massive transformations which an organization is undergoing during such a time, and it is 
desirable to test the influence of profit sharing during more typical business fluctuations. Use of 
robust regression techniques on the basic specifications resulted in weights of zero or close to zero 
being given to the extreme values. For computational simplicity, two levels of trimming were 
tested for all specifications: eliminating five extreme values (restricting the dependent variable 
range to -2.04 to 1.87), and eliminating the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of employment 
changes (restricting the dependent variable range to -.53 to .53). There were no noteworthy 
differences in the results; results for the larger sample (with only five values trimmed) are 
presented here.
32. The GNP and sales figures were first deflated by the GNP deflator, and natural logarithms 
were taken so that changes would represent cumulative percentage changes. The In(GNP) mea 
sure was regressed on a simple time trend, and the residual from this regression was used as the 
demand shock measure (with positive and negative residuals representing positive and negative 
shocks). The unemployment rate measure was specified as the change in ln(l - civilian unemploy 
ment rate), with positive shocks representing decreases in unemployment (i.e., increases in this 
measure). Estimates were also made with nominal company sales, and with deflated company 
sales using the CPI for retail firms and industry inflation measures for manufacturing firms (at the 
3-digit SIC level, from the NBER Trade and Immigration Dataset). There were no notable differ 
ences in results.
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33. This distinguishes the stability theory from "labor hoarding" theories, in which firms may 
retain employees under negative shocks to maintain firm-specific skills and avoid turnover costs.
34. This is estimated as follows. The coefficient on In(sales) in a labor demand equation is the 
elasticity of employment with respect to sales, or %6I/%6Sales which is %&L/(%8P + %50 
(where 5 is the difference operator, L = employment, P = price, and Q = physical output). Under 
the assumption of imperfect competition and constant elasticity of product demand, price is a 
fixed markup over marginal cost. Let the production function be Q = A(L -f), where A is a techni 
cal coefficient and/is nonproduction labor. This has a constant marginal cost of output which is 
w/A, so that p = (WA)(<l>/(<t> -1)) where O = product demand elasticity, and w = compensation per 
worker.
Under these assumptions, an inward shift of the demand curve, provided it does not change 
the demand elasticity, will not affect P for a fixed-wage firm, and the entire %6Sales will repre 
sent output changes. Under the production function Q = A(L - /), the coefficient on In(sales) will 
equal %8L/%&Q = 1 - (flL). As will be seen, empirical estimates of this coefficient are close to .5, 
which under the maintained assumptions implies thatj7L = .5.
For a profit-sharing firm, the relevant marginal cost of labor after a negative demand shift is 
the base wage w' (assuming the demand shift is large enough to eliminate excess demand for 
labor). In this case the marginal cost of output is w'lA, the new price is P1 = (w'/AXO/O-l)), and 
the %&P = (w - c)lc (where c = total compensation per worker, following notation in figure 4.1). 
The coefficient on ln(sales), assuming as before that %8Z/%8g = 1 -flL, will be %6X/%5L/(1 - 
flL) + (wf - eye). Assume (a) a profit share which substitutes for regular compensation and aver 
ages 3.6 percent of compensation (the median of profit shares from companies reporting profit 
share), (b)J7L = .5 (from above paragraph), and (c) a sales decrease of 6 percent (the median fig 
ure for sales decreases across all companies and years). Under these assumptions, the predicted 
change in employment for a non-profit-sharing firm would be -3.0 percent, and for a profit-shar 
ing firm would be -1.2 percent (or only 40 percent of the non-profit-sharing cut in employment).
Therefore under these assumptions about product demand curves and cost structures with 
imperfect competition, the non-profit-sharing firms would respond to a typical sales decrease by 
maintaining prices and cutting employment, while the profit-sharing firms would respond by cut 
ting prices and reducing employment by only roughly half as much. These calculations are obvi 
ously sensitive to the particular assumptions; without any direct measure of price changes in the 
firms, it is impossible to fully evaluate this model.
35. All references to increases and decreases in GNP refer to changes in constant-dollar GNP 
relative to a time trend over 1970-91.
36. The estimated effects on line 1 of table 4.6 represent the antilogs of the (coefficient * .01) 
on lines 1 and 2 of appendix table A4.5. Hie positive coefficients on negative shocks (line 2, table 
4.13) indicate that employment moves in the same direction as the shock, so the estimated effects 
are given as negative in columns 3, 4,7, and 8 of table 4.6.
37. These effects are estimated by adding the coefficients on lines 1 and 3 of appendix table 
A4.S, and then calculating the effect as described in previous footnote. The conclusion that the 
responses are not significantly different is based on the low /-statistics of the interaction coeffi 
cients (lines 3 and 4).
38. The paired results do not include an estimate for non-profit-sharing firms (line 1), since 
these are the base group for the paired differences. Since there is no base effect of demand shocks 
in the paired difference, the illustration of paired results in table 4.6 (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8) uses 
the non-profit-sharing effect from the preceding column as the base effect.
39. Reflecting the results from lines 1 to 3, column 3, table 4.6.
40. In using paired data, all comparisons are relative to the non-profit-sharing group, which is 
why there is no growth trend reflected for this group (i.e., it hovers around 100 percent). The
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paired regression results do not show sensitivity to GNP changes for the baseline non-profit- 
sharing group, but only differential sensitivity compared to the profit-sharing pairs. For purposes 
of illustration, figure 4.3 borrows the coefficients on baseline sensitivity from regression 3 of 
appendix table A4.6.
41. Reflecting the numbers on lines 2, 3, and 4 of column 4, table 4.6.
42. As discussed there, these estimates are based only upon company sales changes as demand 
shock measures, because of the difficulty of distinguishing what would constitute a "large" and 
"small" shock for an individual firm from the aggregate measures.
43. The hypothesis that employment responses are equal between the two types of firms was 
rejected at the 95 percent level for regressions 2 and 4 (using F-tests), but not for the smaller sam 
ples in regressions 3 and 5.
44. Prior negative shock was defined as a decrease in (deflated) sales last year. These estimates 
are on lines 1 to 4 of appendix table A4.6.
45. In particular, the coefficients on line 3 were more positive for PS firms in three of the four 
regressions, indicating a larger cushion of employees who are retained under large negative 
shocks. Also, the coefficients on line 4 are smaller or more negative for the PS firms, indicating a 
smaller likelihood and magnitude of layoffs under small demand shocks. For a discussion of the 
theoretical expectations under the small and large shocks, see appendix 4.
46. This is seen in particular by comparing the PS and NPS coefficients on rows 7 and 8 with 
their theoretical expectation in column 1. In each case the PS firm had more hiring than the NPS 
firm. While this does not fit the theoretical expectation of behavior under a prior negative shock, it 
is nonetheless "favorable" behavior of greater willingness to hire by PS firms.
47. If unionization affects employment changes, obviously the proportion unionized will vary 
between years. If each year's proportion were used, this would introduce a substantial problem of 
simultaneity between employment changes and proportion unionized, biasing the coefficients. 
The use of 1991 proportion unionized as an "instrument" for proportion unionized across the time 
period will correct this bias (while introducing some measurement error since the proportion 
unionized may have changed since the beginning of the period).
48 The results were not sensitive to the use of other cutoff points, including a 0 percent cut-off 
(implying that the profit share must fully substitute for regular compensation). Even if profit shar 
ing fully substitutes for regular compensation, the total compensation per employee may, on aver 
age, be higher because of a risk premium for the variability from profit-sharing compensation.
As noted previously, the limited information on labor expenses restricts the sample for these 
tests. These results are based on only 14 profit-sharing adopters that reported more than one year 
of labor expense data in both the pre- and postadoption periods, and had 90 percent or more of 
employees covered.
49. This cutoff was chosen for the same reason expressed above. Again, results were not sen 
sitive to other cutoff points.
50. Since less than half of the companies reported labor expenses, there were too few observa 
tions for paired results within industry. Lacking within-industry comparisons of responses to 
aggregate demand shocks, only the company sales changes are used as demand shocks here.
51. This is clearly not an ideal measure for two reasons. First, changes in unit labor costs will 
reflect changes in productivity occurring from other sources, while the marginal cost of employ 
ing labor may have stayed constant. Second, total labor expenses as reported in CompuStat 
include the profit share so that even if unit labor costs show a small increase, the profit share 
may still be partially substituting for regular fixed pay. For these reasons, the change in unit labor 
costs used here is not a clear indicator of whether the perceived cost of employing labor has 
changed following profit-sharing adoption; rather, an increase in unit labor cost is treated simply 
as indicating a greater likelihood of the profit share being an add-on.
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Each firm's (labor expenses/sales) was calculated, the (2-digit) industry mean for that year was 
subtracted, and the within-company mean of the result (across years) was calculated. Old profit- 
sharing companies were divided according to whether this within-company mean was positive or 
negative (with a positive value representing a higher likelihood of profit sharing adding on to 
pay), while new profit-sharing companies were divided according to whether this mean increased 
or decreased after adoption (with an increase representing a higher likelihood of profit sharing 
adding on to pay). As with the previous estimates in table 4.7, the limited information on labor 
expenses restricts the sample size: only 14 profit-sharing adopters could be found that reported 
two or more years of labor expense data in both the pre- and postadoption periods (with six hav 
ing a decrease in average unit labor costs).
52. The two measures of substitution did not classify the same adopters as "substituting" or 
"adding on" to base pay, with only six of the fourteen firms having the same status in both sam 
ples.
53. Results on motives for maintaining profit-sharing plans (from table 2.2) showed, not sur 
prisingly, that providing for retirement security was a higher priority for firms maintaining only 
deferred plans.
54. The presented results do not divide old profit-sharing companies from new adopters; when 
this is done, the small number of observations in several categories produces very unreliable esti 
mates. The pattern of results in the unreported regressions provided no clear indication of greater 
or lesser stability after adoption for any of the plan formulas.
55. The weak results may in part be due to the small sample size, since the question on formu 
las was on the mail portion of the survey and only half of profit-sharing companies responded.
56. Estimates of occupational composition by industry class showed roughly similar composi 
tion among the major classes, except for retail trade. Production and service workers constituted 
an average 41-53 percent of workers in all major industries except retail trade, where it was 80 
percent. Similarly, professional/administrative workers constituted a mean of 22-37 percent of 
employees, and clerical/technical workers constituted a mean of 16-31 percent of employees 
across industries, except for retail trade (with means of 11 percent and 10 percent, respectively).
57. As with the estimate of union coverage, occupational composition was asked only as of 
the survey year (1991). This value was imputed back through the sample period to estimate the 
relationship of occupational composition to demand shocks. If each year's proportion were used, 
this would introduce a substantial problem of simultaneity between employment changes and 
occupational composition, biasing the coefficients. The use of 1991 proportions as "instruments" 
across the time period will correct this bias (while introducing some measurement error since the 
composition may have changed since the beginning of the period).
Including each occupation proportion with its demand shock interaction in a regression will 
lead to high multicollinearity and high standard errors, since the demand shocks are identical. The 
presented results were done separately for each occupation group.
58. The results in appendix table A4.ll are only for unpaired data, reflecting both between- 
industry and within-industry effects. The occupational composition tends to be very similar 
within an industry, so that paired within-industry differences were small and failed to produce 
reliable estimates of the relationship between occupation and demand shocks. Separate estimation 
of stability effects by industry class (using both 8-category and 25-category definitions) did not 
show greater or smaller stability effects in any industry.
Summary, Conclusions, 
and Policy Implications
Profit sharing with employees has existed since the earliest days of 
the United States. A major source of support has been ideological: 
profit sharing has been seen as a way to strengthen support for capital 
ism by tying worker rewards more explicitly to the health of the firms. 
There have been two main theories about the effects of profit sharing. 
One is tied to employee incentives: profit sharing has long been advo 
cated on the grounds that it can improve business performance by 
encouraging worker effort, cooperation, and sharing of ideas and infor 
mation (the "productivity theory"). A second, more recent, theory is 
tied to employer incentives: profit sharing has been theorized to change 
incentives to hire and retain employees, leading to greater employment 
and output stability for firms and the economy as a whole (the "stabil 
ity theory").
Overview of Trends
Is there enough practice of profit sharing to make it even worthy of 
study? The disparate sources of evidence, summarized in chapter 1, 
indicate that roughly one-sixth to one-fourth of American businesses 
and employees participate in some form of profit sharing. The preva 
lence does not appear to vary greatly by occupational status or by firm 
size, but does appear to be more common among companies with pub 
lic stock, and less common among unionized employees. This no doubt 
reflects a long history of suspicion of profit sharing by unions, 
although the incidence of profit sharing for unionized employees 
increased in the 1980s (often tied to wage concessions). Internation 
ally, there has been substantial interest in profit sharing in Europe and 
elsewhere, but little data on actual incidence (Blanchflower 1991; Flor- 
kowski 1991; Uvalic 1990).
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This study reports on a new database on profit sharing in U.S. com 
panies with public stock. The survey found that 40.7 percent of such 
companies reported having a profit-sharing plan for employees other 
than top management, a figure very much in line with other data 
sources for U.S. public companies. Data were collected on profit-shar 
ing coverage, types, and formulas, as well as on other personnel poli 
cies that may compete or interact with profit sharing in affecting firm 
behavior. A telephone survey was done of 500 public companies half 
with profit sharing and half without, for purposes of comparison. To 
maximize comparability, an attempt was made to find for each firm a 
same-industry pair with the opposite profit-sharing status for exam 
ple, for each profit-sharing food processor, an attempt was made to find 
a non-profit-sharing food processor for comparison (resulting in pairs 
for 410 of the firms). To provide evidence on the productivity and sta 
bility theories of profit sharing, the survey data were matched with 
publicly available data from public companies on company character 
istics and performance over the 1970-91 period.
Predicting Adoption of Profit Sharing
What factors influence the adoption of profit-sharing plans? Prior 
research has mostly relied on cross-sectional data to examine the corre 
lates of company and industry variables with the presence of profit- 
sharing plans (11 studies summarized in table 2.1). While it has pro 
duced no clear consistent findings, some of the variables highlighted 
by this research as potentially important are: unionization, firm size, 
employee composition, firm growth, capital intensity, and industry 
variability.
In contrast to most previous research, the analysis presented here 
focused on what factors predict the adoption of profit sharing, relying 
mainly on changes in variables in the two years preceding the decision 
to adopt. Such analysis provides a better indication of the causality 
between company characteristics and the presence of profit sharing. It 
was difficult, however, to find strong predictors of adoption.
Improvements in profit margins and stock prices appear to increase 
the chance of profit-sharing adoption (consistent with British data from
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Poole 1989). When profits, or expected profits, increase, a profit-shar 
ing plan may be an attractive means of increasing compensation with 
out obligating the company to a fixed amount each year. Growth in the 
profit margin over the two preceding years appears to be most impor 
tant for predicting adoption of cash plans, while increases in the clos 
ing stock price appear to be most important for deferred plan adoption 
(as summarized in table 2.3). 1 The explanation offered here is that 
deferred plans represent a longer-term commitment (with higher start 
up and shutdown costs), so that a longer-term increase in profitability 
(reflected in the stock price) favors deferred plans.
This finding, while interesting in itself, also serves to cast doubt on 
cross-sectional analyses of profit sharing, in which profit-sharing and 
non-profit-sharing companies are compared on measures of perfor 
mance. If higher profits in fact help predict the adoption of profit shar 
ing, then it is not surprising to find that profit-sharing companies score 
higher on profitability and other performance measures.2
The theory that increased variability of company sales or profits 
helps predict profit-sharing adoption receives some very weak support. 
The pattern of estimates indicates that this is primarily a between- 
industry, rather than within-industry, effect that is, higher variability 
in one's industry during the past five years favors the adoption of profit 
sharing, while higher variability compared to industry competitors 
does not strongly favor this (although even here, the estimate signs 
support this story). Also, comparison of cash and deferred adoption 
indicates that increased variability may predict adoption of deferred 
plans, but does not predict adoption of cash plans.
The only other factor that may predict profit-sharing adoption is the 
presence of a union. Over the period of this study (1970-1990), union 
contracts were increasingly likely to include profit-sharing provisions 
(Bell and Neumark 1993). Union presence showed up in several esti 
mates as a predictor of profit-sharing adoption, particularly for cash 
plans where it roughly doubled the chance of adoption in the sample 
period.
Just as noteworthy are the factors that do not predict adoption of 
profit-sharing plans. Deferred profit-sharing plans offer a potentially 
attractive source of capital for firms, since the assets of such plans may 
be heavily invested in employer securities. However, changes in two 
measures of the reliance on outside capital debt/equity and interest
150 Summary, Conclusions, and Policy Implications
payments did not predict adoption of either type of plan. Changes in 
company and industry labor costs per employee did not predict adop 
tion of profit sharing. The firm's expenditure on research and develop 
ment was also hypothesized to be a potential predictor of profit 
sharing, since this is an area in which supervision costs and the value 
of cooperation may be higher. However, neither levels nor changes in 
R&D expenditures were significant predictors of profit-sharing adop 
tion. Likewise, recent growth in sales and capital intensity did not pre 
dict adoption.
Finally, several company characteristics were addressed that predict 
participation by union employees and different occupational groups in 
profit sharing. Because such data were not easily available for the time 
at which profit sharing was adopted, this analysis relied on 1990 data 
in profit-sharing companies to examine the correlates of current cover 
age by union employees and occupational groups.
The age of profit sharing, and the share of professional/administra 
tive employees within a company were significant predictors of 
employee coverage within profit-sharing plans. Higher union density 
predicts lower coverage in each of the three main occupational groups 
(professional/administrative, production/service, and clerical/techni 
cal), although a greater likelihood that a majority of union members 
participate. Overall, a 10 percentage point increase in unionization 
within a firm is associated with a 2.2 percentage point decline in 
employee coverage within a profit-sharing firm. Therefore, while 
unions have become more likely to participate in profit sharing in the 
past 20 years, their members are still less likely than nonunion employ 
ees to be covered.
The Productivity Theory
Does profit sharing improve company performance? For over a 
century there have been claims that it does, by encouraging workers to 
cooperate with each other and management, share ideas and informa 
tion, and monitor co-workers. This theory has received new attention 
in the past two decades, given the slowdown in productivity growth in 
the United States (which averaged only 1.2 percent per year in the
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1970s and 1980s, following growth of almost 3.0 percent per year 
between World War II and 1970) (Economic Report of the President 
1992: table B-44).
The main argument against positive effects of profit sharing is the 
weak connection between individual effort and reward in group incen 
tive systems; it is possible that this may be overcome by some form of 
cooperative agreement among employees, fostered by appropriate pol 
icies and climate in the firm. Other theoretical issues include employee 
self-selection into or out of profit-sharing companies, and the possibil 
ity of weaker incentives for managerial supervision and capital invest 
ment.
Research in the past 15 years supports the idea that profit sharing 
can improve corporate performance. Across 26 econometric studies 
summarized in table 3.1, a majority of estimated associations (57.4 
percent) between profit sharing and productivity measures have been 
positive and strong enough that random sampling error can be ruled 
out as an explanation. The majority of these studies, though, have not 
compared companies before and after the adoption of profit sharing. 
This leaves open the question of causality: higher productivity may 
lead companies to adopt profit-sharing plans, rather than vice versa. 
This possibility is made more plausible by the finding in chapter 2 that 
increases in profitability help predict the adoption of profit-sharing 
plans.
A variety of methods and variables was employed in attempting to 
gauge the relationship between productivity and profit-sharing adop 
tion and presence. As with most previous research, the estimates were 
based on a production function with capital and labor inputs. The avail 
ability of panel data made it possible to compare pre- and postadoption 
performance on the adopters, and remove the influence of any constant 
factors that make one firm more productive than another (such as mar 
ket placement or managerial quality). Two productivity measures were 
used (value-added per employee and sales per employee). Estimates 
were made using all firms (controlling for broad industry and year 
effects), and using paired differences between firms in the same indus 
try. The estimates also accounted for union presence and the adoption 
and presence of ESOPs and defined benefit pension plans.
The adoption of a profit-sharing plan within the sample period was 
associated with a 3.5 to 5 percent increase in productivity, with no con-
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sistent estimate of an upward or downward productivity trend after 
adoption (summarized in table 3.3, and illustrated in figure 3.1). Ran 
dom sampling error could be ruled out for most of the adoption effects. 
When profit sharing is measured as proportion of employees covered 
rather than a simple dummy variable, the results are slightly weaker.3 
The estimated effect sizes are very much in line with those from other 
studies, where a meta-analysis indicated that the median productivity 
difference associated with profit sharing was 4.4 percent (Weitzman 
and Kruse 1990: 138-9). Simply adopting profit sharing, though, was 
not found to be automatically associated with productivity increases; 
across various estimates, between one-fourth and one-third of the 
adopters had no productivity increase beyond that predicted by other 
company characteristics (in fact, outcomes were just as dispersed for 
adopters as for nonadopters, but were on average shifted in a more pos 
itive direction for the adopters).
A variety of factors are commonly believed to influence the motiva 
tional value of profit sharing. First, cash plans are generally seen as 
better motivators than deferred plans, due to the immediacy of the 
reward. When broken down by plan type, the results are generally con 
sistent with this belief; adoption of cash plans is associated with larger 
productivity increases in all estimates. Second, plans that explicitly tie 
contributions to profits as opposed to a percentage of pay, a discre 
tionary amount, or another method are believed to be better motiva 
tors. The inferiority of percent-of-pay plans is generally confirmed by 
the estimates, although the results were more favorable for adoption of 
discretionary plans than for percent-of-profits plans. The estimated 
relationship between changes in profits and profit-sharing contribu 
tions is actually slightly higher for discretionary plans than for percent- 
of-profit plans (and much larger than for percent-of-pay plans). While 
discretionary plans are not generally viewed as good motivators, it was 
noted that such plans may be more effectively used to reward 
employee performance (subtracting out the "noise" from other influ 
ences on profits) in an atmosphere of high employee trust that better 
employee performance will be recognized and rewarded.
Company size is strongly expected to be a factor in the effect of 
profit sharing on performance, since individual incentives should grow 
weaker as the number of employees who share in profits grows larger. 
Analysis of profit-sharing effects in five size classes gives anomalous
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results (summarized in table 3.4). The productivity effects of profit- 
sharing adoption are in fact largest in the smallest size class (less than 
775 employees). However, estimated productivity effects in the largest 
size class (more than 17,000 employees), while smaller in size, are also 
strong enough to rule out random sampling error. This is hard to recon 
cile with considerations of individual incentives, though it may indi 
cate that the presence of profit sharing is as important as the size of the 
performance-pay link, and large companies may be able to develop a 
"corporate culture" in which profit sharing is most effective.
The size of the profit share in relation to employee compensation is 
also commonly believed to be an important factor in its motivational 
potential. The profit-sharing sample was split into "high-contribution" 
and "low-contribution" groups based on the average contribution as a 
percentage of payroll (to attempt a measure of company policy regard 
ing contributions and minimize obvious problems of higher perfor 
mance leading to higher contributions in any year). The estimates 
(table 3.4) indicated more positive effects for adoption and presence of 
high-contribution plans.
Finally, this study addressed the questions of whether profit sharing 
may simply be a proxy for other personnel policies, and whether profit 
sharing interacts with information-sharing and other policies designed 
to make better use of employee ideas and skills. When the adoption 
and presence of seven other personnel policies were accounted for, the 
profit-sharing estimates were virtually unchanged, indicating that profit 
sharing is unlikely to be a proxy for these other policies. When profit- 
sharing adoption and presence were interacted with three types of 
information-sharing, and with coverage of profit-sharing participants 
by the seven personnel policies, there were no clear indications that 
these policies enhance or detract from the effect of profit sharing. The 
one possible exception is for employee involvement programs cover 
ing profit-sharing participants, where the pattern of results was posi 
tive. To more fully explore this question, profit-sharing companies 
were also asked whether the adoption of profit sharing was accompa 
nied by significant changes in other compensation or policies. One- 
sixth replied in the affirmative, and these companies had generally 
higher increases in productivity in the year of adoption (table 3.6). 
Examination of open-ended responses about the type of changes, 
though, gives no clear indication of what policies may interact with
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profit sharing: nearly half said that other incentive plans had been 
revised or dropped, and nearly half said there had been other changes 
in wages or benefits. Only one company reported a change in a person 
nel policy other than compensation (a new training program).
What is the verdict on whether profit sharing improves perfor 
mance? Different conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the array 
of data presented here.
On the positive side, arguments in favor of profit sharing may be 
marshalled as follows: Adoption of profit sharing is statistically associ 
ated with significant productivity increases, with no negative postadop- 
tion trend (arguing against a simple "Hawthorne effect" from the 
novelty of an innovation). The productivity differentials are very much 
in line with results from previous studies. In line with expectations 
about the effect of profit sharing, these increases are found to be largest 
for cash plans, for small companies, and for plans with high average 
contributions, and nonexistent for percent-of-pay plans where the rela 
tionship to profits is the weakest. In addition, the positive results 
remain when accounting for other policies to solicit employee ideas, 
decisionmaking skills, and commitment; therefore prior positive 
results on profit sharing do not appear to be simply reflecting such pol 
icies. There was some weak evidence that profit sharing combines with 
employee involvement programs to positively affect productivity. A 
variety of techniques to control for statistical bias from company self- 
selection into profit sharing did not weaken the results.
On the negative side, skeptics of profit sharing may make the fol 
lowing arguments: It is difficult to believe that profit sharing causes a 
single immediate upward jump in productivity before employees have 
had a chance to become familiar with it. It takes time for people to 
learn how to work together cooperatively to improve performance, 
implying that the productivity effects should be more gradual. The 
great dispersion in outcomes is noteworthy, with a substantial number 
of adopters experiencing no productivity increase. The existence of 
significant upward jumps in productivity even in the largest size class 
is very suspicious: it strains credulity to think that 17,000 or more 
employees could be inspired to increase productivity when the individ 
ual incentive in such large companies is so weak. It is very possible 
that a profit-sharing plan is simply being used to share with employees 
some of the benefits from increased productivity (occurring for other
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reasons), without increasing fixed compensation levels. Discretionary 
plans should not be good motivators for employees, and the favorable 
results for them casts further doubt on the results. There is little clue as 
to what makes profit sharing "work": there was little evidence of pat 
terns of interactions between profit sharing, information-sharing, and 
personnel policies. Finally, if profit sharing really caused upward 
jumps in productivity, it should be more widespread by now.
Much as it is tempting to offer a verdict on profit sharing and pro 
ductivity, no definite one is possible. It is quite striking that, on aver 
age, companies adopting profit sharing have an upward jump in 
productivity relative to their peers, but it is not clear why this happens. 
This study has employed more detailed data surrounding the adoption 
and presence of profit sharing than have past studies, and has identified 
several features of plans that are associated with higher productivity, 
but it has not identified company characteristics that help profit sharing 
"work." The issue of causality has not been resolved. If profit sharing 
is in fact partly responsible for the productivity increases, it may be 
that the conditions that engender positive effects of profit sharing are 
highly specific to each workplace. "Corporate culture," trust in man 
agement, and history of employee relations are examples of situational 
factors that may determine how employees receive and respond to 
profit sharing (discussed further in the section on implications for com 
panies).
The Stability Theory
Does profit sharing increase the stability of employment by chang 
ing the incentives of employers to hire and fire workers? This theory 
received much attention in the 1980s as a possible source of a cure for 
economic instability in capitalist economies. There have been 15 stud 
ies of profit sharing and employment stability (summarized in table 
4.1). Most of the studies that directly measure stability have found 
some association between profit sharing and greater stability, though 
the studies on how the profit share is treated in employment decisions 
are more mixed.
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One feature of the stability theory is that the profit share must sub 
stitute for other forms of regular fixed pay in order to alter employer 
views of the cost of hiring new workers and of maintaining workers 
during periods of decreased demand. If it does not, no stabilizing 
effects of profit sharing are expected. This question was approached in 
several ways in this study. For companies reporting labor expenses and 
profit-sharing contribution in a given year, the average compensation 
with and without the profit share was calculated as a percentage of 
industry average compensation. Results in this limited sample were 
consistent with a trade-off: mean and median values of these profit- 
sharing firms are slightly above industry averages for all compensa 
tion, but below industry averages for compensation excluding the 
profit share.
A second method to address the trade-off issue was to examine 
compensation levels and growth for all companies reporting labor 
expenses (table 4.3). This revealed a striking difference between com 
panies that had adopted profit sharing prior to 1975 and those who 
adopted after that time. The "old" profit-sharing companies had mean 
compensation levels that were substantially higher than industry aver 
ages, while the "new" profit-sharing companies had mean compensa 
tion levels that were at or below industry averages. For the adopters 
with labor expense data both before and after adoption, the compensa 
tion levels showed small gains after adoption (with a mean of 0.9 per 
cent, and median of 1.9 percent).
A third method was to predict compensation levels and growth 
using data on profit-sharing, unionization, defined benefit pensions, 
and ESOPs (summarized in table 4.4). The estimate sizes indicated that 
compensation levels for old profit-sharing companies were higher than 
for non-profit-sharing and new profit-sharing companies. The profit- 
sharing adopters were estimated to have slight initial decreases in com 
pensation when profit sharing is adopted, followed by positive trends 
so that, on average, pay is higher after adoption than before.
Does profit sharing substitute for regular compensation? This 
appears to be unlikely for old profit-sharing firms, since they had com 
pensation levels higher than industry averages and compensation 
growth at or above industry averages. Therefore the profit share is 
likely to be more of an "add-on" than a substitute for regular compen 
sation among old profit-sharing firms (consistent with the 1974 finding
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of higher base pay among profit-sharing firms, in Mitchell, Lewin, and 
Lawler 1990). In contrast, the profit share appears more likely to sub 
stitute for fixed compensation among some of the new profit-sharing 
adopters, since the average increase in total compensation is smaller 
than the typical profit share.
A second feature of the stability theory is that employers do not 
treat profit-sharing payments and fixed wages in the same way when 
setting employment levels: unlike wages, profit-sharing payments 
should not be seen as part of the obligatory cost of a labor hour (the 
short-run marginal cost of labor). Rather, employers should essentially 
ignore the profit share when hiring and retaining employees. The esti 
mated employment effects of wages and profit-sharing payments were 
generally consistent with this idea. The results were sensitive, though, 
to the choice of variables designed to remove bias from the effect of 
company performance upon the profit share, and no firm conclusion 
was drawn regarding this proposition.
A key prediction of the stability theory is that profit sharing should 
lead to employment stability. While this theory was developed at a 
macroeconomic level, it is based on firm-level incentives that in princi 
ple allow tests of the theory using firm-level data. This study compared 
the employment responses of profit-sharing firms under two types of 
economywide demand shocks (changes in the unemployment rate and 
in GNP, with the paired results accounting for industry differences), 
and under firm-specific demand shocks represented by sales changes. 
Sales changes were not used exclusively because the stability theory 
predicts greater stability in physical output as well as employment, and 
if sales changes are primarily reflecting physical output changes they 
would not provide an appropriate measure of a demand shock. The 
employment behavior of old profit-sharing companies was analyzed 
separately from that of new profit-sharing companies; this allowed 
comparison of the pre- and postadoption behavior of profit-sharing 
adopters, and separate analysis of the old profit-sharing adopters where 
profit sharing appears unlikely to substitute for regular pay.
The stability theory does not predict a simple and direct relationship 
between profit sharing and employment changes. Rather, it predicts a 
discontinuous relationship (discussed in appendix 4) that depends on 
the size of the demand shock, whether the shock is positive or nega 
tive, the extent to which the profit share substitutes for regular pay, the
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sensitivity of company employment to wage changes, and whether the 
demand shock follows upon a prior negative shock that may have elim 
inated the theorized excess demand for labor. A full test of the stability 
theory would require these data. An approximation to such a test was 
made with several assumptions about demand shocks and limited data 
on profit share sizes. The results indicated that: (1) The employment 
behavior of profit-sharing firms in response to demand shocks does 
appear to differ from that of non-profit-sharing firms; (2) The profit- 
sharing employment response to demand shocks was favorable (com 
pared to non-profit-sharing firms), when firms were not recovering 
from a prior negative shock, and the pattern was generally favorable to 
the stability theory; and (3) The situation was more mixed when firms 
were recovering from prior negative shocks, with profit-sharing firms 
having a favorable smaller response to further negative shocks, and 
generally equal or larger responses to positive shocks, though this lat 
ter finding does not fit the theory since the theorized response should 
have been smaller (because the firm should have laid off fewer workers 
during the prior negative shock).
Following previous research, a simpler and more direct technique 
was used for the majority of tests of the employment behavior of 
profit-sharing firms (due to the difficulty of finding appropriate data for 
the full test). The employment responses of profit-sharing firms to pos 
itive and negative shocks were compared with those of non- and pre- 
profit-sharing firms, with emphasis on the negative shocks since the 
predictions are clearest with respect to employment cutbacks.
Did profit sharing lead to more employment stability in this period? 
The direct tests indicated that, comparing pre- and postadoption behav 
ior, profit-sharing adopters had smaller cutbacks in response to GNP 
decreases after adoption (though sampling error could be ruled out 
only in the nonpaired data). The predicted employment paths in figures 
4.2 and 4.3, showed higher growth for new adopters and old profit- 
sharing firms, relative to non-profit-sharing firms. For a firm that 
adopted profit sharing between the two recessions of the period (1973- 
75 and 1980-82), the employment cutback is relatively smaller during 
the later recession. However, there were no estimated differences in 
response to company sales decreases. The remainder of chapter 4 
explored how different characteristics of profit sharing might relate to 
the theorized stability effects.
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Does unionization make a difference? Higher unionization was gen 
erally associated with unfavorable employment behavior smaller 
employment responses to positive shocks, and larger responses to neg 
ative shocks. Participation in profit sharing by a majority of union 
members was found to be associated with a slight decrease in respon- 
siveness to negative shocks, but no estimates were found where sam 
pling error could be ruled out.
Do compensation changes and levels make a difference? The theory 
is clear that profit sharing should only have a positive effect on stabil 
ity if it substitutes, at least in part, for regular fixed pay. This does not 
mean that fixed pay levels must go down: as discussed in chapter 4, if 
the productivity theory is correct and workers put forth extra effort to 
raise productivity thereby raising profit and pay the stability theory 
may still apply if fixed pay is a smaller portion of worker output (and 
workers are being rewarded for their extra effort largely through the 
profit share). Two tests were made of whether the profit share substi 
tuted in part for regular fixed pay: one which looked at changes in 
average pay per employee, and a second which looked at changes in 
pay in relation to output. Both tests indicated that firms in which profit 
sharing appeared to substitute for regular pay had much lower respon- 
siveness to negative shocks after adoption. Due to the small number of 
firms reporting sufficient labor expense data, these results should only 
be taken as indicative.
Finally, what is the relation of employment stability to cash and 
deferred profit sharing, different formulas, and participation by differ 
ent occupations? Several estimates indicated that adoption of deferred 
plans was associated with lower responsiveness to negative aggregate 
shocks, but there were no consistent patterns for cash plans or for 
deferred plans under company sales shocks. Among plan formulas, the 
percent-of-profit plans had the only consistent estimates of lower 
responsiveness to negative shocks (consistent with the stability theory, 
though sampling error could be weakly ruled out only for one estimate) 
and of higher responsiveness to positive shocks. Looking at the profit- 
sharing participation of three occupational groups, adoption of profit 
sharing was associated with decreased responsiveness to GNP declines 
for all three groups, and decreased responsiveness to sales declines for 
clerical/technical and production/service workers, but not for profes-
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sional/administrative employees (and sampling error could not be 
ruled out for most of these differences).
What is the verdict on the stability theory? The mix of evidence 
does not support a clear conclusion. The positive and negative argu 
ments may be marshalled as follows.
On the positive side, the approximation of a full test of the stability 
theory found that the theorized patterns appeared to fit employment 
behavior when firms were not recovering from negative shocks. The 
generally higher responses to positive shocks by profit-sharing firms 
when they were recovering from negative shocks, which does not fit 
the theory, may simply illustrate that these firms are hungry for labor, 
as generally predicted by the stability theory. The simpler tests showed 
improvements in responsiveness to aggregate shocks after adoption. 
Adoption of profit-sharing plans in which a majority of union members 
participated showed a pattern of lower responsiveness to negative 
shocks. Both tests of the relation between the profit share and regular 
fixed pay were consistent with theory: the results were more favorable 
where profit sharing appeared to substitute for regular fixed pay. 
Finally, the results on plan formulas indicated that percent-of-profits 
plans, in line with theory, appear to be associated with the most favor 
able employment behavior. The tremendous variety of forms of profit 
sharing in the United States rarely match up with the pure form in the 
stability theory. Many employers may treat "profit-sharing" payments 
as regular wages. Given this, it is not surprising that the "grab bag" of 
what is called profit sharing in the United States does not produce 
strong results, and study of more relevant kinds of profit sharing is 
likely to be fruitful.
On the negative side, skeptics may note that there is no strong evi 
dence for favorable effects of profit sharing on employment stability, 
and several pieces of the pattern are unfavorable (such as several esti 
mates of profit-sharing companies, particularly old ones, having larger 
employment cutbacks in response to negative shocks). Several favor 
able results are based on distant aggregate shocks, or on small samples 
(in the case of the compensation results), and sampling error often can 
not be ruled out. Even among percent-of-profits plans, where the the 
ory should most directly apply, only one of the favorable results allows 
sampling error to be weakly ruled out. All in all, detractors may con-
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elude, profit sharing has not been shown to produce any notable differ 
ences in employment behavior.
While no definite verdict is possible, the results indicate several 
ways in which profit sharing appears to affect employment behavior, 
and clearly leave the stability theory open for further research. This 
study has illustrated the complexity of the empirical issues in assessing 
the stability theory. As noted by Mitchell, empirical research in incon 
clusive on even such a basic issue of economic theory as the employ 
ment effects of the minimum wage, raising the question, "If we cannot 
settle that issue empirically, what hope is there for convincingly and 
definitively demonstrating (or refuting) the macro effects of particular 
pay systems?" (1993: 22). Recognizing that convincing and definitive 
empirical tests of the stability theory may be very unlikely, further 
research can nonetheless shed substantial light on the actual behavior 
of profit-sharing companies, and create a foundation for future policy 
debates and theoretical development.
The results from this study have several implications for future 
research. First, these results have highlighted the importance of exam 
ining compensation levels, and whether the profit share trades off 
against base compensation. Future research certainly needs to address 
this, to examine whether the perceived cost of hiring or retaining 
profit-sharing employees differs from that of non-profit-sharing 
employees (recognizing and taking into account the effects productiv 
ity may have on pay, requiring measures other than simple pay levels). 
Measurement of demand shocks also deserves more attention, both to 
take account of the theorized greater stability of physical output (which 
is a potentially serious limit on the applicability of sales measures), 
and to distinguish the point at which demand shocks should exhaust 
the theorized excess demand for labor (which requires measures of 
typical profit shares and the relationship of demand shocks to employ 
ment levels). Finally, while this study analyzed a broad spectrum of 
what is called "profit sharing" by U.S. companies, future research 
should focus more intensively on plans where profit shares are strongly 
linked to profitability.
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Implications for Companies
What implications do these findings have for companies consider 
ing the use of profit sharing? The adoption of profit sharing was found 
to be associated with, on average, an increase in productivity, but the 
dispersion in outcomes was very large, and a number of adopters had 
decreases in productivity. This implies that, if profit sharing does in 
fact affect productivity, the effects are very likely to depend on a num 
ber of conditions and characteristics of a firm, its plan design, and its 
implementation. Such a conclusion is strongly echoed in the literature 
on case studies and the design of group incentive programs. Following 
is a brief review of the factors most often mentioned in the prescriptive 
literature on the design of group incentives, with several references to 
the results from this study.4
The prescriptive literature emphasizes, first, that a number of fac 
tors need to be assessed prior to installing a group incentive plan. 
These include (1) the hierarchical structure of decisionmaking in the 
firm (a centrally organized vs. decentralized "flat" structure); (2) cur 
rent systems of accountability and performance measurement, and pay 
sensitivity to those measurements; (3) pay practices in the relevant 
industry or geographical area; (4) the presence of unions and history of 
union-management relations; (5) employee demographics that influ 
ence risk preferences, turnover probabilities, and training needs; (6) 
the ways in which the type of work, job responsibilities, and past man 
agement practice support an individual or team orientation; and (7) 
several interrelated elements that reflect the history of employment 
relations and company "culture," including the presence and structure 
of formal and informal employee involvement, communication and 
information-sharing, employee trust in and commitment to the com 
pany, and the pressure for performance. If employee involvement, 
trust, and commitment do not exist when a plan is installed, the pre 
scriptive literature emphasizes that they will not automatically be cre 
ated by a new plan. 5 Plan success in this case will depend on 
thoroughgoing efforts to create new management styles, communica 
tion, and processes for employee input to change the work structure 
and environment.
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If a group incentive is deemed worthwhile, the literature recom 
mends paying attention to the following elements of plan design and 
implementation: (1) which employee groups to include; (2) a formula 
that creates a "line of sight" from employee behavior to plan outcomes 
(possibly blending the plan with operational measures); (3) anticipated 
size of average contributions to ensure that the contribution is a signif 
icant portion of employee pay; (4) cash or deferred payouts; (5) 
employee involvement in plan design to meet employee needs and 
engender strong employee support; and (6) ensuring support at all lev 
els of management to integrate the plan into management philosophy.
Results from this study are relevant to several of these points. There 
were larger productivity increases with the adoption of plans with high 
average contributions, and with the adoption of cash plans.6 Somewhat 
surprisingly, the results also indicated the most positive effects for 
plans where the contribution is discretionary, with no set formula it is 
possible that a discretionary plan may be used to more accurately 
reflect the contribution of employees to improved performance (sub 
tracting much of the "noise" in profits which is due to other factors), 
but this would appear to require a high level of employee trust that the 
discretion will not be abused. The finding that productivity increases 
were largest in small firms is consistent with the prescription to keep 
the basis for payoff within the "line of sight" of employees. There was 
no strong support for the recommendation that profit sharing works 
best when combined with information-sharing and programs encourag 
ing employee involvement. Given the strong prescription that these are 
very important for profit sharing to have motivational effects, this find 
ing may either: (1) cast doubt on the conclusion that profit sharing is 
responsible for the average performance improvement observed here, 
or (2) cast doubt on the broad measures of information-sharing and 
employee involvement used here, suggesting that more detailed mea 
sures or company-specific analysis should be used.
What implications does the stability theory have for companies? 
The stability theory is oriented toward the economywide benefits of 
broad profit sharing rather than the benefits that one firm may reap by 
adopting profit sharing. While there are many ways in which firms may 
gain through employment stabilization strategies (e.g., by retaining 
employee skills in which the firm has invested, and by increasing 
employee commitment which can lead to a more motivated and flexi-
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ble workforce),7 the theory predicts that individual firms will not have 
sufficient incentive to adopt profit sharing since many of the theorized 
benefits from stability do not accrue directly to the firm. In fact, there 
may be some disincentives for individual firms to adopt profit sharing, 
such as employee aversion to fluctuating income. For firms that would 
like to pursue employment stabilization strategies, though, profit shar 
ing may be a useful complement to such efforts. It may do this by add 
ing flexibility to one element of labor costs: when the firm is hit with 
decreases in product demand, the profit share should be ignored by 
profit-maximizing managers as a cost of retaining employees (accord 
ing to theory). Employee concerns about fluctuating income may be 
balanced by increased employment security, and by the prospect of 
higher income if company performance improves (whether or not due 
to higher employee productivity, as predicted by the productivity the 
ory). Therefore profit sharing may prove useful in helping to stabilize 
employment at the firm level; once again, though, the major benefit in 
theory would be to the economy as a whole when profit sharing is 
widespread, with lower unemployment and a smaller or nonexistent 
business cycle. Whether such benefits are likely remains an important 
research question, given that there are several supportive findings but 
no strong support for the stability theory in the results presented here.
Implications for Unions
Unionized employees are less b'kely than nonunion employees to be 
participants in profit-sharing plans, though there has been an increase 
in profit-sharing provisions in union contracts in the 1980s (as 
described in chapter 1). While few unions have ever opposed profit 
sharing outright (Zalusky 1986: 177), the traditional union strategy has 
emphasized fixed wages and benefits,8 and firms are less likely to 
maintain profit sharing after successful union drives (Freeman and 
Kleiner 1990; Czarnecki 1969).9
The distrust of profit sharing by unionists may be traced to three 
sources. First, profit sharing has been used by some employers as an 
antiunion tool (National Civic Federation 1920; Lindop 1989; Zalusky 
1986). In this study, survey respondents indicated that "reducing likeli-
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hood of unionization" was, on average, one of the least important rea 
sons for maintaining profit sharing, yet it was still listed as "very 
important" by a small percentage (see table 2.2).
Second, industrial unions have traditionally been committed to 
establishing uniform fixed wages and benefits in an industry to "take 
wages out of competition" creating income stability, strengthening 
worker solidarity, and forcing management to compete on "its ability 
and innovation" (Zalusky 1986: 179). Profit sharing represents a chal 
lenge to this approach since it may increase variability of income, 
wage dispersion among workers, and worker competition between 
firms (Mitchell 1987). As shown by the experience of Ford and Gen 
eral Motors in the 1980s, differences in formulas and company perfor 
mance can lead to very different worker payouts (Kruger 1986). Such 
differences can provide lessons about the types of formulas and con 
tract provisions that can most benefit workers; still, they also illustrate 
the potential of profit sharing to increase wage dispersion and income 
variability (balanced against greater job security, if the stability theory 
is correct).
A third source of union concern is that, compared to fixed wages 
and benefits, compliance with contract provisions regarding profit 
sharing is more difficult to monitor. If a profit-sharing plan is part of a 
union contract, labor law gives unions legal access to company records 
to verify contract compliance. Such records may be easier to verify in 
companies with public stock, where stockholders and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission also monitor the information, than in pri 
vate companies. One would expect the monitoring problem to lead 
unions away from plans where the profit-sharing contribution is wholly 
discretionary; in this context, it is noteworthy that discretionary plans, 
while slightly less prevalent in unionized profit-sharing firms, nonethe 
less represent almost half of the plans in unionized firms (though it is 
unclear whether these plans are negotiated in union contracts) (Cardi 
nal and Helburn 1986: 169).
Can profit sharing be useful to unions? While not part of the tradi 
tional union strategy, profit sharing did figure into concession bargain 
ing in the 1980s: "Profit sharing became part of a trade an investment 
of current wages for a promise of a share of future returns" (Zalusky 
1986: 180). Over the 1981-88 period, 17.1 percent of the union con 
tracts involving first-year wage cuts also included profit-sharing provi-
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sions. 10 In this context, the concessions are designed to save jobs, while 
profit sharing provides potential for workers to automatically share in 
any recovery. The stability theory holds that this method of sharing in 
recovery rather than through increases in fixed wages and benefits  
will make future layoffs less likely. The evidence from this study on 
union participation in profit sharing (summarized in table 4.6) is mildly 
favorable to this idea for a given demand shock, postadoption layoffs 
tend to be smaller than preadoption layoffs but the variability in out 
comes does not allow one to reject the possibility that there is no dif 
ference in behavior. 11
Is the productivity theory applicable in unionized settings? It is 
clear that most instances of profit sharing in union contracts are not the 
result of efforts to improve productivity (Zalusky 1986, 1990). If it is 
applied in a unionized setting, there is no clear prediction on how 
unions will affect the results. As discussed by Cooke (1993), unions 
may enhance the effects of group-based pay incentives and employee 
participation through providing additional information channels, 
greater employment security, narrower pay and status differentials, and 
greater worker cohesion; they may instead detract from such effects 
through an adversarial stance against management, limiting efforts to 
reorganize work, and restricting employee monitoring and sanctions 
against those not cooperating in team-based activities. Unions clearly 
add to the complex interplay of factors that determine the performance 
of profit sharing in a particular setting. While there is potential for 
profit sharing to positively affect performance in a union setting, too 
little is known to make general conclusions. 12
Both the stability and productivity theories imply advantages for 
workers and unions, through the potential for fewer layoffs under 
adverse conditions and the potential for higher pay from better perfor 
mance. This study provides some limited support for both theories, but 
realizing these potentials (and whether they may be worth the costs of 
wage concessions when such a choice is presented) undoubtedly 
depends greatly on circumstances unique to each setting. 13
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Implications for Public Policy
Is there a role for public policy to play in the development of profit 
sharing? The issue has been a subject of policy debates, proposals, and 
legislation in a number of countries (Uvalic 1990; Florkowski 1991; 
D'Art 1992). 14 Current approaches by national governments, as noted 
by Florkowski (1991), can be divided into four categories: some form 
of mandatory profit sharing (in 13 countries, although enforcement is 
unclear), tax incentives (in four countries), advisory institutions (in one 
country Denmark), 15 and nonintervention (in 29 countries). The 
United States has tax incentives only for deferred profit-sharing plans, 
but this incentive is not specific to profit sharing since it exists for other 
types of pensions. Great Britain, in contrast, established tax incentives 
in 1987 specifically targeted to cash profit sharing (motivated in large 
part by its potential to decrease high unemployment levels). 16
Is there a role for public policy in the productivity theory? There is 
no obvious role. The gains from productivity improvement accrue to 
the company and the employees, so if profit sharing improves produc 
tivity, there should be sufficient private incentives for profit-sharing 
adoption. Tax incentives are likely inappropriate under this theory, 
since they are potentially costly and likely to encourage cosmetic 
schemes in workplaces where profit sharing is unlikely to have a posi 
tive impact. 17 The most appropriate government role under the produc 
tivity theory would be to gather and disseminate information on how 
profit sharing can be used to increase productivity. Such an approach 
recognizes that this information may have a "public good" nature, cre 
ating a potential role for government similar to its dissemination of 
information through the agricultural extension system and sponsorship 
of research on alternative energy sources. 18 As noted by Mitchell, the 
rationale for this approach is weakened when there is substantial infor 
mation available from private sources, so that
the argument for government dissemination of pay system information 
must be ...that the incentives for "reliable" information spreading are 
insufficient and that, because government is 'neutral, 1 its reports and 
conferences will be seen as more credible (better) than those of poten 
tially- biased private disseminators (or possibly of fuzzy-headed aca 
demics left on their own). (1993: 10)
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The approach that government should have a role in actively dis 
seminating information is embodied in the recommendation by the 
Cuomo Commission on Competitiveness to create a "National Center 
for Employee Participation and Ownership." This would encourage a 
"new, more participatory type of American capitalism" by assisting 
companies considering or implementing participative systems such as 
profit sharing and employee ownership (Kaden and Smith 1992: 105). 
Florkowski recommends the creation of
a national commission of government, business, and labor representa 
tives. This body could act as a short-term catalyst by mobilizing exper 
tise, serving as an information clearinghouse, and engaging in 
research roles similar to those performed by the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health. As Denmark's experience demon 
strates, this policy choice will not by itself directly facilitate a share 
economy, but it will promote better quality information for decision 
making and solutions that are acceptable to all parties. (1991: 111)
He goes on to point out how, with or without such a commission, the 
U.S. federal government could redesign employer questionnaires "to 
gather data about the presence and structural features of profit-sharing 
plans and their outcomes," and could disseminate information through 
agencies such as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service or the 
(now defunct) Bureau of Labor Management Cooperation. Given the 
remarkable strength of associations between profit sharing and produc 
tivity, and given that productivity growth rates have been slow in the 
United States, such attention seems warranted.
Is there a role for public policy under the stability theory? Yes, 
because the gains to employment stability do not accrue only to the 
profit-sharing firm and employees, but to the entire economy (as 
worker purchasing power is maintained without unemployment insur 
ance or government assistance)."The external benefits to government 
and the economy, if the stability theory is correct, would be justifica 
tion for appropriate tax incentives (which was a large part of the ratio 
nale for Great Britain's adoption of tax incentives for cash profit 
sharing in 1987). The accumulated empirical evidence does not yet 
make a strong case for tax incentives, as may be true for many public 
policies and programs, but definitely makes a case for the attention of a 
commission as recommended above.
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In line with several dozen studies over the past decade, this one has 
found higher productivity associated with profit sharing, and differ 
ences in employment behavior associated with certain kinds of profit 
sharing. Most fundamentally, there clearly are links between profit 
sharing, performance, pay, and employment that are remarkably 
intriguing and worthy of more analysis. A safe conclusion is the tradi 
tional call for further research to determine if, and under what condi 
tions, profit sharing aids productivity and employment stability and 
such a call is made here.20 Future studies can provide a more solid 
foundation for policy debates, informed decisions by companies and 
unions, and future theoretical development (even if, as is true in most 
areas of inquiry, the conclusions are disparate).
There are high stakes in exploring the potential of profit sharing, 
since the issues addressed by the profit-sharing theories productivity, 
unemployment, and macroeconomic stability are central to economic 
performance, security, and the standard of living.
NOTES
1. As discussed in the chapter, it cannot be ruled out that the stock price increase may have 
been due to the announcement of a profit-sharing plan.
2. This does not invalidate results of cross-sectional studies, particularly where researchers 
have made corrections for the endogeneity of profit sharing (e.g., Fitzroy and Kraft 1987), or 
where the effects are found to be labor-embodied (Shepard 1986).
3. If profit sharing is at all responsible for the productivity increases, the stronger results for 
the dummy variable may reflect the targeting of key employees in firms with less than 100 percent 
coverage.
4. Numerous journal, magazine, and newspaper articles describing successful and unsuccess 
ful case studies, along with more general literature mentioning profit sharing, were obtained 
through searches of the ABI/INFORM, UNCOVER, ProQuest, and Business Dateline computer 
ized databases, and the Business Periodicals Index up through June 1993. The following review is 
based on a small sample of the prescriptive literature on group incentives, drawing from the fol 
lowing books and articles: Belcher (1991); Cooper, Dyck; and Frohlich (1992); Gross (1989); 
Gross and Bacher (1993); Hubbartt (1991); May (1991); McAdams and Hawk (1992); Nickel 
(1990); Nichols (1989); Ost (1989); and Tomer (1987). Extended treatments are available in 
Belcher (1991) and Schuster and Zingheim (1992).
5. Employee trust in management of Fortune 500 firms appears to have declined in the 1980s 
(Denton 1991). Profit sharing may be a poor method of increasing trust, and may in fact have the 
opposite effect. In a survey of Michigan employers, a large majority viewed profit sharing by 
itself as having a negative effect on employee trust (Mishra and Morrissey 1990). A review of 
studies of employee attitudes under profit sharing, employee ownership, quality circles, and 
autonomous work groups also makes it clear that employee attitudes will not automatically 
improve with these workplace innovations (Kelly and Kelly 1991).
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6. It remains possible, however, that deferred plans have some delayed advantage in reducing 
turnover.
7. See Dyer, Foltman, and Milkovich (1985); Osterman (1987); and Ichniowski (1992).
8. Exceptions include the "progress sharing" provision in the United Auto Workers-American 
Motors contract in 1961, and a number of negotiated profit-sharing plans in the 1980s (particu 
larly in the automobile industry). See Zalusky (1986) for other examples and a discussion.
9. In the absence of formal contractual profit sharing, unions nonetheless affect firm profits, 
and in some sense may "share" in them by negotiating higher fixed wages and benefits in profit 
able companies. For evidence on the union-profit relationship, see Becker and Olson (1992).
10. Calculated from table 1 of Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler. (1990: 25). Overall, 133 contracts 
included profit sharing, representing 7.4 percent of the contracts identified in this period. In con 
tracts where cost-of-living allowances were frozen or eliminated, 17.6 percent and 12.3 percent 
(respectively) included profit sharing, again clearly suggesting a higher incidence of profit sharing 
in concession situations than in nonconcession situations.
11. The favorable but statistically insignificant results for union participation in profit sharing 
are comparable to those of Bell and Neumark (1993).
12. Limited existing evidence indicates that union participation can have positive effects. 
Cooke (1993) finds positive interactions of unions and profit/gainsharing on three performance 
measures in a sample of Michigan manufacturing firms (though the most positive interactions 
come from unions and employee participation). While the productivity effects of union participa 
tion in profit sharing were not a focus of the present study, a cursory examination of the profit- 
sharing adoptions in chapter 3 revealed positive but smaller and insignificant estimates on adop 
tions of plans in which a majority of union members participate (with a substantial dispersion in 
outcomes, indicating a number of positive and negative productivity outcomes).
13. When profit-sharing plans are negotiated, Kruger emphasizes that: "[Management and 
their unions must commit themselves to the plan if it is to be effective. For a plan to have credibil 
ity, it must have the complete support of management, unions, and employees. A key factor is the 
employees. They must be fully informed of the purposes and goals of the new plan. The features 
must be thoroughly explained, and they must be convinced or persuaded of its direct benefit" 
(1986:153-4).
14. For a related discussion of policy options for employee ownership in the United States, see 
Blasi and Kruse (1993).
15. For a discussion of the history and debates in Denmark over public policy on profit sharing 
and employee stock ownership, see chapter 5 in D'Art (1992). Similar discussion for Sweden and 
Ireland are provided in chapters 4 and 6.
16. For a brief overview of the current status, see Singleton-Green (1992).
17. Tax incentives might, though, be used to encourage experimentation, as temporary incen 
tives have sometimes been designed to encourage development and diffusion of new technolo 
gies. Also, it is possible that there are market failures acting against the combination of profit 
sharing with other participative arrangements, which may also justify tax incentives. See, e.g., 
Levine and D'Andrea Tyson (1990); and Levine (1992b).
18. If there are valuable lessons on productivity to be learned from company experiments in 
profit sharing, these "positive externalities" create a stronger case for active government encour 
agement of profit sharing.
19. This "macro rationale" for profit sharing is further discussed in Mitchell (1993). He also 
notes that public policy intervention can be based on a "social transformation rationale" (where 
the practice being encouraged is part of a desired social transformation, such as labor law or civil 
rights legislation) or on a "merit goods rationale" (where the government takes the lead in encour-
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aging citizens to do what is in their long-term interest, such as encouraging retirement security by 
subsidizing private pension plans).
20. Whether government should sponsor such research, possibly through a commission as 
described above, is a question better left to those with less self-interest in the answer.

Appendix 1 
Construction of Dataset and Analysis of Response
To test adequately the profit-sharing theories requires company perfor 
mance and employment data over a number of years. The problem with pick 
ing companies with the most years of information is that they will be the 
oldest companies, and perhaps clustered in particular industries; this presents 
external validity problems in generalizing the results to younger and middle- 
aged companies and to other industries. The selection rule employed in con 
structing the sample frame was to identify those companies with at least eight 
years of employment data over the 1980s (1980-89), since employment data 
are crucial in testing both profit-sharing theories.
Past evidence indicates that fewer than 50 percent of U.S. companies have 
profit-sharing plans for employees other than top management. Profit-sharing 
firms were oversampled to increase their representation in the final dataset. 
Additionally, to increase the quality of industry controls, an attempt was made 
to find, for each company, a matched pair within the same (2-digit SIC) indus 
try with the opposite profit-sharing status. For example, for each profit-sharing 
food processor, an attempt was made to find a non-profit-sharing food proces 
sor to act as a paired control.
The initial sample, drawn from the 1990 Standard and Poor's CompuStat at 
Rutgers University, included 1,085 companies. These were ordered by indus 
try, and a systematic sample was drawn to ensure a representative distribution 
across industries. The Eagleton Institute at Rutgers, which conducted the sur 
vey, employed five interviewers to contact and complete interviews with 250 
companies, asking for the Vice-President for Human Resources (if not, then 
"the person in the company who is most familiar with the employee benefits 
your company offers"). 1 The interviews were completed between May and 
July of 1991 and took an average of 6.16 minutes. After the initial 250 suc 
cessful contacts, the process of finding same-industry matched pairs began. 
For many firms the initial random sample produced matched pairs in the same 
industry, so that further systematic sampling could be done. Where a same- 
industry matched pair was needed, firms in that industry were contacted until 
one with the opposite profit-sharing status could be interviewed. The search 
for a matched pair was not successful in each industry, which led to the pro-
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duction of a larger sample frame. In those industries the standard was lowered 
to 7 out of 10 years of employment data in the 1980s, producing an additional 
89 companies in the sample frame. Such choice-based sampling produces a 
final sample which is not representative of the population. This does not pro 
duce a bias in fixed-effects estimation (Heckman and Robb 1985: 219). For 
the sample selection terms and the few specifications that did not use fixed 
effects, variables were reweighted to reflect the choice-based sampling (Man- 
ski and Lerman 1977).2
Of the 1,174 companies in the final sample frame, at least one attempt was 
made to contact 906 of them. Of these, three had gone out of business at the 
time of the survey, and 36 could not be reached due to disconnected phone 
numbers, leaving 867 that were contacted. In the course of finding paired con 
trols for the initial systematic sample, two profit-sharing and 53 non-profit- 
sharing firms were excluded because they could not serve as a paired control. 
Of the remaining 812 contacted firms, interviews were completed with 500, 
for a response rate among contacted firms of 61.6 percent. Unsuccessful con 
tacts included 115 refusals and 197 cases where repeated attempts to locate 
and talk to the appropriate person were unsuccessful.
The information from non-profit-sharing firms was obtained entirely by 
phone. For profit-sharing firms, the respondents were asked at the end of the 
phone interview whether they would answer several further questions in a fol 
low-up mail survey. The primary reason for doing so was that the desired 
information would generally require looking up records relevant to the plan. 
In particular, information was desired on what share of participants' pay was 
represented by profit sharing in each of the years 1975 to 1990. In addition, 
the questions on the profit-sharing formula, and whether profit-sharing adop 
tion was accompanied by changes in management personnel, were reserved 
for the mail survey. Mail surveys were sent to the 253 profit-sharing partici 
pants, and after several call-backs to nonrespondents, were received com 
pleted by 124 respondents (a response rate of 49 percent on the mail portion).
The telephone and mail survey forms are reproduced in this appendix. At 
the beginning of the telephone survey, the confidentiality promise was made 
explicit for respondents who hesitated or inquired about the survey: "All your 
responses will be kept totally confidential no one will know how you 
responded to any particular question. The results of the survey are presented in 
a statistical report and will not single out anyone in particular."
Appendix table A 1.1 shows a comparison of the firms interviewed in the 
phone portion of the survey with the other firms that were contacted but not 
interviewed. As can be seen by comparisons of the mean values, the respon 
dents on average had significantly lower sales, employment, and net assets in 
1990 relative to the nonrespondents, but similar averages in profit margins and
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other financial measures. These measures were used in probit regressions pre 
dicting response. Regression 1 uses 1990 measures, and, to determine whether 
recent trends in these variables affect response, regression 2 uses both 1989 
and 1990 measures. Few significant differences in size or financial measures 
appear in the regressions. In regression 1, at the 10 percent level of statistical 
significance, respondents appear to have higher capital intensity and lower 
debt/equity ratios. Recent changes in these variables appear not to matter, as 
indicated by the insignificance of these variables or their lags in regression 
2 the only financial or size measure reaching significance at the 10 percent 
level is 1989 sales/invested capital. A variety of other measures was used with 
no greater success in predicting response. Selection corrections using inverse 
Mill's ratios were included with the subsequent regressions reported in chap 
ters 2, 3, and 4.
NOTES
1. The distribution of respondents was as follows: 60 Vice-Presidents/Directors of Human 
Resources, 247 Directors/Managers of Employee Benefits, 33 other Vice-Presidents or Corporate 
Officers, with most of the remainder representing compensation or benefits analysts, or personnel/ 
employee services staff.
2. The reweighting caused very minor changes in the results, largely due to the high incidence 
of profit sharing (40.7 percent) in the random sample, which did not vary greatly by broad indus 
try.



















































































































































































































NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses.





QIC91 ___ _!__ TIME BEGAN:.




Hello, I'd like to speak with the Vice President for Hunan Resources.
Interviewer Note;
Other possible titles are! Chief Operating Officer; Vice President for Industrial 
Relations or Personnel; Manager of Operations; Director of Employee Benefits.
Description of Position: I'd Uka to speak with the person In the company who is 
most familiar with the employee benefits your company offers.
When appropriate person Is on the teleahonf;
Hello, my name 1s—————————————————(first and last name). I'm on the 
staff of the Eagleton Institute at Rutgers University. We have randomly selected 
companies nationwide to conduct a survey on employee benefits. I'd like to ask you 
few questions about your company.
1. To begin, does your company have a profit sharing plan for employees other 
than too management?
109- |1. YES r
NO
ASK Q. 2
GO TO Q.8, P.3
2. Do you have one or more than one profit-sharing plan? (PROBE: IF ."ORE TK;N 
1 ASK: How many plans do you have?)
110- I. ONE PLAN
2. TWO PLANS
3. THREE PLANS 
4. FOUR PLANS 
5. MORE THAN FOUR PLANS 
9. DON'T KNOW
2A. What 1s the nan«(s) of the plan(s}?
111- PLAN 1: __________________
112- PLAN 2: ___________________
113- PLAN 3: __________________
114- PLAN 4: __________________
180
3- Cou1 r^rL,?IeUS tcl1 me "h*1 th1s ( the«) pUn(s) 1$ (are)? 
(INTERVIEWER CODE EACH PLAN NAMED UNDER A SPECIFIC PLAN)
PUN 2 PUN? PLAN A
». Cash pUn (with payment! 115- 1 n*. i 117. , .„ , 
directly to employed) "• l
b. Pension plan (with payments 2 2 •> •» 
to a pension trust)
c. Combination of cash and pension plan 3333
d. Other (Specify-) ____________ * 4 4 4
e. Other (Specify;) ___________ 5 5 5 <
F. Don't Know/Refused 9999
4. Could you please tell me about how many years the plan (each of these plans) 
have been In existence? 
(INTERVIEWER: IF MORE THAN ONE PLAN, ASK FOR EACH PLAN NAMED IN Q.3)
119-120 PLAN 1: _________________ (DON'T KNOW - 99)
121-122 PLAN 2: __________________
123-124 PLAN 3: __________________
125-126 PLAN 4: _________________
5. When the (any) profit sharing plan(s) was (were) established, were any
significant changes nadt in personnel policies or other conpensation? (IF 
"YES," ASK: Please describe these changes.)




Approximately, what percentage of your company employees, excluding ton 
. is covered by the profit sharing plan(s)?
130 • 132
7. Abo«t what percentage of all (nane each type of employee) at the company are 
covered by the pUn(s)7
(999-OON'T KNOW/REFUSED)
133-135 a. Production/service employees (non-exempt) ______X
136-138 b. Clerical/technical employees (non-exenpt) _____*
139-141 c. Professional/administrative employees (exempt) ______*
ASK EVERYONE




142-143 Production/service (non-exempt) _
144-145 Clerical/technical (non-exempt) _
146-147 Professional/administrative (exempt) _
(INTERVIEWER NOTE: THIS SHOULD ADO TO 100%)
.48-
Are any of your employees covered under a union contract?
1. YES -r>| ASK q. 10
2. NO 
9. DON'T KNOW { — _y GO TO Q.
(IF -YES* TO Q. 9, ASK:)
10. What is the approximate percentage of all employees covered by a union contract?
(OON'T KNOW/REFUSED • 999)
149 - 151
(ASK ONLY If HAVE PBOPIT SHAR1N61
11. Do a majority of union employees participate in the profit-sharing plan(s)?
152- 1. YES, MAJORITY PARTICIPATES
2. NO, MAJORITY DOES MOT PARTICIPATE 
9. DON'T KNOW
2. About how many corporation employees, excluding top management, areroutinely provide* with (READ ITEM BELOW)--nont, some, about half, most, or
'About
None Some Halt Uo*t All Don't 
0% 1-40% 41-aO% 61-09% 100% "no*





i on cofnpcdton' 
rtictfvt pwfofTnanc*
182
13. Now I'm going to read a list of programs or policies. For each, just tall 
me how many years your company has had that program or policy. If your 
company does not have It, just say so. First, how about (START AT 
DESIGNATED POINT) ...
Number of Do Not 







98 ( ) a. Attitude Survey Feedback
-Corporate employees
-•Union employees 
"Members of the 
profit-sharing plan
98 ( ) b. Suggestion System
-•Corporate employees 
"Union employees
-Members of the 
profit-sharing plan
98 ( ) c. Job Enrichment or Redesign
-Corporate employees
-*Unioa employees
-Members of the 
profit-sharing plan
98 ( ) d. Employee Involvement groups, 




--Members of the 
profit-sharing plan
98 ( ) e. Self-Manned work teams 
"Corporate employees
-Union employees 
"Members of the 
profit-sharing plan
98 ( ) f. Employment Security 
"Corporate employees 
.•Union employees
-Members of the 
profit-sharing plan
98 ( ) f> Prodactmry-JUtattd Group Bonuea
-Corporate employees
--Union employees





























































































































































READ THIS QUESTION FOR EACH PROGRAM/POLICY THE COMPANY HAS; \
14. Now, thinking about your company's (STAXT AT DESIGNATED POINT), about how many (TY 
OF EMPLOYEE) participate in this plan-none, SOM, about half, most or all.
NOTE: ONLY ASX A00OT 'NEWER* OF PROFIT-SHAMNfi PLAN' IF CONPANY HAS PROFIT SHARIM
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FOR COMPANIES WITH PROFIT SHARING. 
Thank you vary much for your cooperation
ForfK ! «h!JiS ""There S1milty^? ?»rt| cular1 y Interested 1n companies that have 
profit-sharing. There are some additional questions we would like you to answer on a





FOR COMPANIES WITHOUT PROFIT SHARING:
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101-104 O8Sb*/AT>6N* DECK 
108-106 108
PROFIT SHARING SURVEY 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO TELEPHONE SURVEY
According to the telephone interview we had with you. the following are the profit sharing plans 
fou offer to employees (other than top management):
TYPE OF PLAN






\s we described on the telephone, there is some additional Information we would like to have 
about these plans.
I. For each plan you have, circle the number '1 * next to the option(s) that describes 
what your company's contribution to the plan is based upon?
Sotnoanv Contribution Qptlona 
L Specific percentage of profits
(Please write In what percent)
>. Specific percentage of profits in excess 
of amount reserved for dividends or 
retained earnings
(Please write In what percent:)
:. Fully discretionary
L Specific percentage of profits plus 
discretionary amount
•, Specific percentage of participants' pay 







































Was the profit-sharing plan adopted following a change in management personnel?
56- 1. YES
2. NO
IF YES. ON THE LINES BELOW. BREIFLY DESCRIBE THE CHANGES:
$9-160 _______________________________________________________________
What was the company's contribution to the profit-sharing plan(s) as a percent of the 
total payroll for participants in each of the following years?
(NOTE: THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE PLANS FOR TOP MANAGEMENT) 
(If fiscal year basis, indicate beginning month: __)
18M62





% 1980 % 1984 %
168-168 213-215 223-227
* 1961 % 1985 %
180-171 216-218 228-230










\. Each of the following are reasons for maintaining the profit-sharing plan(s). Please 
use the five point scale to indicate how important each is for maintaining the profit- 
sharing plan(s) in your company.
Not Vary 
Important Important
M. a. Providing a source of retirement Inconw 1 234 5
17. b. Recruiting and retaining personnel 1 234 5
» c. Motivating existing employees t 234 5
19- d. Reducing likelihood of unionization 1 234 5
so- e. Reducing the probablfty or size of layoffs 1 234 5
n- f. Stabllzing corporate cash flow i 234 5
Please list any other reasons for maintaining the profit-sharing plan(s) on the lines 










.EASE RETURN IN THE ENCLOSED PASTAGE PAID ENVELOPE TO:
Center for Public Interest Polling
Eagleton Institute of Politics
Rutgers University
Wood Lawn - Neilson Campus
90 Clifton Avenue
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1568
Appendix 2 
Econometric Specification of Prediction Equations
The prediction of profit-sharing adoption was done with both linear proba 
bility and binomial logit models. The linear probability model was specified 
as:
(1) PS J, = al- 
where
PS = dummy for existence of profit sharing in firm /, year t
a/ = firm-specific intercept term
pi and P2= coefficient vectors
%i, t - 1 = vector of explanatory variables in firm /, year t - 1
Xf, t-2 = vector of explanatory variables in firm i, year t - 2
ex = error term.
The firm-specific intercept a, was removed through using deviations from 
firm-specific means for all variables, and an AR(1) correction was done to 
adjust for autocorrelation. The binomial logit model was based on first-differ 
enced data, with the dependent variable PS,, - PS Jr ,. i and independent vari 
ables Xj t . i - Xk , _ 2- For both models, lagged independent variables were 
chosen to avoid simultaneity problems. The logit specification was chosen 
since this transformation will produce consistent estimates of the parameters 
of interest (unlike probits, where there is not a consistent estimator with panel 
data) (Hsiao 1986: 163). Because the firm intercept is removed by both proce 
dures, the value of the dependent variable varies only when profit sharing is 
adopted—therefore these regressions involve prediction of profit-sharing 
adoption rather than the presence of profit sharing.
For both of these procedures, the regressions were done with the full sam 
ple, and then using only the paired sample, with the difference between each 
pair representing a single observation.
Results are presented in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3, with descriptive 
statistics and variable definitions in appendix table A2.1.
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Presence of profit-sharing plan in year ta
Adoption of plan with cash elements in year t
Adoption of deferred-only plan in year t
Variance of change in In(sales) over t - 5 to t - 1
Variance of change in ln(profit margin) over f - 5 to / - 1
Profit margin in / - 1
Profit margin in / - 2
Ln(total sales) in t - 1
Ln(total sales) in t - 2
Closing stock price in / - 1
Closing stock price in t - 2 
(first-differenced value is percentage change in price)
Ln(net assets/employees) in f - 1
Ln(net assets/employees) in / - 2
Debt/equity ratio in t - 1
Debt/equity ratio in t - 2
Interest (-1) 0.035 (0.05) 0.000 (0.02) Interest payments as percent of sales in t - 1
Interest (-2) 0.035 (0.04) Interest payments as percent of sales in t - 2
Union trend 61.713 (36.11) 0.782 (0.41) Time trend for unionized companies
NOTES: For the paired differences in appendix tables A2.2 and A2.3, the value of each variable in a nonprofit-sharing company was subtracted from the 
value for its paired profit-sharing company. Each observation represents a matched pair.
a. For first-differenced PS (including cash and deferred), variable value is profit-sharing dummy in t minus value in t - 1. For other first-differenced data, 
variable equals / - 1 minus 1-1 value (except for price change, which is percentage change in price from / - 2 to t - 1).












Firm-intercepts, linear probability 






















































Change from 1 - 2 












IE - 04 Price 
(0.0004)






















































































































































































NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. See appendix table A2.1 for definitions and descnptive statistics, 
a. Logit sample restricted to firms which did not have profit sharing in/- 1. 
*Significantly different from zero at p < 10 **p <.05.
Table A2.3 Prediction of Cash and Deferred Plan Adoption
Cash plans Deferred plans
Paired differences
Independent variable

































































































































































































NOTES: See appendix table A2.1 fa- variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
*Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.













































































































































































Percent of employees in 






Percent of employees in 
union


























NOTES: The sample in column 1 is restricted to profit-sharing firms with unions, while the samples in columns 3 to 6 are restricted to profit-sharing firms. 
Standard errors in parentheses for coefficients, and standard deviations in parentheses for means. 
"Significantly different from zero at p < 10 * p <.05.

Appendix 3 
Econometric Specification and Selection Corrections
The estimating equation is based upon the first terms of a translogarithmic 
production function (Christensen, Jorgensen, and Lau 1975):
ln(0 = P!*ln(L) + P^hX/O + pn*ln(L)*ln(L) +
pVln(K)*ln(K) + PJtl *ln(L)*ln(/0 
where
Q = output, alternatively measured as sales and as value-added 
L = total employees 
K = capital stock
Pi» Pk' Pn» PA*» P*i = coefficients representing the relationship of these 
factors to output.
In the analysis presented here, this function is augmented to include: profit 
sharing, defined benefit plan, and ESOP variables alone and interacted with 
time trends, year dummies, and industry time trends. In addition, a union trend 
variable has been included due to the possibility that union presence affected 
productivity growth over this time period (Hirsch 1991). Ln(L) was subtracted 
from both sides to make the dependent variable the natural logarithm of output 
per worker (identical to the measure used in the simple comparisons of table 
3.2). (While measurement error in ln(L) will bias coefficients on the indepen 
dent variables using ln(L), the results for profit sharing were found to be
197
198
nearly identical when ln(L) is not subtracted from both sides.) The resulting 
specification, where the subscript / indicates company and t indicates year, is:
,) = (PrD*ln(LlV)
P/PSft + P/,,*(AgeofPS) + 
P/DB,, +P^*(AgeofDB) + 
Pe*ESOPit + Pe,*(Age of ESOP) + 
Pu*(Union*time) + (industry time trends) 
+ (year dummies) + a/ + e# 
where
PS = profit-sharing plan 
DB = defined benefit pension plan 
ESOP = Employee Stock Ownership Plan 
Union = union presence
a,- = firm-specific fixed effect 
e,-r = error term.
To remove the effects of any unobserved variables that may be in the firm-spe 
cific fixed effect (a,), this equation is first-differenced so that all measured val 
ues represent the difference between t and / - I. 1 This results in the estimated 





Pe*8ESOP + pe,*ESOP, + pM *Union +
(industry dummies) + (year dummies) + e.
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The key parameters of interest for this study are $p and $pt. These can be 
interpreted in two equivalent ways: as measures of profit-sharing presence and 
trend effects on productivity levels; or as measures of profit-sharing adoption 
and profit-sharing presence on productivity growth. The same interpretations 
can be applied to the coefficients on defined benefit (pj and P<#), ESOP ($e 
and pg/) and union (pa) variables. 2
A variety of experiments with alternative lag structures for the production 
function terms made little difference in the estimated effects of profit sharing, 
so only the first-differenced results are presented here.
The reported results have had the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of 
productivity changes trimmed to remove any undue influence these outliers 
may have upon the results. Prior to trimming, the minimum (maximum) value 
of 8ln(j2/L) was -5.71 (4.35) when Q was measured as sales per employee, 
and -4.60 (4.47) when Q was measured as value-added per employee. These 
extremes imply productivity changes on the order of 100-fold, and it is con 
sidered unlikely that profit sharing will be a key influence in such extreme 
circumstances. After trimming the upper and lower 1 percent, the minimum 
(maximum) value of &ln(Q/L) was -.40 (.56) when Q was measured as sales 
per employee, and -.40 (.51) when Q was measured as value-added per 
employee, implying productivity changes of no more than -33 percent to 75 
percent. The basic results in appendix table A3.2 are not substantially 
affected by inclusion of the outliers, or by use of a robust regression tech 
nique (as packaged in the Stata statistical package) that gives smaller weight 
to outliers (Rousseeuw and Leroy 1987). 3 The productivity specifications 
were also run with the upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent of 8ln(L) and 
§ln(K) trimmed (restricting the range of 8ln(L) to -.536 to .526, and the range 
of 8ln(£) to -.489 to .746), with very similar results for the profit-sharing 
coefficients.
Adoption of profit sharing may be accompanied by accounting changes 
and/or company mergers or acquisitions, either of which could impart a bias to 
the estimated profit-sharing effects. Both events were less common in adop 
tion years than in the sample as a whole: for the sample used in regression 1 of 
table A3.2, an accounting change was reported in 2.4 percent of the adoption 
years compared to 2.5 percent of all observations, while a merger or acquisi 
tion was reported in 6.1 percent of adoption years compared to 12.4 percent of 
all observations. Tests were made alternatively excluding these observations, 
and including them with variables representing the events, and the results 
were nearly identical to those reported in table A3.2.
As discussed in chapter 3, the above framework may be tainted by selec 
tion bias (see, e.g., Maddala 1983; Heckman and Robb 1985; Heckman and
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Hotz 1989). There may be factors that predict profit-sharing status and, 
through correlation between profit-sharing status and the distribution of the 
error term, violate standard assumptions about the error term in equation (1).
While self-selection may create a bias, it does not necessarily do so. Heck- 
man and Robb (1985: 216-223) review several models using panel data in 
which a bias does not exist under certain decision rules and error processes.
In the presence of selection bias, there are two standard procedures for 
removing the correlation between the variable of interest and the error term: 
instrumental variables to predict profit-sharing variables that are uncorrelated 
with the error term, and the addition of a selection term to correct for the dis 
tribution of the error. Both techniques were tested for the correction of selec 
tion bias caused by systematic choice of adoption and maintenance of profit- 
sharing plans. The results employing a selection term (inverse Mill's ratio) are 
presented here since extensive use of instrumental variable techniques failed 
to produce credible estimates. A sampling of those estimates will be briefly 
described here.
Instrumental variable estimates were attempted using both linear probabil 
ity and probit techniques to predict both profit-sharing adoption and profit- 
sharing maintenance. When adoption and maintenance are separately pre 
dicted using exogenous variables and the lagged variables represented in table 
2.3, and the predicted 8PS and PS, are inserted in equation (1), the estimated 
Pp and Ppr are 2.226 and .209 when the dependent variable is 8ln(sales/ 
employees), and 3.367 and .217 when the dependent variable is 8ln(value- 
added/employees). These coefficients, which are all highly statistically signif 
icant (at p <.01), imply productivity increases of more than eightfold when 
profit sharing is adopted, and more than 20 percent each year it is in place. 
When probits are used to predict 6PS and PS^ the estimated coefficients for pp 
and $pt are .329 and .468 when ln(sales/employees) is used, and .785 and .534 
when ln(value-added/employees) is used. These are again highly statistically 
significant and imply adoption effects of 40-120 percent and trend effects of 
60-70 percent per year. A variety of other instrumental variable techniques 
produced results that were similarly not credible; such results argue for the use 
of other techniques for the correction of selection bias.
The bias created by self-selection into a program may be corrected by the 
inclusion of a selection correction term in the estimated equation. Construc 
tion of a term relies on prediction of profit-sharing status (with variables Zf- 
and coefficients t), then creation of a normal density function y(tZ/) and cumu 
lative density function F(iZ,-) using those estimates. One method to correct for 
the distribution of the error term under sample selection, based on Heckman 
(1979), is to create a variable yCtZjO/fXiZ,-) where the profit-sharing status 
equals one, and -f(iZ^I(\ - F(xZ,)) where it equals zero. A second method
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allowing different coefficients between the profit-sharing and non-profit-shar 
ing samples uses, in addition to the common explanatory variables, the values 
of these variables multiplied by F(iZ,), as well as /(tZ,-) as an independent 
regressor (Maddala 1983: 227). A third method tested here is to predict what 
the expected outcome would be if the non-profit-sharing firms decided to 
adopt profit sharing, by using the coefficients on the non-profit-sharing sample 
with the additional selection term /(TZ^/FCtZ,-), and comparing the predicted 
productivity change with the actual productivity change for the profit-sharing 
firms (Maddala 1983: 261).
In addition, two alternative methods, developed to assess the effect of train 
ing programs on worker earnings, were tested to correct for selection bias. The 
first is based on a control function developed by Heckman and Robb (1985: 
224-5) that removes the correlation between the error term and program par 
ticipation. This control function relies on prediction of program participation 
using preprogram error terms. For this study, the prediction was done using an 
unrestricted process for the four error terms prior to profit-sharing adoption. A 
second method employed is based on Bassi (1984), who uses a transformation 
of the equation designed to purge the correlation between program participa 
tion and the error terms.
Two variables that predicted profit-sharing adoption and raised a strong 
possibility of selection bias were the change in the stock price, and change in 
the profit margin, from / - 2 to / - l.To examine the influence of these vari 
ables, the profit-sharing adopters were divided into two groups—those that 
had positive and negative values on these variables (relative to industry means 
for that year)—and separate productivity effects were calculated for compari 
son with columns 1 to 4 of appendix table A3.2. The coefficients on profit- 
sharing adoption were of similar magnitude between the two groups, and nei 
ther group had consistently larger or smaller coefficients.
The tests on these alternative sample selection correction techniques did 
not produce noteworthy differences in the results. For example, looking at the 
profit-sharing adoption coefficient in the full sample with ln(sales/employee) 
as the dependent variable (comparable to column 1 of appendix table A3.2) 
gave the following results. Estimation of the model assuming different coeffi 
cients between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms (Maddala 1983: 
227) gives a coefficient of .040 (t = 3.58). Estimation of the model which pre 
dicts the outcome if non-profit-sharing firms were to adopt profit sharing 
(Maddala 1983: 261) produces a coefficient of .042 (t = 3.29). Use of the con 
trol function based on preprogram error terms (Heckman and Robb 1985: 224- 
5) produces a coefficient of .045 (/ = 3.49) when all firms are included, and 
.066 (t = 3.42) when only adopters are included. Finally, use of Bassi's tech-
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nique produces an average coefficient of .044 over the first three postadoption 
years.
Since these techniques did not produce noteworthy differences, only the 
results from the first method are presented here (with common production 
parameters across the sample). Specifically, because the productivity regres 
sions primarily indicate a profit-sharing adoption effect, and the selection bias 
is likely to be strongest among adopters, the selection term used the specifica 
tion from regression 5 of appendix table A2.1 to predict profit-sharing adop 
tion (excluding the change in stock price, due to concerns about its 
exogeneity). Once the adoption had been made, the adopters maintained the 
selection term from the time of adoption. Old profit-sharing companies that 
had no preadoption values were simply assigned the mean postadoption selec 
tion term from the adopters. Separate selection terms were created for cash 
and deferred plans (appendix table A3.3), type of formula (appendix table 
A3.4), and size of employer contribution (appendix table A3.6). The coeffi 
cients on the selection terms are not presented here since they were never dis 
tinguishable from zero and had no pattern of positive and negative 
coefficients. Experiments with a number of other specifications of the selec 
tion term (including prediction of profit-sharing presence as well as adoption) 
failed to produce any consistent patterns or substantial effects on the results. 
This indicates that sample selection is unlikely to be an important factor in the 
productivity effects.
A separate form of selection bias may be present with missing observations 
on incomplete panel data (see, e.g., Hausman and Wise 1979; Ridder 1990; 
Verbeek 1990). The selection rule on when observations are reported may be 
related to the variable of interest. There was, however, no discernible relation 
ship between the pattern of profit-sharing adoption and missing observations 
in the panel. The possibility of bias was checked and discounted with the vari 
able addition test and comparison of random effects estimators from the bal 
anced and unbalanced panels (Verbeek and Nijman 1992).
NOTES
1. A random effects model, in which oq is treated as a random variable, was also estimated 
(Hsiao 1986:32-47). Consistency of results depends on orthogonality between the random effects 
and other regressors, which was strongly rejected by the data. When using random effects specifi 
cations, the results indicated much larger effects of profit-sharing adoption (e.g., using sales per 
employee as the dependent variable on the full sample, the coefficient on profit-sharing adoption 
was .112 with a /-statistic of 6.29).
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2. The survey collected data on union presence and proportion unionized as of the survey date, 
but not over the entire sample period. For this reason, equation (1) does not attempt to measure 
the effects of changes in union presence or proportion unionized in the period. While proportion 
unionized may have varied across this period, the assumption made here is that union presence is 
unlikely to have varied, and any variations are unlikely to have been correlated with profit-sharing 
status. The same regressions were run without the union variable and showed equivalent results.
3. When all observations are included in the specifications reported in columns 1 to 4 of 
appendix table A3.2, the estimated effects of profit-sharing adoption with equally weighted obser 
vations are slightly larger (between .034 and .055), and with robust regressions are slightly 
smaller (between .032 and .037), and all are statistically significant at the 95 percent or 99 percent 
levels.
Table A3.1 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Productivity Regressions
Means (s.d.) for variables in appendix table A3.2








0.067 -0.007 0.067 -0.007
(0.116) (0.150) (0.117) (0.150)
0.064 -0.005 0.064 -0.005
(0.111) (0.145) (0.111) (0.145)
0.015 0.033 0.014 0.029 0.010 0.024 0.009 0.021
(0.120) (0.179) (0.118) (0.168) (0.091) (0.142) (0.088) (0.130)
0.310 
(0.462)








Union trend 0.753 
(0.431)
0.719 0.341 0.748 0.235 0.553 0.258 0.582
(0.449) (0.474) (0.434) (0.391) (0.434) (0.402) (0.427)
-0.001 0.005 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.002
(0.088) (0.070) (0.100) (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.043)
-0.020 0.742 -0.025 0.329 -0.015 0.277 -0.010
(0.632) (0.437) (0.632) (0.321) (0.426) (0.279) (0.387)
0.003 0.017 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.004
(0.181) (0.130) (0.184) (0.056) (0.081) (0.052) (0.078)
0.069 0.386 0.100 0.142 0.036 0.084 0.045
(0.6%) (0.487) (0.705) (0.278) (0.324) (0.192) (0.264)
-0.068 0.723 -0.066 0.756 -0.057 0.726 -0.054
(0.537) (0.448) (0.546) (0.430) (0.523) (0.446) (0.530)
Change in ln(sales/employees) from t - 1 
tor
Change in ln(value-added/employees) 
from t - 1 to r*
Change in presence of profit-sharing plan 
from t- I lot (measured as dummy in 
cols., 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8) 
Presence of profit sharing in t (measured 
as dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion 
covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of defined benefit 
plan from / -1 to t (measured as dummy 
in cols., 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8) 
Presence of defined benefit plan in t 
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4, 
proportion covered in 5-8) 
Change in presence of ESOP from t -1 to 
/ (measured as dummy in cols. 1-4, 
proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of ESOP in t (measured as 
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered 
in 5-8) 































































































Change in In(employees) from t - 1 to t
Change in ln(net assets) from t - 1 to t
Change in square of In(employees) from
t - 1 to /
Change in square of ln(net assets) from
/ - 1 to t
Change in (ln(net assets) times
In(employees)) from t - 1 to t
NOTE: Labor expense was instrumented as described in text.
a. Value-added was calculated from CompuStat as (sales - (cost of goods sold - labor expenses - rental expense)).



































































































































































































































































NOTE: See appendix table A3.1 for variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
*Statistically significant at p <.10 ** p <.05 ***p <.01.





































































































































































































NOTES: See appendix table A3.1 for variable definitions. Cash PS represents those with any cash element, while deferred PS represents those which are
only deferred.
'Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.















































































































































































NOTES: Variable definitions: Percent-of-profits plan: company contribution based on fixed percent of profits (may include discretionary element in addi 
tion). Discretionary plan: company contribution wholly discretionary. Percent-of-pay plan: company contribution based on fixed percent of participants' 
pay. Other: company contribution based on formula other than above three. All regressions include variables listed in appendix table A3.2 (except for PS 
adoption and presence), plus separate inverse Mill's selection terms for each of the four classes of formula. See appendix table A3.1 for other variable 
definitions and descriptive statistics. 
'Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A3.5 Profit Sharing and Productivity by Employment Size Class
Analysis of profit-sharing effects by five size classes, representing the smallest 10 percent, 10-25 percent, 25-50 percent, 50-75 percent, 





775 < = Empl. <1681
PS adoption
PS trend
1681 < = Empl. <4599
PS adoption
PS trend





































































































NOTES: The regressions include variables from regressions 1 and 3 of appendix table A3.2 (translog terms, year dummies, 25 industry dummies, and 
DB, ESOP, and union terms). Translog production terms have been fully interacted with the five size classes. 
*Statistically significant at p <. 10 **p <.05 ** *p <.01.
Table A3.6 Productivity Growth and Size of Employer Contribution
For those reporting profit-sharing contribution as a percentage of participant payroll (n=71), the mean figure for each company was 
calculated. The median of these figures was 3.62 percent. A mean contribution less (greater) than 3.62 percent was designated as a "low" 
("high") mean employer contribution.
6ln(Sales/L)
Dependent variable










































































































R-squared 0.265 0.305 0.287 0.399
N_________________3598 345 2861 276 3598 345 2861 276
NOTES: All regressions include variables from regressions reported in appendix table A3.2, plus separate inverse Mill's terms for the high- and low-con 
tribution plans. 
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <.01.
Table A3.7 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Personnel Policy Variables in Appendix Table A3.8
Means (s.d.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Definitions
Survey adoption 0.012 0.001 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.001 

















0.128 0.026 0.119 0.036 0.082 0.023
(0.334) (0.475) (0.324) (0.469) (0.252) (0.339)
0.008 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.087) (0.127) (0.089) (0.134) (0.037) (0.053)
0.147 0.066 0.152 0.040 0.055 0.067
(0.354) (0.432) (0.359) (0.435) (0.198) (0.269)
0.008 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.087) (0.097) (0.090) (0.106) (0.042) (0.034)
0.100 0.052 0.096 0.055 0.032 0.019
(0.300) (0.329) (0.295) (0.350) (0.147) (0.212)
0.019 -0.002 0.019 0.001 0.009 0.000
(0.138) (0.185) (0.137) (0.187) (0.076) (0.091)
0.063 0.051 0.070 0.047 0.058 0.028 
(0.243) (0.480) (0.254) (0.484) (0.194) (0.256)
0.006 0.001 Change in presence of attitude survey 
(0.068) (0.105) feedback from t - 1 to t (measured as dummy
in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8) 
0.070 0.040 Presence of attitude survey feedback in t 
(0.232) (0.308) (measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
0.003 0.002 Change in presence of job enrichment or 
(0.041) (0.059) redesign from t-1 tot (measured as dummy
in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
0.052 0.064 Presence of job enrichment or redesign in t 
(0.192) (0.278) (measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
0.003 0.002 Change in presence of autonomous 
(0.044) (0.038) workteams from / -1 to / (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 
5-8)
0.034 0.012 Presence of autonomous workteams in t 
(0.151) (0.217) (measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
0.008 0.001 Change in presence of employee 
(0.073) (0.086) involvement from t - \ to t (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in
5-9)
0.056 0.021 Presence of employee involvement in t 
(0.187) (0.239) (measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
























































































































Change in presence of employment security
policy from t - 1 to t (measured as dummy in
cols. 1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of employment security policy in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of suggestion system
from t- 1 lot (measured as dummy in cols.
1-4, proportion covered in 5-8)
Presence of suggestion system in t
(measured as dummy in cols. 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Change in presence of gainsharing from
t - 1 to t (measured as dummy in cols., 1-4,
proportion covered in 5-8)
Presenced of gainsharing in t (measured as
dummy in cols. 1-4, proportion covered in
5-8)
NOTES: Definitions and descriptive statistics for other regression variables are in appendix table A3.1. Personnel policies are defined in table 3.5. See 
table 1.3 for comparisons of personnel policies between profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing companies.




































































































































































































































































































































NOTES: All regressions include variables from appendix table A3.2, and variables representing personnel policies of uncertain age (see text). See tables 
3.5, appendix table A3.1, and appendix table A3.7 for variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
'Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
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Info-sharing on company 
results interacted with 
PS adoption
PS presence
Info-sharing on business 
plans interacted with 
PS adoption
PS presence
Info-sharing on competitors' 



















































































































NOTES: All regressions include vanables from appendix table A3.2 (with definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix table A3.1). PS adoption and 
presence are measured as dummy variables. Definitions of information-sharing variables: Respondents were asked: "About how many corporation 
employees, excluding top management, are routinely provided with:
a. Information about the company's overall operating results?
b. Information on business plans and goals?
c. Information on competitors' relative performance?"
The proportionof employees provided with such information was interacted with PS adoption and presence. PS=profit sharing. 
"Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.









Job enrichment • PS
adoption
trend

















































































































































Employee involvement • PS
adoption
trend























































































































































NOTES: All regressions include variables from appendix table A3.2. See table 3.5 and appendix table A3.1 for personnel policy definitions. 
*Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A3.ll Change in Other Policies When Profit Sharing is Adopted
Profit-sharing companies were asked, "When the profit-sharing plan was established, were any significant changes made in personnel 















































































































NOTES: All regressions include variables from regressions presented in appendix table A3.2, with descriptive statistics in appendix table A3.1. PS =
profit sharing.
'Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Appendix 4 
Stability Theory and Econometric Specifications
Theory
The basics of the stability theory of profit sharing can be illustrated as fol 
lows. If profit shares are equally distributed among workers, each worker's 
compensation is
c = w' + s[(R(L) - w'L)/L] = w'(l - s) + sR(L)/L 
where
R(L) = one-input revenue function of the firm
s = share of profits going to workers collectively, set by firms in
advance
L = number of workers 
w1 = base wage.
The firm's problem is to maximize profits, defined as revenue minus labor 
costs:
Maximize R(L) - Lc = R(L) - L[w'(l - s) + sR(L)/L] = (1 - s)[R(L) - w'L].
With s fixed in the short-run, maximizing with respect to L leads to the first- 
order condition that
R'(L) = w'
where R'(L) is the marginal revenue product (MRP) of labor (the first deriva 
tive of revenue with respect to labor). In other words, the firm would hire 
workers up to the point where the MRP of labor equals the base wage. The 
profit share is essentially ignored—it acts as a form of "tax" on profits that is 
irrelevant in the firm's calculations of maximizing revenues minus fixed obli 
gations.
Firms in the long run will adjust their compensation parameters (s and w') 
so that the expected c will equal R'(L) (Weitzman 1983). If c < R'(L), firms 
will find it profitable to attract more workers by raising the values of the com 
pensation parameters (s and/or w') to increase c. When c = /?'(L), firms will not 
find it profitable to change the compensation parameters. Since w'< c, the
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firm's short-run first-order condition /?'(L) = w' cannot hold in long-run equi 
librium; consequently R'(L) > w\ implying an excess demand for labor by the 
firm. This excess demand is manifested in the firm's eagerness to hire workers 
at the current compensation parameters and willingness to retain workers 
when business conditions slump. A higher share component $, and lower base 
wage w', will lower both the probability and extent of layoffs in a profit-shar 
ing firm.
What employment changes are predicted by the stability theory? The the 
ory does not predict a simple linear relationship between demand shocks and 
amount of profit sharing. The prediction is that the profit-sharing firm will 
have a "cushion" of employees, representing the theorized excess demand for 
labor, who will be retained in a negative demand shock (as long as R'(L) > w'). 
Once the excess demand for labor is exhausted by a negative shock, the profit- 
sharing firm will lay off workers just as readily as the non-profit-sharing firm. 
When hiring workers under a positive demand shock, the firms will behave 
similarly if the positive shock does not represent recovery from a previous 
negative shock, but the profit-sharing firm will hire back fewer workers if it 
does represent such a recovery (since the profit-sharing firm laid off fewer to 
begin with). The complex, nonlinear relationship between employment and 
profit sharing may be mapped out as follows. 1 Theorized relationships 
between profit sharing and demand shocks, ceteris paribus:
Definitions
8L = change in employment 
Dpos = positive demand shock (continuous) 
Dneg = negative demand shock (continuous) 
EDL = excess demand for labor by a profit-sharing firm (always 
positive; determined by labor demand elasticity and the 
degree to which profit share substitutes for fixed compen 
sation) 
®tt+ and 0j_ = coefficients on positive and negative demand shocks
For a non-profit-sharing firm:
(1) SL = 0^+ *(Dpos) if demand shock is positive 
= 0^.*(Dneg) if demand shock is negative.
For a profit-sharing firm:
If negative demand shock does not exhaust EDL,
(2) 8L = 0*(Dneg) = 0.
If negative demand shock does exhaust EDL,
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(3) 5L=e
If negative demand shock follows upon a prior negative shock that 
exhausted EDL,
(4) 8L=erf_*(Dneg).
If firm has a positive demand shock starting from an equilibrium position 
(i.e., not recovering from a prior negative shock),
(5) 8L=0<i+ *(Dpos).
If firm is recovering from a prior negative shock that did not exhaust its 
EDL (relationship 2),
(6) 6X = 0*(Dpos) = 0.
If firm is recovering from a prior negative shock that exhausted its EDL 
(relationship 3),
(7) 8ln(L) = 0d+ -"(Dpos) - EDL.
These seven relationships can be explained as follows. If profit-sharing firms 
have an incentive to hire labor to the point where R'(L) = w', as described 
above (i.e., to the point of LI in figure 4.1), the difference between the desired 
and actual employment level (between LQ and L\} can be estimated in percent 
age terms as the labor demand elasticity (the percentage change in desired 
employment for a 1 percent change in wages) multiplied by the gap between 
w' and c. If, for example, the labor demand elasticity is 0.5 and the gap 
between w' and c is 3.6 percent of the wage (representing the median profit- 
sharing contribution as a percent of wages, making the assumption that it fully 
substitutes for base pay), the gap between desired and actual employment is 
1.8 percent. This 1.8 percent becomes, in effect, a cushion for negative 
demand shocks. As illustrated in the bottom of figure 4.1, a small negative 
shock that causes a non-profit-sharing firm to lay off 1.8 percent of workers 
(relationship 1 above) should lead the profit-sharing firm to lay off none (rela 
tionship 2 above), while a large negative shock will cause both firms to lay off 
workers, but the profit-sharing firm will lay off fewer workers (the amount 
represented by EDL) (relationships 1 and 3 above).
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What are the theorized responses to positive demand shocks? If starting 
from an initial equilibrium position, the responses should be the same between 
the two types of firms, since labor would be available on the same conditions 
(relationships 1 and 5 above). If the positive demand shock represents a recov 
ery from a previous negative shock, however, the profit-sharing firm will hire 
back fewer workers since it laid off fewer to begin with. If recovering from a 
small shock, in which it laid off no workers (relationship 2), it will hire back 
no workers (relationship 6). If recovering from a large negative shock, in 
which the profit-sharing firm laid off 1.8 percent fewer workers (relationship 
3), the profit-sharing firm will hire back fewer workers (relationship 7).
Complete empirical estimation of the stability theory therefore requires 
several types of information: (1) the degree to which profit sharing substitutes 
for fixed compensation (c - w'); (2) accurate measures of demand shocks, 
allowing the calculation of the point at which a negative demand shock 
exhausts the theorized excess demand for labor of the profit-sharing firm; (3) a 
measure of demand shocks that distinguishes whether they follow upon a pre 
vious negative shock that may have eliminated the theorized excess demand 
for labor; and (4) the labor demand elasticity. Information on the first and third 
of these types of information is particularly difficult to obtain, and the results 
are likely to be sensitive to assumptions about their magnitudes. Attempts to 
specify this full model, and the reliance on a simpler model, will be described 
in the following discussion of econometric techniques.
Econometric Estimation of Stability Effects
Estimates of stability effects are based on the following first-difference 
variant of a labor demand equation:
(8) 8ln(L) = 00 + 9w*8ln(w) + 0/8D + 0psd *PS*8D
where
L = employment level 
w = base wage
D = measure of demand for firm's products 
PS = dummy indicating presence of profit-sharing plan 
X = other explanatory variables (cost of capital, cost of other pro 
duction inputs) 
t = time trend
8 = first-difference operator (from t - 1 to /) 
0 = coefficients.
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In this specification Qw measures the wage elasticity of labor demand, ©^ 
measures the employment response to changes in demand for the firm's prod 
ucts, 0psd measures any differential in employment response for firms that 
have profit-sharing plans in effect, and 0^ and 0^ measure any general dif 
ference in growth rates (apart from demand shocks) associated with profit 
sharing.
As described above, the stability theory predicts that the employment 
response of profit-sharing firms will depend on the degree to which the profit 
share substitutes for fixed compensation, the size of negative and positive 
demand shocks, and whether the demand shocks were preceded by shocks that 
eliminated the excess demand for labor. A specification that incorporates rela 
tionships (1) to (7) above is the following:
(9) 8ln(L) = + *(Dposnps) + 0d_*(Dnegnps)
ens*(Dnegsmall )*PS
0^.*(Dneglaige)*PS + EDLlaige *PS + 
%*(Dnegexhaust)*PS + 
0<f+ *(Dposnew)*PS + 0rs*(Dpossmall(. 1))*PS 
- EDLlarge(. 1)*PS +
where
0ps*PS + 0pst*PS*r + QX*X
= change in demand for NPS firm's products, if the change is
negative, and 0 otherwise
Dnegsman = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is 
negative and small (i.e., does not exhaust EDL), and 0 oth 
erwise
= change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is 
negative and large (i.e., does exhaust EDL), and 0 other 
wise
5t = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is 
negative and a prior negative shock exhausted the EDL, 
and 0 otherwise
= change in demand for PS firm's products, if change is posi 
tive and firm is not recovering from prior negative shock
DposB
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= change in demand for NFS firm's products, if the change is 
positive, and 0 otherwise
Dp°ssmall(-i) = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is 
positive and the firm is recovering from a prior negative 
shock that was small (i.e., did not exhaust the EDL), and 0 
otherwise
^P°slarge(-i) = change in demand for PS firm's products, if the change is 
positive and the firm is recovering from a prior negative 
shock that was large (i.e., did exhaust the EDL), and 0 oth 
erwise 
= excess demand for labor for PS firm, if firm was subject to
demand shock large enough to exhaust EDL 
= excess demand for labor for PS firm, if prior negative 
demand shock was large enough to exhaust EDL
Other variables defined above.
The Qd+ and 0^_ coefficients should be strongly positive, since employment is 
expected to move in the same direction as the demand shock. The ©^ and 0rs 
coefficients are expected to be close to zero, since they measure employment 
adjustments within the profit-sharing firm's excess demand for labor. Several 
experiments were made with cost-of-capital measures, but as these had incon 
sistent signs and magnitudes and made no difference in the profit-sharing vari 
ables (as in Kruse 199Ib), they were dropped from the final runs.
Equation (9) was estimated on the full sample, and on a restricted sample 
comprising PS firms which reported at least three years of profit-sharing con 
tribution data, with NPS firms from the same industries (with unpaired and 
paired results for both samples). For this test, it was necessary to determine 
the size of the demand shock that would be expected to exhaust the theorized 
excess demand for labor. This was estimated as follows. In the restricted sam 
ple, for profit-sharing firms which reported profit-sharing contributions as a 
percentage of participant payroll, the mean value was calculated within the 
company. It was alternatively assumed that this fully substituted for fixed pay 
(representing c - w'), and that only half of it substituted for fixed pay. The 
excess demand for labor was estimated by multiplying this mean value (or 
half of the mean value) by an estimated labor demand elasticity of 0.5 for 
fixed pay (obtained from estimates on non-profit-sharing firms). This was 
multiplied by the coefficient on the estimated output elasticity of labor for 
decreases in product demand (which equaled .642),2 to determine the size of a 
negative demand shock that would be expected to eliminate this excess 
demand for labor. The result is the estimated decrease in sales which is neces 
sary to eliminate the EDL (and the corresponding increase in sales which is
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necessary to restore the EDL), which divides the demand shocks according to 
whether they were "small" or "large." (The median of this measure was .030, 
with a mean of .036 and a standard deviation of .025.)
It may be that non-profit-sharing firms will have different responses to 
large and small demand shocks. Therefore, to compare the employment 
responses of profit-sharing and non-profit-sharing firms, sales shocks for NPS 
firms were divided into "large" and "small" according to whether they 
exceeded, or failed to exceed, the above mean estimate for PS companies 
(.036) of the demand shock sufficient to eliminate the EDL. Also, separate 
coefficients were estimated for each situation facing the firms (i.e., the 64+ 
and 0</_ coefficients in equation (9) were not constrained to be equal across the 
terms in which they appear). To take account of the terms including EDL, 
dummy variables were specified to take a value of one for a large negative 
shock (and zero otherwise), with the coefficient presumably reflecting the size 
of the EDL (or more generally, any fixed employment response to a large neg 
ative shock that does not vary with the size of the shock). The sample of PS 
companies which reported sufficient contribution data were combined with 
NPS firms in the same industries for the restricted sample estimates, reported 
in columns 4 and 5 of appendix table A4.6.
For the full sample of PS and NPS firms, with results reported in columns 
2 and 3, the EDL was assumed to be 1.8 percent for all PS firms (representing 
the median profit share as a percent of payroll, multiplied by a labor demand 
elasticity of 0.5). This was used to create measures of "small" and "large" 
demand shocks for both PS and NPS firms, again by dividing this figure of 
.018 by the coefficient on sales decreases (estimated as described above) in 
order to determine the size of a demand shock which would be sufficient to 
exhaust the EDL. In the full sample, unlike the restricted sample, the cutoff 
between large and small was identical for all firms.
The results using discontinuous measures rely only upon sales changes as 
demand shock measures. This is due to the great difficulty in trying to deter 
mine for a firm what constitutes a large and small shock, and recovery from a 
prior negative shock, from aggregate measures. The period saw two reces 
sions, in 1973-75 and 1980-82, but there was no means of separating these 
into large and small shocks, which is necessary for the tests being developed 
here.
The changes in sales were deflated by the GNP deflator prior to estimation, 
and "negative" shocks were defined as those in which the change in ln(de- 
flated sales) was negative. Tests were also made using nominal data (since 
declines in nominal sales represent obvious negative shocks), and deflated 
data using more detailed inflation measures (comprising 3-digit industry infla 
tion measures for manufacturing firms from the NBER Trade and Immigration
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Dataset, the CPI for retail firms, and the GNP deflator for all others); the meth 
ods produced similar findings.
The results, presented in appendix table A4.6, do not show a clear pattern 
with respect to the stability theory. Presented results assume the profit share 
fully substituted for fixed compensation; results assuming that only half sub 
stituted were very similar. When not recovering from a negative demand 
shock, the employment responses of PS firms are larger than that of NPS firms 
for sales increases (line 1), and are smaller than that of NPS firms for sales 
decreases (lines 2 to 3, where positive values on line 3 can be interpreted as 
companies retaining more employees during a big negative shock, and the 
negative values on line 4 can be interpreted as slight increases in employment 
when negative shocks occur). When recovering from a prior negative shock, 
the PS firms continue to have smaller responses to further negative shocks 
(line 5), have mixed results in response to big positive shocks (lines 6 and 7), 
and have more positive responses to small positive shocks (line 8). The stabil 
ity theory would predict that, because the PS firms laid off fewer employees to 
begin with under the prior negative shock, the response to a subsequent posi 
tive shock should not be as positive—a prediction which does not fit neatly 
with these results, though it may indicate that PS firms are simply hungrier for 
labor under most circumstances. As described in the main text, these results 
give some support to the view that employment behavior differs between PS 
and NPS firms. When not recovering from negative shocks, the behavior of PS 
firms is favorable (lower responses to negative shocks, and higher responses 
to positive shocks), and generally fits the stability theory. When recovering 
from negath shocks, the behavior of PS firms is likewise favorable in that 
there is less response to negative shocks and a more positive response to small 
positive shocks, though this latter result does not fit the theory, and the mixed 
results with respect to large positive shocks provide no clear guide.
As noted, these estimates make strong assumptions about the size of the 
excess demand for labor, and whether a firm is experiencing or recovering 
from a large or small negative demand shock. On top of this, the stability the 
ory predicts that profit-sharing firms should be generally more willing than 
fixed-wage firms to hire workers, so that the employment response to a posi 
tive shock in a time of unemployment may even be stronger for a profit-shar 
ing firm. Determining what conditions apply to the hiring decision—whether 
the profit-sharing firm has an "excess demand for labor" at that point—is 
fraught with conceptual and empirical problems.
A simpler approach, as used in most previous research, is employed for the 
other regression results presented in this chapter: comparing the overall
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employment responses to positive and negative demand shocks between non 
profit-sharing and profit-sharing firms. This uses the following specification:
(10) 8ln(L) = 00 + ew*8ln(w) + 6^+ *(Dpos) + 0 
0ps+ *a>pos)*PS + 0ps.*(Dneg)*PS
Dpos = change in demand for firm's products, if the change is positive, and 
0 otherwise
Dneg = change in demand for firm's products, if the change is negative, and 
0 otherwise
Other variables and coefficients as defined above.
The estimated responses of NPS firms to positive and negative demand 
shocks are, respectively, 0^+ and 0^_ (both estimated as positive, since 
employment is expected to move in the same direction as the demand shock), 
while the estimated responses of PS firms include the interaction coefficients 
(0^+ + 0pj.+ for positive shocks, and 0^. + 0^. for negative ones). Profit- 
sharing firms are theorized to have generally smaller employment responses to 
negative demand shocks (implying that the interaction coefficient 0^. is neg 
ative), and to have roughly similar responses to positive demand shocks (with 
smaller responses if recovering from a previous negative shock, but stronger 
responses if unemployment exists and workers are available, so that the sign 
of 0ps+ is ambiguous). Since the prediction is clearer with respect to negative 
shocks, more attention is paid to negative shocks.
As described in the main text, there are potentially important differences 
between old profit-sharing firms and new adopters in whether the profit share 
is substituting for, or adding onto, fixed compensation. Therefore separate 
0ps+ and 0ps. coefficients are estimated for the old profit-sharing firms and for 
the adopters both pre- and postadoption, which has the advantage that pre- and 
postadoption responses can be compared.
NOTES
1. The seven relationships should be interpreted not as full equations of labor demand, but as 
the relationship between demand shocks and employment changes, ceteris paribus.
2. Estimated with change in In(employment) as the dependent variable, separate coefficients 
on change in In(sales) for increases and decreases, instrumented change in average pay, year dum 
mies, and 25 industry dummies and time trends as independent variables.
Table A4.1 Compensation Levels and Growth Regressions
Company compensation/industry average compensation
Dependent variable
Presence of pre-1975 PS
Presence of post- 1975 PS
PS adoption
















































































































































































































































































NOTES: tandard errors in parentheses in regression columns. 
PS = profit sharing; DB = defined benefit; ESOP = Employee Stock Ownership Plan.
Dependent variable for regressions 1 to 3 is the company's average compensation (total labor expenses/employees) divided by the industry average com 
pensation per employee (calculated from National Income and Product Accounts data). Dependent variable in regression 4 is the difference in this ratio 
between the current and preceding year. The dependent variables in regressions 5 to 7 are based on the same denominator, but the numerator is based on 
(total labor expenses minus total pension expenses)/employees. 
*Statistically significant at p<. 10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A4.2 Labor Demand Elasticities







































































































































P-value for equality of 
base compensation and 
PS coefficients 0.316 0.340 0.436 0.034 0.014
NOTES: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors in columns 1-5 and standard deviations in la to 5a.
Sample definitions: Column 1: Only firms which reported both compensation and PS contribution in a given year; Column 2: Only firms which reported
PS contribution in a given year; Column 3: C 'y PS firms which reported compensation in a given year; Column 4: All PS firms; Column 5: All firms.
In columnns 2 to 5, compensation and PS contribution were imputed from instruments.
Variable definitions: Base compensation change: change in ln(total compensation per employee, minus profit share), from t - 1 to t.
PS contribution change: change in profit-sharing contribution as percentage of compensation from t - 1 to t.
Output change: change in ln(sales + inventory) from t - llot.
Change in base compensation and PS contribution were instrumented as described in text.
PS = profit sharing; Cont = contribution; Comp. = compensation.
*Statistically significant at p<. 10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A4.3 Demand Shock Measures and Descriptive Statistics for Employment Change Regressions
Unemployment rate = change in ln(l - civilian unemployment rate) from t - 1 to t (positive value represents decrease in unemployment) 
GNP = change in ln(deflated Gross National Product) relative to time trend, from t - 1 to t 
Company sales = change in ln(deflated company sales) from t - 1 to / (deflated by GNP deflator) 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTE: All figures represent means, with standard deviations in parentheses, except for 1971-1990 values in columns (1) and (2), which represent actual
values.
a. Changes in company sales have had upper 1 percent and lower 1 percent, across full sample, of values removed.
Table A4.4 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Employment Change Regressions
Demand shock definitions and descriptive statistics are given in appendix table A4.3. Below are descriptive statistics of variables which 


























































6308 Profit-sharing status in year t (dummy)
Proportion of company workforce covered by 
6300 union contract in 1991
Majority of union members participating in 
PS in 1991 (dummy)
2625
See bottom of table A4.8
See bottom of table A4.8
2802
See bottom of table A4.8
See bottom of table A4.8
2681 Co. compensation not reported
Means (s.d.)
Table A4.9

































































5146 PS contribution paid as cash or to cash/
deferred plan (dummy)
PS contribution put in pension trust (dummy)
1991 proportion of employees who are:
3728 Clerical/technical (nonexempt)
Covered by PS if clerical/technical
4057 Production/service (nonexempt)
Covered by PS if production/service
3933 Professional/administrative (exempt)
Covered by PS if professional/admin.
Employer's PS contributions tied to:
4592 Percent of profits (dummy)
Wholly discretionary (dummy)
Percent of participant's pay (dummy)
Other formula (dummy)
NOTES: PS = profit sharing; NPS = non-profit-sharing.
a. Descriptive statistics based on samples for regressions 1 and 3 in indicated tables (except appendix table A4.8 which uses all regressions). Old PS = PS
adopted prior to 1975; New PS = PS adopted 1975 or later. PS companies are restricted to those with more than 90 percent of employees covered.
Table A4.5 Profit Sharing and Employment Changes

























































































































Old PS • year
New PS, preadoption
New PS • year, preadoption
New PS presence, postadoption








































































































































NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions 1,3, and 5 include (instrumented) wage change, dummies and time trends for 25 industries. Defini 
tions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. 
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A4.6 Discontinuous Measures of Sales Demand Shocks
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment). Demand measure: Change in ln(cmpany sales). See appendix 4 text for discussion.



















Not recovering from a prior negative shock:
1. Positive shock
2. Big negative shock (continuous)
3. Big negative shock (dummy)






































































Recovering from a prior negative shock:
5. Negative shock positive positive
6. Big positive shock (continuous) positive positive
7. Big positive shock (dummy) negative 0
(size=EDL)
0.409*** 0.581*** 0.404*** 0.680*** 0.180 0.552*** 0.263 0.635***
(0.069) (0.045) (0.111) (0.087) (0.140) (0.054) (0.240) (0.176)
0.540*** 0.723*** 0.477*** 0.480*** 0.730*** 0.730*** 0.959** 0.480*
(0.017) (0.061) (0.168) (0.115) (0.208) (0.087) (0.405) (0.275)
0.021 -0.037*** 0.033 -0.006 0.007 -0.040*** -0.039 -0.005
(0.017) (0.009) (0.025) (0.019) (0.029) (0.012) (0.052) (0.042)
Full sample, assuming EDL = 1.8 percent Restricted sample, with separate EDL 
of workforce by firm







PS NPS PS NPS












-0.801 4.668** -0.089 













NOTES: All regressions also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, dummies and time trends for profit sharing, and defined benefit plans 
interacted with demand shocks. Standard errors in parentheses.
PS = profit sharing; NFS = nonprofit sharing;EDL = theorized positive excess demand for labor by profit-sharing firm. Calculated as (labor demand 
elasticity * mean profit share/payroll) = (0.5* .036) for columns 2 and 3 (since .036 is median profit share/payroll), and (0.5* within-co. mean) for col 
umns 4 and 5. See appendix 4 text. 
^Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Brief definitions: (see appendix table A4.3 for demand 
shock descriptive statistics)
Not recovering from negative shock (product demand 
increased last period):
1. Positive shock: increase in product demand
2. Big negative shock (continuous): decrease in demand 
which is predicted to exhaust EDL
3. Big negative shock (dummy): dummy for decrease in 
demand which is predicted to exhaust EDL









0.120 0.345 0.351 0.518 0.061 0.409 0.385 0.480
0.033 0.097 0.092 0.160 0.015 0.105 0.091 0.160
0.033 0.097 0.092 0.160 0.015 0.105 0.091 0.160
4. Small negative shock: decrease in demand, if not
predicted to exhaust EDL 0.014 0.038 0.040 0.060 0.006 0.057 0.037 0.071 
Recovering from negative shock (product demand 
decreased last period):
5. Negative shock: decrease in product demand 0.045 0.133 0.130 0.208 0.017 0.148 0.108 0.186
6. Big positive shock (continuous): increase in demand 
which is predicted to reestablish EDL 0.032 0.098 0.088 0.159 0.014 0.102 0.082 0.166
7. Big positive shock (dummy): dummy for increase in
demand which is predicted to reestablish EDL 0.032 0.098 0.088 0.159 0.015 0.102 0.082 0.166
8. Small positive shock: increase in demand which is not
predicted to reestablish EDL 0.009 0.025 0.025 0.038 0.005 0.039 0.028 0.050
N 6188 1770 4120 537
Table A4.7 Profit Sharing, Unions, and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Demand measure
1. Positive demand shock
2. Negative demand shock
Unionized proportion times:
3. Positive demand shock
4. Negative demand shock
Majority of union members in PS:
Old (pre-1975) PS
5. Positive demand shock
6. Negative demand shock
New (post-1975) PS
Pre-adoption:
























































































8. Negative demand shock
Postadoption:
9. Positive demand shock
10. Negative demand shock













































































NOTES: All regressions include demand shocks interacted with presence of defined benefit plan, plus dummies and year trends for old PS, preadoption 
new PS, and postadoption new PS. Regressions 1, 3, and 5 also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries and pay changes. Definitions and 
descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. Standard errors in parentheses. 
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A4.8 Compensation Levels and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment). Demand measure: Change in ln(company sales).
(1) (2) 
Looking at levels of pay Looking at levels of pay in relation to output
PS "substitutes" for PS "added on" 
regular pay8 to regular pay"
1 . Positive demand 
shock










































PS "substitutes" for PS "added on" 










































8. Negative demand -0.675*** 0.143 -0.568** -0.063 0.080 
shock (0.232) (0.241) (0.259) (0.257) (0.120) 
R-squared 0.327 0.315 0.291 
N 2625 2802 2681 
Dependent variable
mean 0.009 0.010 0.009 
(s.d.)_____________________(0.107)______________________(0.110)______________(0.175)
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, dummies and dme trends for old PS and
pre- and postadoption new PS (instrumented) average wage change, and defined benefit plans interacted with sales changes.
a. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular pay if average compensation in old PS firms is less than 102 percent of industry average, or if average
compensation in new PS firm went up by less than 2 percent. Profit sharing assumed to "add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold.
b. Profit sharing assumed to "substitute" for regular pay if average unit labor costs in old PS firm are less than industry average, or if average unit labor
costs in new PS firm, relative to industry, declined. Profit sharing assumed to "add on" to regular pay if these conditions do not hold.
Definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. See text and bottom of table 4.7 for further discussion.
*Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <.01.
Table A4.9 Cash vs. Deferred Profit Sharing and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Demand measure
1 . Positive demand shock
2. Negative demand shock
Cash or combo plan
Old (pre-1975)
3. Positive demand shock
4. Negative demand shock
New (post- 1974), preadoption
5. Positive demand shock
6. Negative demand shock
New (post- 1974), postadoption
7. Positive demand shock






































































































9. Positive demand shock
10. Negative demand shock
New (post- 1974), preadoption
11. Positive demand shock
12. Negative demand shock
New (post-1974), postadoption
13. Positive demand shock























































































NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include demand shocks interacted with presence of defined benefit plan, and separate time trends 
for old and new cash and deferred plans. Regressions 1,3, and 5 also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, and average wage change. Def 
initions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. 
*Statistically significant at p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01.
Table A4.10 Profit-Sharing Formulas and Employment Changes
Dependent variable: Change in In(employment)
Unemployment rate
Demand measure
1 . Positive demand shock
2. Negative demand shock
Percent-of-profits plan
3. Positive demand shock
4. Negative demand shock
Discretionary plan
5. Positive demand shock
6. Negative demand shock
Percent-of-pay plan
7. Positive demand shock





































































































9. Positive demand shock





















































NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions include demand shocks interacted with presence of defined benefit plan, and separate dummies 
and dme trends for each plan formula. Regressions 1, 3, and 5 also include dummies and time trends for 25 industries, and instrumented wage change. 
Definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and A4.4. 
"Statistically significant at p <.10 **p <.05 ***p <.01.
Table A4.ll Profit Sharing, Occupation, and Employment Changes






















Interaction of occupation proportion with:
1. Positive demand shock
2. Negative demand shock
Interaction of occupation proportion
percent of occupation in PS, with:
Old PS
3. Positive demand shock
4. Negative demand shock
New PS, preadoption
5. Positive demand shock
6. Negative demand shock
New PS, postadoption

































































































































NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses. Regressions were run separately for each occupation group to reduce multicollinearity. Regressions also include
dummies and time trends for 25 industries and (instrumented) average wage change. Definitions and descriptive statistics in appendix tables A4.3 and
A4.4.




Abowd, John M. 1989. "The Effect of Wage Bargains on the Stock Market 
Value of the Firm," American Economic Review 79 (September), pp. 774- 
800.
Addison, John T., Kornelius Kraft, and Joachim Wagner. Forthcoming. "Ger 
man Works Councils and Firm Performance." In Employee Representation: 
Alternatives and Future Directions, by Bruce Kaufman and Morris Kleiner. 
Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Akerlof, George, and Janet Yellen. 1986. Efficiency Wage Models of the Labor 
Market. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. "Production, Information 
Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review 62, pp. 
777-795.
Alien, Steven G., and Robert L. Clark. 1987. "Pensions and Firm Perfor 
mance." In Human Resources and the Performance of the Firm, Morris M. 
Kleiner, Richard N. Block, Myron Roomkin, and Sidney W. Salsburg, eds. 
Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Askwith, M.E. 1926. Profit-Sharing: An Aid to Trade Revival. London: Dun- 
can Scott.
Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic 
Books.
Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1993. "Subjective Per 
formance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts." Draft, Harvard Busi 
ness School (May).
Baker, George P., Michael C. Jensen, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1988. "Compensa 
tion and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory," Journal of Finance 43, 3 (July), 
pp. 593-616.
Balderston, C. Canby. 1937. Profit Sharing for Wage Earners. New York: 
Industrial Relations Counsellors.
Bartlett, Will, John Cable, Saul Estrin, Derek C. Jones, and Stephen C. Smith. 
1992. "Labor-Managed Cooperatives and Private Firms in North Central 
Italy: An Empirical Comparison," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
46,1 (October), pp. 103-118.
Bashir, Abdel-Hameed Mohamed. 1990. "Profit-Sharing Contracts with Moral 
Hazard and Adverse Selection," American Journal of Islamic Social Sci 
ences 7, 3, pp. 357-383.
Bassi, Laurie J. 1984. "Estimating the Effect of Training Programs with Non- 
Random Selection," Review of Economics and Statistics 66, pp. 36-43.
259
260
Becker, Brian E., and Craig A. Olson. 1992. "Unions and Firm Profits," Indus 
trial Relations 31, 3 (Fall), pp. 395415.
Belcher, John G. 1991. Gain Sharing: The New Path to Profits and Productiv 
ity. Houston: Gulf Publishing.
Bell, D. Wallace, and Charles G. Hanson. 1987. Profit Sharing and Profitabil 
ity: How Profit Sharing Promotes Business Success. London: Kogan Page.
Bell, Linda, and David Neumark. 1993. "Lump Sum Payments and Profit- 
sharing Plans in the Union Sector of the United States Economy," Eco 
nomic Journal 103,418 (May), pp. 602-619.
Ben-Ner, Avner, and Derek C. Jones. 1992. "A New Conceptual Framework 
for the Analysis of the Impact of Employee Participation, Profit Sharing, 
and Ownership on Firm Performance." Working Paper No. 92/1, Depart 
ment of Economics, Hamilton College.
Bensaid, Bernard, and Robert J. Gary-Bobo. 1991. "Negotiation of Profit- 
Sharing Contracts in Industry," European Economic Review 35, pp. 1069- 
1085.
Berlin, Jesse A., Colin B. Begg, and Thomas A. Louis. 1989. "An Assessment 
of Publication Bias Using A Sample of Published Clinical Trials," Journal 
of the American Statistical Association 84 (June), pp. 381-92.
Bhargava, Sandeep. 1991. "Profit Sharing and Profitability: Evidence from 
U.K. Firm Level Data." Draft, St. John's College, Oxford (April).
Blanchflower, Daniel. 1991. "The Economic Effects of Profit Sharing in Great 
Britain," International Journal of Manpower 12,1, pp. 3-9.
Blanchflower, Daniel, and Andrew Oswald. 1987a. "Shares for Employees: A 
Test of Their Effects." Discussion Paper No. 273, Centre for Labour Eco 
nomics, London School of Economics.
___. 1987b. "Profit Sharing-<:an It Work?" Oxford Economic Papers 39, 
pp. 1-19.
___. 1988. "Profit-Related Pay: Prose Discovered?" Economic Journal 98,
pp. 720-730.
Blanchflower, Daniel, and Mario D. Garrett. 1990. "Insider Power in Wage 
Determination," Economica 57, pp. 143-170.
Blanchflower, Daniel, N. Millward, and Andrew Oswald. 1991. "Unionism 
and Employment Behavior," Economic Journal 101, 407 (July), pp. 816- 
834.
Blanchflower, Daniel, Andrew Oswald, and Peter Sanfey. 1992. "Wages, Prof 
its, and Rent Sharing." Working Paper No. 4222, National Bureau of Eco 
nomic Research (December).
Blasi, Joseph R. 1988. Employee Ownership: Revolution or Ripoff? New 
York: Harper and Row.
261
Blasi, Joseph R., and Douglas L. Kruse. 1991. The New Owners. New York:
HarperCollins. 
___. 1993. "Employee Ownership and Participation: Trends, Problems, and
Policy Options," Journal of Employee Ownership Law and Finance 5, 2
(Spring), pp. 41-73. 
Blinder, Alan. 1986a. "Comment," NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
___. 1986b. "On the Share Economy...A Bottle Half Full," Challenge,
November-December, pp. 51-52. 
Bloom, Steven. 1985. "Employee Ownership and Firm Performance." Ph.D.
Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard University. 
Bonin, John P., and Louis Putterman. 1987. Economics of Cooperation and
the Labor-Managed Economy. Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic
Publishers.
Bowie, James A. 1922. Sharing Profits with Employees. London: Sir Isaac Pit 
man and Sons. 
Bradley, Keith Saul Estrin, and Simon Taylor. 1990. "Employee Ownership
and Economic Performance," Industrial Relations, 29, 3, pp. 385-402. 
Bradley, Michael D., and Stephen C. Smith. 1991. "Firm Size and the Effect
of Profit Sharing." Draft, Department, of Economics, George Washington
University.
___. 1992. The Comparative Institutions of Profit Sharing: The U.S. Com 
puter Industry," Journal of Economic Issues 26, 2 (June), pp. 573-582. 
Brickley, J.A., S. Bhagat, and R.C. Lease. 1985. "The Impact of Long-Range
Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth," Journal of
Accounting and Economics 7, pp. 115-129. 
Brickley, J.A., and K.T. Hevert. 1991. "Direct Employee Stock Ownership:
An Empirical Investigation," Financial Management 20,2, pp. 70-84. 
Brower, F. Beatrice. 1957. "Sharing Profits with Employees," Studies in Per 
sonnel Policies 162. New York: National Industrial Conference Board. 
Brown, Charles. 1990. "Firms' Choice of Method of Pay," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review 43, 3 (January), pp. 165S-182S. 
Bullock, R.J., and Mark E. Tubbs. 1990. "A Case Meta-Analysis of Gainshar-
ing Plans as Organization Development Interventions," Journal of Applied
Behavioral Science 26,3, pp. 383-404. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Employee Benefits in Medium and Large
Firms (various issues). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Burton, John. 1986. "Review Symposium: The Share Economy," Industrial
and Labor Relations Review 39,2 (January), pp. 285-90.
262
Cable, John R., and Felix R. Fitzroy. 1980a. "Cooperation and Productivity: 
Some Evidence from West German Experience," Economic Analysis and 
Workers'Management 14,2, pp. 163-180.
___. 1980b. "Productivity Efficiency, Incentives, and Employee Participa 
tion: Some Preliminary Results for West Germany," Kyklos 33, 1, pp. 100- 
121.
Cable, John R., and Nicholas Wilson. 1989. "Profit Sharing and Productivity: 
An Analysis of U.K. Engineering Firms," Economic Journal 99 (June), pp. 
366-375.
___. 1990. "Profit Sharing and Productivity: Some Further Evidence," Eco 
nomic Journal 100,401 (June), pp. 550-555.
Cahuc, Pierre, and Brigitte Dormont. 1992. "Profit-Sharing: Does it Increase 
Productivity and Employment? A Theoretical Model and Empirical Evi 
dence on French Microdata." Working Paper 92.45, Cahiers Ecomath, Uni 
versity of Paris (June).
Calvo, Guillermo A.R. 1987. "The Economics of Supervision." In Incentives, 
Cooperation, and Risk Sharing: Economic and Psychological Perspectives 
on Employment Contracts, Haig R. Nalbantian, ed. Totowa, NJ: Rowman 
and Littlefield.
Card, David. 1990. "Comment." In Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evi 
dence, Alan S. Blinder, ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 
140-141.
Cardinal, Laura B., and I.B. Helburn. 1986. "Union Versus Nonunion Atti 
tudes Toward Share Arrangements," Industrial Relations Research Associ 
ation 39th Annual Proceedings, pp. 167-173.
Carstensen, Vivian, Knut Gerlach, and Olaf Hubler. 1992. "Profit Sharing in 
German Finns: Institutional Framework, Participation, and Microeco- 
nomic Effects." Paper prepared for the WZB Workshop, "Institutional 
Frameworks and Labor Market Performance," Hannover University, Berlin 
(October).
Cheadle, Alien. 1989. "Explaining Patterns of Profit Sharing Activity," Indus 
trial Relations 28,3 (Fall), pp. 387-400.
Chelius, James, and Robert Smith. 1990. "Profit Sharing and Employment 
Stability," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43, 3 (January), pp. 
256S-273S.
Christensen, Laurits, Dale Jorgenseb, and Lawrence Lau. 1975. "Transcen 
dental Logarithmic Production Frontiers," Review of Economics and Statis 
tics 55, pp. 28-45.
Coates, Edward M. 1991. "Profit Sharing Today: Plans and Provisions," 
Monthly Labor Review (April), pp. 19-25.
263
Colletti, Jerome. 1969. Profit Sharing and Employee Attitudes: A Case Study 
of the Deferred Profit Sharing Program at Motorola, Inc. Madison, WI: 
University of Wisconsin Center for the Study of Productivity Motivation.
Conte, Michael A., and Jan Svejnar. 1988. "Productivity Effects of Worker 
Participation in Management, Profit-Sharing, Worker Ownership of Assets 
and Unionization in U.S. Firms," International Journal of Industrial Orga 
nization 6 (March), pp. 139-151.
___. 1990. "The Performance Effects of Employee Ownership Plans." In 
Paying for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Alan S. Blinder, ed. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 143-182.
Cook, Thomas D., and Donald T. Campbell. 1979. Quasi-Experimentation: 
Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Cooke, Willam N. 1993. "Employee Participation, Group-Based Pay Incen 
tives, and Firm Performance: A Union-Nonunion Comparison." Draft, 
Wayne State University.
Cooper, Russell. 1988. "Will Share Contracts Increase Economic Welfare?" 
American Economic Review 78, pp. 138-154.
Czarnecki, Edgar R. 1969. "Effect of Profit-Sharing Plans on Union Organiz 
ing Efforts," Personnel Journal (September), pp. 763-773.
D'Art, Daryl. 1992. Economic Democracy and Financial Participation: A 
Comparative Study. New York: Routledge.
Dawes, Robyn M., and Richard H. Thaler. 1988. "The Effects of Worker Par 
ticipation on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Evidence from French 
Cooperatives," International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, pp. 45- 
59.
Defourney, Jacques, Saul Estrin, and Derek C. Jones. 1985. "The Effects of 
Worker Participation on Enterprise Performance: Empirical Evidence from 
French Cooperatives," International Journal of Industrial Organization 3, 
pp. 197-217.
Denton, D. Keith. 1991. "What's Wrong With These Employees?" Business 
Horizons (September/October), pp. 45-59.
Doherty, Elizabeth M., Walter R. Nord, amd Jerry L. McAdams. 1989. "Gain- 
sharing and Organization Development: A Productive Synergy," Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science 25, 3, pp. 209-229.
Dyer, Lee, Felician Foltmam, and George Milkovich. 1985. "Contemporary 
Employment Stabilization Practices." In Human Resource Management 
and Industrial Relations, Thomas A. Kochan and Thomas A. Barocci, eds. 
Boston: Littel, Brown, pp. 203-214.
Eaton, Adrienne. 1992. "New Production Techniques, Employee Involvement, 
and Unions." Draft, Department of Labor Studies, Rutgers University 
(August).
264
Eaton, Adrienne, and Paula Voos. 1992. "Unions and Contemporary Innova 
tions in Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation." 
In Unions and Economic Competitiveness, Paula Voos and Laurence 
Mishel, eds. Annonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, pp. 173-215.
Eckalbar, John C. 1992. "Profit Sharing and Employment, Economic Model 
ling (April), pp. 104-110.
Economic Report of the President. 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office.
Estrin, Saul, Derek C. Jones, and Jan Svejnar. 1987. "The Productivity Effects 
of Worker Participation: Producer Cooperatives in Western Economies," 
Journal of Comparative Economics 11 (March), pp. 40-61.
Estrin, Saul, and Nicholas Wilson. 1987. "The Microeconomic Effects of 
Profit Sharing: the British Experience." Discussion Paper 247, Centre for 
Labour Economics, London School of Economics.
___. 1989. "Profit Sharing, the Marginal Cost of Labour and Employment 
Variability." Draft, Department of Economics, London School of Econom 
ics (May).
Estrin, Saul, Paul Grout, and Sushil Wadhwani. 1987. "Profit Sharing and 
Employee Share Ownership," Economic Policy (April), pp. 13-62.
Fein, Mitchell. 1981. "IMPROSHARE: An Alternative to Traditional Manag 
ing." Norcross, GA: American Institute of Industrial Engineers.
___. 1983. "Improved Productivity Through Worker Involvement," Indus 
trial Management 25, 3 (May-June), pp. 1-12.
Finseth, Eric. 1988. "The Employment Behavior of Profit-Sharing Firms: An 
Empirical Test of the Weitzman Theory." Senior Thesis, Harvard Univer 
sity Department of Economics.
Fitzroy, Felix R., 1988. "Incomplete Contracts, Monetary Policy, and Employ 
ment in Share Economies," Draft, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fur Sozial- 
forschung, Berlin, October.
Fitzroy, Felix, and Komelius Kraft. 1986. "Profitability and Profit Sharing," 
Journal of Industrial Economics 35 (December), pp. 113-130.
___. 1987. "Cooperation, Productivity, and Profit Sharing," Quarterly Jour 
nal of Economics 102 (February), pp. 23-35.
___. 1992. "Forms of Profit Sharing and Firm Performance," Kyklos 45, 2,
pp. 209-225.
Fitzroy, Felix, and Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead. 1989. "Employment, Effi 
ciency Wages, and Profit Sharing in French Firms." Draft, London School 
of Economics (May).
Florkowski, Gary W. 1988. "The Organizational Impact of Profit Sharing." 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University.
265
__. 1990. "Profit Sharing and Public Policy: Insights for the United 
States," Industrial Relations 30,1 (Winter), pp. 96-115. 
__. 1991. "Profit Sharing and Employment: Growth and Stability Effects
in American Companies." Draft, School of Business, University of Pitts 
burgh (August).
Florkowski, Gary W., and Kuldeep Shastri. 1992. "Stock Price Response to 
Profit Sharing in Unionized Settings," Journal of Labor Research 13, 4 
(Fall), pp. 407-420.
Florkowski, Gary W., and Michael H. Schuster. 1992. "Support for Profit 
Sharing and Organizational Commitment: A Path Analysis," Human Rela 
tions 45, 5, pp. 507-523.
Fosbre, Anne B. 1989. "It's Time to Change Public Opinion about Corporate 
Profits; One Way is to Make Use of Profit Sharing Plans to Link Pay to 
Profit," Mid-Atlantic Journal of Business 25,6 (April), pp. 51-65.
Freeman, Richard B., and Morris M. Kleiner. 1990. "The Impact of New 
Unionization on Wages and Working Conditions," Journal of Labor Eco 
nomics 8,1, Part 2 (January), pp. S8- S25.
Freeman, Richard B., and Joel Rogers. Forthcoming. "Who Speaks for Us?: 
Employee Representation in a Nonunion Labor Market." In Employee Rep 
resentation: Alternatives and Future Directions, Bruce Kaufman and Mor 
ris Kleiner, eds. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Freeman, Richard B., and Martin L. Weitzman. 1987. "Bonuses and Employ 
ment in Japan," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 1 
(June), pp. 168-94.
Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin. 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated 
Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica 
54 (May), pp. 533-54.
Fung, K.C. 1989. "Profit-Sharing and European Unemployment," European 
Economic Review 3, pp. 1787-1798.
Fur ubotn, E., and S. Pejovich. 1970. "Property Rights and the Behavior of the 
Firm in a Socialist State: The Example of Yugoslavia," Zeitschrift fur 
Nationalokonomie 30, pp. 431-454.
Gerhart, Barry. 1991. "Employment Stability under Different Managerial 
Compensation Systems." Working Paper No. 91-02, Center for Advanced 
Human Resource Studies, Cornell University.
Gerhart, Barry, and George T. Milkovich. 1992. "Employee Compensation: 
Research and Practice." In Handbook of Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, Vol. 3, 2nd Ed., Marvin D. Dunnette and Leatta M. Hough, 
eds. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Gerhart, Barry, and Brian Murray. 1992. "Pay, Performance, and Participa 
tion." In Research Frontiers in Industrial Relations and Human Resources,
266
David Lewin, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Peter D. Sherer, eds. Madison, WI: 
Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 193-238.
Gershenfeld, Walter J. 1987. "Employee Participation in Finn Decisions." In 
Human Resources and the Performance of the Firm, Morris M. Kleiner, 
Richard N. Block, Myron Roomkin, and Sidney W. Salsburg, eds. Madi 
son, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Oilman, Nicholas Paine. 1899. A Dividend to Labor: A Study of Employers' 
Welfare Institutions. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin.
Globerson, Shlomo, and Robert Parsons. 1987. "IMPROSHARE: An Analysis 
of User Responses," Proceedings of the IXth International Conference on 
Production Research. Cincinnati, OH: International Conference on Produc 
tion Research, pp. 158-62.
Gowen, Charles R. 1990. "Gainsharing Programs: An Overview of History 
and Research," Journal of Organizational Behavior Management 11, 2, pp. 
77-99.
Gregg, P.A., and S.J. Machin. 1988. "Unions and the Incidence of Perfor 
mance Linked Pay Schemes in Britain," International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 6, pp. 91-107.
Gross, Steven E. 1989. "Customizing Compensation: The Right Diagnostic 
Tools," Compensation and Benefits Review 25,1, pp. 24- 33.
Gross, Steven E., and Jeffrey P. Bacher. 1993. "The New Variable Pay Pro 
grams: How Some Succeed, Why Some Don't," Compensation and Bene 
fits Review (January/February), pp. 51- 56.
Gross, Steven E., and Steven J. Herman. 1992. "The Role of Compensation in 
Planning Quality Improvement," Journal of Compensation and Benefits 
(September/October), pp. 5-8.
Gunderson, Morley, Douglas Hyatt, and James E. Pesando. 1992. "Wage-Pen 
sion Trade-Offs in Collective Agreements," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 46,1 (October), pp. 146-160.
Gustman, Alan L., and Olivia S. Mitchell. 1992. "Pensions and Labor Market 
Activity: Behavior and Data Requirements." In Pensions and the Econ 
omy: Sources, Uses, and Limitations of Data, Zvi Bodie and Alicia Mun- 
nell, eds. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 39-114.
Hamermesh, Daniel S. 1993. Labor Demand. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni 
versity Press.
Hamermesh, Daniel S., and Gerard Pfann. 1992. "Turnover and the Dynamics 
of Labor Demand. Working Paper No. 4204, National Bureau of Economic 
Research (October).
Hanlon, Susan C., and Robert R. Taylor. 1991. "An Examination of Changes 
in Work Group Communication Behaviors Following Installation of a
267
Gainsharing Plan," Group and Organization Studies 16,3 (September), pp. 
238-267.
Hanson, Charles, and Robert Watson. 1990. "Profit'sharing and Company Per 
formance: Some Empirical Evidence for the UK." In New Forms of Own 
ership, Glenville Jenkins and Michael Poole, eds. London: Routledge, pp. 
165-182.
Hart, R.A., and Olaf Hubler. 1990. "Wage, Labour Mobility, and Working 
Time Effects of Profit-Sharing," Empirica 17, pp. 115-130.
___. 1991. "Are Profit Shares and Wages Substitute or Complementary 
Forms of Compensation?" Kyklos 44, pp. 221-231.
Hatton, T.J. 1988. "Profit Sharing in British Industry, 1865- 1913," Interna 
tional Journal of Industrial Organization 6,1 (March), pp. 69-90.
Hausman, J.A. and D.A. Wise. 1979. "Attrition Bias in Experimental and 
Panel Data: The Gary Income Maintenance Experiment," Econometrica 
47, pp. 455-473.
Heckman, James J. 1976. "The Common Structure of Statistical Models of 
Truncation, Sample Selection, and Limited Dependent Variables and a 
Simple Estimator for Such Models," Annals of Economic and Social Mea 
surement 5, pp. 475-492.
___. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica 
47, pp. 153-161.
___. 1990. "Varieties of Selection Bias," American Economic Review, 80, 2
(May), pp. 313-318.
Heckman, James J., and V Joseph Hotz. 1989. "Choosing Among Alternative 
Nonexperimental Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: 
The Case of Manpower Training," Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 84,408 (December), pp. 862-874.
Heckman, James J., and Richard Robb. 1985. "Alternative Methods for Evalu 
ating the Impact of Treatment on Outcomes." In Longitudinal Analysis of 
Labor Market Data, J. Heckman and B. Singer, eds. Cambridge: Cam 
bridge University Press.
Hewitt Associates. 1985. Salaried Employee Benefits Provided by Major U.S. 
Employers: A Comparison Study, 1979 Through 1984. Atlanta, GA: Hewitt 
Associates.
___. 1986. Salaried Employee Benefits Provided by Major U.S. Employers 
in 1985. Atlanta, GA: Hewitt Associates.
Hirsch, Barry T. 1991. Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of 
Firms. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Howard, Bion B. 1979. A Study of the Financial Significance of Profit Shar 
ing: 1958-1977. Chicago: Profit Sharing Council of America.
268
Howard, Bion B., and Peter O. Dietz. 1969. A Study of the Financial Signifi 
cance of Profit Sharing. Chicago: Profit Sharing Council of America.
Hsiao, Cheng. 1986. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer 
sity Press.
Hubbartt, William S. 1991. "Money Talks: How to Use Financial Incentives to 
Motivate Employees," Office Systems (April), pp. 76-80.
Hublar, Olaf. 1993. "Productivity, Earnings, and Profit Sharing: An Econo 
metric Analysis of Alternative Models," Empirical Economics 18, pp. 357- 
380.
Huselid, Mark A. 1992. "Human Resource Management Practices and Firm 
Performance." Draft, Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rut- 
gers University (October).
Ichniowski, Casey. 1990. "Human Resource Management Systems and the 
Performance of U.S. Manufacturing Businesses." Working Paper No. 3449, 
National Bureau of Economic Research (September).
___. 1992. "Human Resource Practices and Productive Labor- Management 
Relations." In Research Frontiers in Industrial Relations and Human 
Resources, David Lewin, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Peter D. Sherer, eds. 
Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 239-272.
Industrial Participation Association. 1984. Profit Sharing and Employee 
Shareholding Attitude Survey. London: Industrial Participation Associa 
tion.
Israelsen, L. Dwight. 1980. "Collectives, Communes, and Incentives," Jour 
nal of Comparative Economics 4, pp. 99-124.
Jehring, John J. 1956. Succeeding with Profit Sharing: The Experiences of 
Profit Sharing Companies in Communicating Their Plans to Their Employ 
ees. Evanston, IL: Profit Sharing Research Foundation.
Jehring, John J., and Bertram L. Metzger. 1960. The Stockholder and 
Employee Profit Sharing. Evanston, IL: Profit Sharing Research Founda 
tion.
Jenkins, Glenville, and Michael Poole, eds. 1990. New Forms of Ownership. 
London: Routledge.
John, Andrew. 1991. "Employment Fluctuations in a Share Economy," Oxford 
Economic Papers 43,1, pp. 75-84.
Jones, Derek C. 1982. "British Producer Cooperatives, 1948-68: Productivity 
and Organizational Structure." In Participatory and Self-Managed Firms: 
Evaluating Economic Performance, Derek C. Jones and Jan Svejnar, eds. 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
___. 1987. "The Productivity Effects of Worker Directors and Financial 
Participation in the Firm: The Case of British Retail Cooperatives," Indus 
trial and Labor Relations Review 41 (October), pp. 79-92.
269
Jones, Derek C, and Takao Kato. 1992a. "The Incidence and Effects on Com 
pany Performance of Financial Participation Schemes: An Overview of the 
Japanese Experience." Working Paper No. 92/2, Department of Economics, 
Hamilton College.
___. 1992b. "The Productivity Effects of Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
and Bonuses: Evidence from Japanese Panel Data." Working Paper No. 92/ 
6, Department of Economics, Hamilton College.
Jones, Derek C., and Jeffrey Pliskin. 1989. "British Evidence on the Employ 
ment Effects of Profit Sharing," Industrial Relations 28 (Spring), pp. 276- 
298.
___. 199 la. "Unionization and the Incidence of Performance-Based Com 
pensation: Evidence from Canada," Working Paper No. 89/4, Department 
of Economics, Hamilton College.
___. 199 Ib. "The Productivity Effects of Profit Sharing and Worker Repre 
sentation on the Board." Working Paper No. 91/6, Department of Econom 
ics, Hamilton College (December).
Jones, Derek C., and Jan Svejnar. 1985. "Participation, Profit Sharing, Worker 
Ownership and Efficiency in Italian Producer Cooperatives," Economica 
52 (November), pp. 449-465.
Kaden, Lewis B., and Lee Smith. 1992. America's Agenda: Rebuilding Eco 
nomic Strength. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
Kahneman, Daniel, and Richard Thaler. 1991. "Economic Analysis and the 
Psychology of Utility: Applications to Compensation Policy," American 
Economic Review 81,2 (May), pp. 341-346.
Kandel, Eugene, and Edward P. Lazear. 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partner 
ships," Journal of Political Economy 100 (August), pp. 801-817.
Katz, Harry C., and Noah M. Meltz. 1991. "Profit Sharing and Auto Workers' 
Earnings: The United States vs. Canada," Industrial Relations-Quebec 46, 
3 (Summer), pp. 515-529.
Katz, Lawrence. 1987. "Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation." In 
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Stanley Fischer, ed. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Kaufman, Bruce, and Morris Kleiner. Forthcoming. Employee Representa 
tion: Alternatives and Future Directions. Madison, WI: Industrial Rela 
tions Research Association.
Kaufman, Roger T. 1992. "The Effects of IMPROSHARE on Productivity," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 45,2 (January), pp. 311-22.
Keefe, Jeffrey. 1991. "Is Incentive Pay Obsolete?" Draft, Rutgers University 
(November).
270
Kelly, John, and Caroline Kelly. 1991. "'Them and Us': Social Psychology 
and 'The New Industrial Relations'," British Journal of Industrial Rela 
tions 29, pp. 25-48.
Kertesz, Louise. 1990. "Employers Add Profit-Sharing to 401(k)s," Business 
Insurance November 19, pp. 26-7.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1964. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, 
and Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.
Kirn, Joon Woo. 1988. "Bonuses and Employment in Korea." Senior thesis, 
Department of Economics, Harvard University.
Kim, Seongsu. 1993. "Profit Sharing and Profitability of Firms in the United 
States: A Simultaneous Equations Approach." Draft, Anderson Graduate 
School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles (March).
Kleiner, Morris M., and Marvin L. Bouillon. 1988. "Providing Business Infor 
mation to Production Workers: Correlates of Compensation and Profitabil 
ity," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 41 (July), pp. 605-617.
___. 1991. "Information Sharing of Sensitive Business Information with 
Employees," Industrial Relations 30,4 (Fall), pp. 480-491.
Knowlton, Philip A. 1954. Profit Sharing Patterns. Evanston, IL: Profit Shar 
ing Research Foundation.
Kraft Kornelius. 1991. "The Incentive Effects of Dismissals, Efficiency 
Wages, Piece-Rates, and Profit-Sharing," Review of Economics and Statis 
tics 73, 3, pp. 451-459.
Kruger, Daniel H. 1986. "Profit-Sharing Arrangements and Collective Bar 
gaining," Industrial Relations Research Association 39th Annual Proceed 
ings, pp. 152-158.
Kruse, Douglas L. 1988. "Essays on Profit Sharing and Unemployment," 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard University.
___. 199 la. "Profit Sharing and Employment Variability: Microeconomic 
Evidence on the Weitzman Theory," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 
44,3 (April), pp. 437-453.
___. 199 Ib. "Profit Sharing in the 1980's: Disguised Wages or a Fundamen 
tally Different Form of Compensation?" In Structural Changes in U.S. 
Labor Markets: Causes and Consequences, Randall Eberts and Erica 
Groshen, eds. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
__. 199 Ic. "Pension Substitution in the 1980's: Why the Shift Toward
Defined Contribution Plans?" Working Paper No. 3882, National Bureau of 
Economic Research (November). 
__. 1992. "Profit Sharing and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence
from the United States," Economic Journal 102,410 (January), pp. 24-36. 
LaCivita, Charles, and Robert Pirog. 1992. "Implementing the Share Econ 
omy," Southern Economic Journal 58,4, pp. 1095-1102.
271
Latta, Geoffrey W. 1979. Profit Sharing, Employee Stock Ownership, Savings,
and Asset Formation Plans in the Western World. Philadelphia: Industrial
Research Unit, The Wharton School. 
Lawler, Edward E. 1971. Pay and Organizational Effectiveness. New York:
McGraw-Hill. 
Lawler, Edward E. 1987. "Pay for Performance: A Motivational Analysis." In
Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Sharing: Economic and Phychological
Perspectives on Employment Contracts. Haig Nalbantian, ed. Totowa, NJ:
Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 69-86. 
Lawler, Edward E., Gerald Ledford, and Susan Mohrman. 1989. Employee
Involvement in America. American Productivity and Quality Center. 
Lazear, Edward P. 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of
Labor Economics 87,6 (December), pp. 1261-84. 
___. 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business 59, 3, pp. 405-
431. 
___. 1992. "Compensation, Productivity, and the New Economics of Per 
sonnel." In Research Frontiers in Industrial Relations and Human 
Resources, David Lewin, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Peter D. Sherer, eds. 
Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association, pp. 341-380.
Learner, Edward E. 1978. Specification Searches, Ad Hoc Inference with Non- 
experimental Data. New York: Wiley and Sons.
Lee, Michael B., and Yinsog Rhee. 1992. "Bonus, Union, and Labor Produc 
tivity in South Korea between 1972-89." Draft, Department of Manage 
ment, Georgia State University (December).
Leonard, Jonathan. 1986. "Employment Variation and Wage Rigidity: A Com 
parison of Union and Non-union Plants." Draft, University of California, 
Berkeley.
Levine, David. 1987. "Efficiency Wages in Weitzman's Share Economy," Eco 
nomics Letters, 23, 3, pp. 245-249.
___. 1989. "Efficiency Wages in Weitzman's Share Economy," Industrial 
Relations 23, 3 (Fall), pp. 321-334.
___. 1992a. "Piece Rates, Output Restriction, and Cohesiveness," Journal
of Economic Psychology 13,3 (September), pp. 473-490. 
__. 1992b. "Public Policy Implications of Imperfections in the Market for
Worker Participation," Economic and Industrial Democracy 13, 2 (May), 
pp. 183-206.
Levine, David, and Laura D'Andrea Tyson. 1990. "Participation, Productivity, 
and the Firm's Environment." In Paying for Productivity: A Look at the 
Evidence, Alan S. Blinder, ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 
183-244.
272
Lewis, H. Gregg. 1986. Union Relative Wage Effects: A Survey. Chicago: Uni 
versity of Chicago Press.
Lewis, John Spedan. 1954. Fairer Shares: A Possible Advance in Civilisation 
and Perhaps the Only Alternative to Communism. London: Staples Press.
Lindop, Esmond. 1989. "The Turbulent Birth of British Profit- Sharing," Per 
sonnel Management (January), pp. 44-47.
Lissy, William E. 1991. "Currents i Compensation and Benefits," Compensa 
tion and Benefits Review, 23,2, pp. 7-12.
Long, Richard J. 1989. "Patterns of Workplace Innovation in Canada," Indus 
trial Relations-Quebec 44,4, pp. 805-826.
___. 1992. "The Incidence and Nature of Employee Profit Sharing and 
Share Ownership in Canada," Industrial Relations-Quebec 47, 3, pp. 463- 
488.
Maddala, G.S. 1983. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econo 
metrics. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Manski, Charles F. 1989. "Anatomy of the Selection Problem," Journal of 
Human Resources 24, 3 (Summer), pp. 341-360.
Manski, Charles E, and Steven R. Lerman. 1977. "The Estimation of Choice 
Probabilities from Choice Based Samples," Econometrica 45, 8 (novem- 
ber), pp. 1977-1988.
Markham, Steven E., K. Dow Scott, Beverly L. Little, and Steven Berman. 
1992. "Gainsharing Experiments in Health Care," Compensation and Bene 
fits Review 24,2 (March/April), pp. 57-64.
Masternak, Robert L. 1991/92. "Gainsharing Programs at Two Fortune 500 
Facilities: Why One Worked Better," National Productivity Review 11, 1 
(Winter), pp. 71-86.
Masternak, Robert L., and Timothy L. Ross. 1992. "Gainsharing: A Bonus 
Plan or Employee Involvement?" Compensation and Benefits Review 24,1 
(January/February), pp. 46-54.
May, Bess Ritter. 1991. "Earn More Profits by Sharing Them," Supervision 
(May), pp. 3-5.
McAdams, Jerry L., and Elizabeth J. Hawk. 1992. Capitalizing on Human 
Assets. Scottsdale, AZ: American Compensation Association.
Metzger, Bert. 1966. Profit Sharing in Perspective. Evanston, JL: Profit Shar 
ing Research Foundation.
___. 1975. Profit-Sharing in 38 Large Companies, Vol. 1. Evanston, IL: 
Profit Sharing Research Foundation.
___. 1978. Profit-Sharing in 38 Large Companies, Vol. 2. Evanston, IL:
Profit Sharing Research Foundation.
Metzger, Bert, and Jerome A. Colletti. 1971. Does Profit Sharing Pay? A 
Comparative Study of the Financial Performance of Retailers With and
273
Without Profit Sharing Programs. Evanston, IL: Profit Sharing Research
Foundation. 
Mishra, Jitendra, and Molly A. Monissey. 1990. "Trust in Employee/
Employer Relationships: A Survey of West Michigan Managers," Public
Personnel Management 19,4 (Winter), pp. 443-486. 
Mitchell, Daniel J.B. 1985. "Wage Flexibility: Then and Now," Industrial
Relations 24, pp. 255-279. 
___. 1987. "The Share Economy and Industrial Relations: Implications of
the Weitzman Proposal," Industrial Relations 26,1 (Winter), pp. 1-17. 
.. 1993. "Profit Sharing and Employee Ownership: Policy Implications."
Working Paper Series 251, Institute of Industrial Relations, University of
California, Los Angeles (May). 
Mitchell, Daniel J.B., and Renae F. Broderick. 1991. "Flexible Pay Systems in
the American Context: History, Policy, Research, and Implications." In
Advances in Industrial and Labor Relations, Vol. 5, David Lewin, Donna
Sockell, and David Lipsky, eds. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 95-149. 
Mitchell, Daniel J.B., David Lewin, and Edward E. Lawler III. 1990. "Alter 
native Pay Systems, Firm Performance, and Productivity." In Paying for
Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Alan S. Blinder, ed. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution, pp. 15-88. 
Monroe, Paul. 1896. "Profit Sharing in the United States," American Journal
of Sociology 1 (May), pp. 685-709. 
Morkes, John. 1991. "Salaries Up, Benefits Down, U.S. Researchers Say,"
R&D Magazine (June), pp. 36-38. 
Nalbantian, Haig. R. (ed.) 1987. Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Sharing:
Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Employment Contracts.
Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. 
National Civic Federation. 1920. Profit Sharing by American Employers. New
York: National Civic Federation. 
National Wages Council. 1986. "Report of the Subcommittee on Wage
Reform." Singapore: Ministry of Labour. 
New York Stock Exchange. 1982. People and Productivity: A Challenge to
Corporate America. New York: New York Stock Exchange. 
Nichols, Don. 1989. "Bottom-Up Strategies: Asking the Employees for
Advice," Management Review (December), pp. 44-49. 
Nickel, James E. 1990. "Can Your Organization Achieve Better Results by
Sharing Gains with Employees?" Employment Relations Today (Autumn),
pp. 173-184. 
Nightingale, Donald V. 1980. Does Profit Sharing Really Make A Difference?
Ottawa: Conference Board in Canada.
274
Nordhaus, William. 1986. "Introduction to the Share Economy," Journal of 
Comparative Economics 10,4 (December), pp. 416- 420.
___. 1988. "Can the Share Economy Conquer Stagflation?" Quarterly Jour 
nal of Economics 103,1 (February), pp. 201-217.
Nuti, Domenico Mario. 1987. "Profit-Sharing and Employment Claims and 
Overclaims," Industrial Relations 26,1 (Winter), pp. 18-29.
ODell, Carla, and Jerry McAdams. 1987. People, Performance, and Pay. 
Austin, TX: American Productivity Center.
Opinion Research Corporation. 1957. How Profit Sharing Affects Employee 
Attitudes. Princeton, NJ: Opinion Research Corporation.
Ost, Edward. 1989. "Gain Sharing's Potential," Personnel Administrator 
(July), pp. 92-96.
Osterman, Paul. 1987. "Turnover, Employment Security, and the Performance 
of the Firm." In Human Resources and the Performance of the Firm, Mor 
ris M. Kleiner, Richard N. Block, Myron Roomkin, and Sidney W. 
Salsburg, eds. Madison, WI: Industrial Relations Research Association.
Parks, Bill. 1990. "The 'Share Economy': A Boon for Small Business?" Amer 
ican Business Review 8,2 (June), pp. 20-24.
Parsons, Donald O. 1986. "The Employment Relationship: Job Attachment, 
Work Effort, and the Nature of Contracts." In Handbook of Labor Econom 
ics, Orley Ashenfelter and Richard Layard, eds. Amsterdam: North-Hol 
land.
Peel, Michael, Maurice Pendlebury, and Roger Groves. 1991. "Wider Share 
Ownership and Employee Reporting," Management Accounting (May), pp. 
38-39.
Peel, Michael, and Nicholas Wilson. "Labour Absenteeism: The Impact of 
Profit Sharing, Voice and Participation," International Journal of Man 
power 11,7, pp. 17-24.
Perry, Charles R., and Delwyn H. Kegley. 1990. Employee Financial Partici 
pation: An International Survey. Philadelphia: Industrial Research Unit, 
The Wharton School.
Poole, Michael. 1989. The Origins of Economic Democracy: Profit-Sharing 
and Employee-Shareholding Schemes. London: Routledge.
Poole, Michael, and Glenville Jenkins. 1990. The Impact of Economic Democ 
racy: Profit-Sharing and Employee-Shareholding Schemes. London: Rout- 
ledge.
Profit Sharing Council of America (PSCA). 1959. "Albert Gallatin," Profit 
Sharing Trends 14 (March-April), pp. 2-3.
___. 1984. Profit Sharing: Philosophy, Practice, Benefits to Society. Chi 
cago: Profit Sharing Council of America.
275
___. 1989. The 1988 Profit Sharing Survey. Chicago: Profit Sharing Council
of America. 
Profit Sharing Research Foundation (PSRF). 1989. Sources and Resources for
the Study of Profit Sharing. Chicago: Profit Sharing Research Foundation. 
___. 1992a. "Profit-Sharing Plans Gamer Success in Achieving Company
Objectives for Enhancing the Workplace," PSRF Update 1,1 (April), pp. 2-
3. 
.. 1992b. "Company Stock: A Growing Component of Larger DC- Plan
Portfolios," PSRF Update 1,6 (September), pp. 1-3. 
__. 1992c. "PSCA's 1992 Annual Survey Shows Change in Asset Invest 
ment Practices," PSRF Update 1, 8 (December), pp. 1-3.
Putterman, Louis, and Gil SkiUman, Jr. 1988. "The Incentive Effects of Moni 
toring under Alternative Compensation Schemes," International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 6, pp. 109-119.
Quarrey, Michael, and Corey Rosen. 1986. Employee Ownership and Corpo 
rate Performance. Oakland, CA: National Center for Employee Owner 
ship.
Ridder, Geert. 1990. "Attrition in Multi-Wave Panel Data." In Panel Data and 
Labor Market Studies, loop Hartog, Geert Ridder, and Jules Theeuwes, 
eds. New York: Elsevier Science Publishers, pp. 45-68.
Robertson, R.N., and Chuma I. Osuorah. 1991. "Gainsharing in Action at 
Control Data," Journal of Quality and Participation 14, 6 (December), pp. 
28-31.
Roomkin, Myron J., ed. 1990. Profit Sharing and Gain Sharing. Metuchen, 
NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Rooney, Patrick. 1992. "Employee Ownership and Worker Participation: 
Effects on Firm-Level Productivity in the United States." Draft, Depart 
ment of Economics, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 
March.
Rousseeuw, P.J., and A.M. Leroy. 1987. Robust Regression and Outlier Detec 
tion. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Schuster, Jay R., and Patricia K. Zingheim. 1982. The New Pay: Linking 
Employee and Organizational Performance. New York: McMillan.
Schuster, Michael. 1983. "The Impact of Union-Management Cooperation on 
Productivity and Employment," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 36 
(April), pp. 425-30.
___. 1984. "The Scanlon Plan: A Longitudinal Analysis," Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science 20,1, pp. 23-38.
Sen, Amartya K. 1966. "Labour Allocation in a Cooperative Enterprise," 
Review of Economic Studies 33, pp. 361-371.
276
Shepard, Edward M. 1986. "The Effect of Profit Sharing on Productivity," 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston College.
Shepard, Edward M. Forthcoming. "Profit Sharing and Productivity: Further 
Evidence from the Chemicals Industry," Industrial Relations.
Singleton-Green, Brian. 1992. "Lower Payrolls, Higher Pay," Accountancy 
(December), pp. 38-39.
Smith, Gillian R. 1986. "Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership in 
Britain," Employment Gazette 94 (September), pp. 380-384.
Smith, Stephen C. 1988. "On the Incidence of Profit and Equity Sharing," 
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9, pp. 45-58.
___. Forthcoming. "Innovation and Market Strategy in Italian Producer 
Cooperatives: Econometric Evidence on Organizational Comparative 
Advantage," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1987. "The Design of Labor Contracts: The Economics of 
Incentives and Risk Sharing." In Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Shar 
ing: Economic and Psychological Perspectives on Employment Contracts, 
Haig Nalbantian, ed. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Summers, Lawrence. 1986. "On the Share Economy," Challenge (November/ 
December), pp. 47-50.
Tehranian, H. and J.F. Waeglenin. 1985. "Market Reaction to Short-term 
Compensation Plan Adoption," Journal of Accounting and Economics 7, 
pp. 131-144.
Tomer, John F. 1987. Organizational Capital: The Path to Higher Productiv 
ity and Well-Being. New York: Praeger.
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Employee Benefits (various issues). Washington, 
DC: Economic Policy Division, Chamber of Commerce of the United 
States.
U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO). 1987. Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans: Little Evidence of Effects on Corporate Performance, GAO/PEMD- 
88-1, October.
___. 1988. Employee Involvement: Issues for Agencies to Consider in 
Designing and Implementing Plans, GGD-88-82, May.
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance. 1939. "Survey of 
Experiences in Profit Sharing and Possibilities of Incentive Taxation." 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Usilaner, Brian, and John Leitch. 1989. "Miles to Go...or Unity at Last," 
Journal for Quality and Participation (June), pp. 60-67.
Uvalic, Milica. 1990. "The PEPPER Report: Promotion of Employee Partici 
pation in Profits and Enterprise Results in the Member States of the Euro 
pean Community." Prepared for the Commission of the European
277
Communities, Brussels. San Domenico, Italy: European University Insti 
tute, June.
Verbeek, Marno. 1990. "On the Estimation of a Fixed Effects Model with 
Selectivity Bias," Economics Letters 34, pp. 267- 270.
Verbeek, Marno, and Theo Nijman. 1992. "Testing for Selectivity Bias in 
Panel Data Models," International Economic Review 33, 3 (August), pp. 
681-703.
Voos, Paula. 1987. "Managerial Perceptions of the Economic Impact of Labor 
Relations Programs," Industrial and Labor Relations Review 40 (January), 
pp. 195-208.
Wadhwani, Sushil, and Martin Wall. 1990. "The Effects of Profit Sharing on 
Employment, Wages, Stock Returns and Productivity: Evidence from UK 
Micro-Data," Economic Journal, 100, 399 (March), pp. 1-17.
Weiss, Andrew. 1987. "Incentives and Worker Behavior: Some Evidence." In 
Incentives, Cooperation, and Risk Snaring: Economic and Psychological 
Perspectives on Employment Contracts, Haig Nalbantian, ed. Totowa, NJ: 
Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 137-150.
Weitzman, Martin L. 1983. "Some Macroeconomic Implications of Alterna 
tive Compensation Systems," Economic Journal 93, pp. 763-83.
___. 1984. The Share Economy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
___. 1985. "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit-Sharing," American 
Economic Review 75, pp. 937-953.
___. 1986. "Macroeconomic Implications of Profit-Sharing," NBER Macro 
economics Annual 1986. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 291-335. 
.. 1988. "Comment on xCan the Share Economy Conquer Stagflation?1 "
Quarterly Journal of Economics 103,1 (February), pp. 219-223.
Weitzman, Martin L., and Douglas Kruse. 1990. "Profit Sharing and Produc 
tivity." In Pay ing for Productivity: A Look at the Evidence, Alan S. Blinder, 
ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, pp. 95-140.
Wider Share Ownership Council. 1985. Employee Share Schemes. London: 
Copeman Patterson.
Wilson, Nicholas, and Michael J. Peel. 1991. "The Impact on Absenteeism 
and Quits of Profit-Sharing and Other Forms of Employee Participation," 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 44,3 (April), pp. 454-468.
Wray, David L. 1993. "Cash Profit-Sharing Plans: An Overview," Profit Shar 
ing 41,1 (January), pp. 12-15.
Zalusky, John L. 1986. "Labor's Collective Bargaining Experience with Gain- 
sharing and Profit-Sharing." Industrial Relations Research Association 
39th Annual Proceedings, pp. 174-182.
___. 1990. "Labor-Management Relations: Unions View Profit-Sharing." In 
Profit Sharing and Gain Sharing, Myron J. Roomkin, ed. Metuchen, NJ: 
Scarecrow Press, pp. 65-78.

Index
Abowd, John, 60 
Akerlof, George, 24 
Alcbian, Armen A., 48 
Askwith,M. E., 1,2 
Axelrod, Robert M., 47
Babbage, Charles, 1
Bacher, Jeffrey P., 48, 88
Baker, George, 77
Bashir, Abdel-Hameed M., 47
Bassi, Laurie J., 201
Begg, Colin B., 55
Bell, D.Wallace, 51,52
Bell, Linda, 8-lOt, 11, 36, 108, 109t,
113,149
Berlin, Jesse A., 55 
Bhargava, Sandeep, 56t 
Bias
minimizing simultaneity, 82
self-selection statistical, 65-68, 126, 
199-202
Blanchflower, Daniel, 12,51, 52,147 
Blasi, Jospeh R., 5, 7, 36 
Bomn, John P., 49 
Bonuses
as form of profit sharing, 13
in gainsharing plans, 42nl 
Bouillon, Marvin L., 86 
Bradley, Keith, 8-lOt, 56t, 108, 109t,
112
Bradley, Michael D., 18, 55 
Broderick, Renae F., 51 
Brower, F. Beatrice, 51 
Brown, Charles, 23
Cable, John R., 55,, 56t 
Cahuc, Pierre, 26t, 29, 56t 
Canada, 12, 30 
Capital
availability in deferred profit-sharing
plans, 149
investment when workers share in
profits, 49-50
Card, David, 55
Cardinal, Laura B., 165
Carstensen, Vivian, 26t, 30, 56t, 114
Cash/deferred profit-sharing plans, 5-6
Cash profit-sharing plans 
conditions for adoption of, 149 
defined, 5-6 
effect of, 51,73-74 
impact on productivity growth, 208-9 
as motivators, 152 
prediction of adoption, 192-93 
relation to employment stability, 138- 
40,159
tax incentives in Great Britain for, 168, 
169
Cheadle, Alien, 26t, 28
Chelius, James, 8-10t, 108, 109t
Christensen, Laurits, 197
Colletti, Jerome, 51, 52
Compensation 
conditions for deferral of, 23 
effect on labor force of decreased, 
105-6
efficiency wage as form of, 24 
flexibility in profit-sharing plan, 24-25 
levels and growth of, 115-20, 234-36 
in old and new profit-sharing 
companies, 112-20 
profit-sharing distributions as, 120-22 
size of profit share in relation to, SI- 
83, 153
See also Profit-sharing payments; 
Wages
Compensation systems 
deferred as worker compensation 
system, 23
with deferred compensation, 45 
employee self-selection of, 50 
incentives in deferred, 45 
to induce worker effort, 23 
with reduced company profitability, 
24-25
Conte, Michael A., 5, 7
279
280
Cooke, William N., 55, 57t, 166
Cooperative solution 
establishment in firm of, 78-79 
in group performance game, 47, 78 
information-sharing as part of, 86
Cuomo Commission on 
Competitiveness, 168
Czamecki, Edgar R., 25,164
D'Art, Daryl, 12,167 
Data sources
for analysis of profit-sharing
prediction, 28-30
for firm policy analysis, 88-89
on prevalence and variety of profit
sharing, 7-13
on profit sharing in publicly held
companies, 13-19
from surveys, 13-15 





employer incentives to adopt, 37
401(K) as, 6
impact on productivity growth, 208-9
pension trusts as, 5-6
prediction of adoption, 192-93
relation to employment stability, 138-
40,159
tax incentive policy in United States, 
167
Defouraey, Jacques, 57t 
Demand shocks. See Economic shocks,
demand
Demsetz, H., 48 
Denmark, 170nl5 
Dietz, Peter G., 52 
Discretionary plans
effect of, 163
profit-sharing formulas in, 50, 74-78
in rewarding empoyee performance, 
77-78, 152
in unionized firms, 165
without formulas for profit
distribution, 4, 74-75 
Doherty, Elizabeth M., 88 
Dormont, Brigitte, 26t, 29, 56t
Eaton, Adrienne, 84 
Economic shocks, demand
behavior of profit-sharing firms with, 
102-8
effect on profit-sharing firms of, 126-
28
employment response to, 127-28
firm sensitivity to, 130-32
measures and descriptive statistics for,
238-40
measures of sales, 245-47
relation of union presence to, 133
response of fixed-wage and profit- 
sharing firms, 122-28 
Economic stability, 3—4, 101-8 
Efficiency wage
as form of worker compensation, 24
motivation in, 46 
Employee performance
discretionary plans reward, 77-78,152
effect of profit share size on, 81-83, 
151-52,154-55
See also Group performance
See also Productivity 
Employee Retirement Incomes
Security Act (ERISA), 
1974, 20n8 
Employees
calculation of income risk, 93n8
clerical/technical, 39-42




risk in profit sharing, 24-25
self-selection criteria of, 50, 65-68
See also Workers
281
Employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs)
adoption of, 72-73 
differences from profit sharing, 5 
function of, 6-7 
as incentive scheme, 42nl 
in relation between productivity and
profit sharing, 151 
Employee surveys, 84-86 
Employer 
contribution to deferred profit-sharing
plans, 5-6, 81-83
motivation for profit sharing, 24-25 
relation of contribution to productivity
growth, 214-15 
See also Discretionary plans 
Employment 
behavior with profit sharing, 157, 161,
169
effect of shocks in unionized, non 
profit-sharing firm, 133 
with union participation in profit
sharing, 133-34 
variability in firm, 123-28 
Employment changes 
analysis of profit-sharing effect on,
157-58, 243^4 
with cash and deferred profit-sharing
plans, 252-53 
with changing compensation levels,
250-51 
with different profit-sharing formulas,
254-55 
with positive and negative demand
shocks, 106-7 
with profit sharing of different
occupations,
256-57
in share economy theory, 102-8 
with union participation in profit
sharing, 248-^9 
Employment security policy, 84-85,
216-19
Employment stability 
in stability theory of profit sharing, 
102-8, 155-61,163-64 
studies of, 108-12 
tests for, 128-32, 243-44 
in unionized and nonunionized firms, 
133-34, 248-49 
ESOPs. See Employee stock ownership
plans (ESOPs) 
Estrin, Saul, 26t, 29,49, 57t, 107, 108,
109t, lilt, 112, 114 
European Community (EC), 12
Factors of production, 65-69 
Finseth, Eric, HOt, 112 
Firm performance 
cross-sectional comparisons with and
without profit sharing, 52-53 
effect of size with profit sharing, 152-
53
with information-sharing, 86-88 
with policies to improve, 83-86 
profit sharing with variability in, 24-
25 
relation to profit sharing of, 51-53,
151-55
See also Productivity; Profitability 
Firms
considering profit sharing, 162-64 
differences of profit- and non-profit- 
sharing, 122-32
fixed-wage incentives for, 75, 101-3 
prevalence of non-profit-sharing, 16-
19,147 
profit-sharing incentives for, 15-19,
102-8
stability theory incentives for, 3-4 
See also Monitoring; Personnel
policies; Piece rates; Profitability,
firm; Profit-sharing adoption 
Firms, profit-sharing 




employment decisions of, 102-3 
motives for maintaining profit sharing, 
32-34
participation of workers in, 38-42 
prevalence of, 7-13 
profit-sharing methods employed by, 
75-76 
Fitzroy, Felix, 24, 26t, 29, 55, 56t, 57t,
88, 108, HOt, 112 
Fixed-wage economy theory, 102-8,
113,122 
Florkowski, Gary W., 13, 36, 52, 58t,
60, HOt, 112, 147,167, 168 
Formulas
discretionary component in, 50, 74-78 
in estimating employment changes, 
254-55
for profit-sharing plans, 74-78, 210-11 
to specify distributions to employees, 
4-5
401(k) pension plan, 6 
France, 12, 29 




case studies of, 93-94nl3
defined, 42nl
as group incentive plans, 84-86, 216- 
19
Gallatin, Albert, 1 
Gerhart, Barry, 54,108, HOt, 112 
Gerlach, Knut, 26t, 30, 56t, 114 
Germany, 30, 112, 114
See also West Germany 
Gibbons, Robert, 77 
Oilman, Nicholas Paine, 1, 2 
Great Britain
cash profit-sharing plans in, 168
firms with profit sharing in, 12, 21n23, 
29-30, 51, 53, 108-12
tax incentives for profit sharing, 167, 
168
Gregg, P. A., 27t, 30 
Gross, Steven E., 48, 88 
Group incentive plans
cooperative equilibrium in game of,
47-48
factors influencing effect of, 78
gainsharing plans as, 42nl, 84-86,93-
94nl3, 216-19
plan design and implementation, 163
prior assessment for, 162
profit sharing as, 45-46
self-selection of workers into, 50 
Group performance
cooperative solution in, 47, 78
as incentive under profit-sharing
system, 46
See also Cooperative solution;
Employee
performance; Prisoner's dilemma 
Grout, Paul, 108, lilt 
Groves, Roger, 12
Hamermesh, Daniel S., 121
Hanson, Charles G., 51, 52
Hart, R. A., 114
Hausman, J. A., 202
Hawk, Elizabeth, 11
Heckman, James, 174, 199-200, 201
Helburn, J. B., 165
Hewitt Associates, 8-1 Ot
Hirsch, Barry T., 197
Hotz, V. Joseph, 199-200
Howard, Bion B., 52
Hsiao, Cheng, 187




effect of changes in plans on, 92 
for employment by fixed-wage and 
profit-sharing firms, 103-8 
of firm in stability theory, 3—4
283
for form to retain and hire employees,
102-8
with group performance, 46-48 
for investment with profit sharing, 49-
50
of managers in profit sharing, 48-49 
in profit-sharing compensation system,
24,45
for worker with profit-sharing plan, 2 
See also Group incentive plans;
Motivation
Industrial Participation Association, 51 
Information
government dissemination of, 167-68 
solicitation of employees for, 84-86,
154
Information sharing 
in British firms with profit sharing,
21n23
cost and effect of, 78-79, 86-88 
in group incentive plans, 46 
relation to levels of profit sharing,
220-21
Ireland, 12, 170nl5 
Italy, 12
Japan, 13
Jehring, John J., 51, 52
Jenkins, Glenville, 29, 37, 38,41, 51,
53,66
Jevons, Stanley, 1 
Jones, Derek C., 13, 27t, 30, 37, 49, 55,
57t, 58t, 107, 108, llOt 
Jorgenson, Dale W., 197
Kaden, Lewis B., 168 
Kahneman, Daniel, 48 
Kandel, Eugene, 24, 47, 48 
Kato, Takao, 13, 58t 
Katz, Lawrence, 24 
Keefe, Jeffrey, 23 
Kegley, Delwyn H., 12 
Keynes, John Maynard, 3, 101 
Kirn, Seongsu, 13, 27t, 29,40,59t, 
Kleiner, Morris M., 26t, 31, 86, 164
Knowlton, Philip A., 51
Korea, 13
Kraft, Koraelius, 24, 26t, 29, 57t, 88,
108, HOt
Kruger, Daniel H., 165 
Kruse, Douglas, 5, 8-lOt, 11, 27t, 28,
36,48, 55, 59t, 73, 108, lilt, 112,
121-22,139, 152, 230
Labor force 
costs in profit-sharing firm of, 25,102-
3, 112-20 
effect of demand shocks on fixed-wage
and profit sharing, 122-28 





demand in equilibrium and under
demand shocks, 102-8 
self-selection criteria of, 50, 65-68 
See also Employment; Employment
changes; Unemployment 
Lau, Lawrence, 197 
Lawler, Edward E., IJJ, 8-10t, 11, 14,
18,25,591,84,113,119,157 
Lazear, Edward, 23, 24, 47, 48 
Learner, Edward E., 55 
Ledford, Gerald, 84 
Lee, Michael B., 59t 
Leonard, Jonathan, 133 
Lerman, Steven R., 174 
Leroy, A. M., 199 
Levine, David, 23, 107 
Lewin, David, 8-10t, 11, 14, 18, 25,
59t, 113, 119,157 
Lewis, H. Gregg, 117 
Lewis, John Spedan, 2 
Lindop, Esmond, 25, 164 
Long, Richard J., 12,18 
Louis, Thomas A., 55 
McAdams, Jerry L., 11, 51, 88
Machin, S. J., 27t, 30 
Maddala, G. S., 199, 201
284
Manski, Charles F., 174 
Maskin, Eric, 47 
Metzger,Bert,51,52 
Milkovich, George T, 54 
MU1, John Stuart, 1
Mitchell, Daniel J. B., 8-10t, 11,14,18, 
25, 51, 591,113,119,157,161,165, 
167
Mohrman, Susan, 84 
Monitoring
cost to employer of, 46
effect of, 48^9
worker, or horizontal, 45-47 
Morkes, John, 38 
Motivation
to adopt and maintain profit sharing, 
32-34, 152
as argument for profit sharing, 2
compensation methods for employee, 
23-24
of employer for profit sharing, 24
of firms maintaining profit-sharing 
plans, 32-34
See also Incentives 
Murphy, Kevin J., 77
Nalbantian, Haig R., 46
National Civic Federation, 1, 25, 31,
164
National Wages Council, 13 
Netherlands, the, 12 
Neumark, David, 8-lOt, 11, 36,108,
1091,113,149
New York Stock Exchange, 51 
Nickel, James E., 51 
Nightingale, Donald V., 51 
Nijman, Theo, 202 
Non-European countries, 13 
Nord, Walter R., 88 
Nordhaus, William, 103, 107
Occupational groups 
composition as determinant of profit- 
sharing coverage, 40-42
relation of sizes and profit sharing, 79-
81 
Occupations
participation in profit sharing by, 194-
95
targeted for inclusion in profit sharing,
38-42
See also Employees 
O'Dell, Carla, 51
Opinion Research Corporation, 2, 51 
Oswald, Andrew, 52
Pairwise comparison 
in data set construction, 173-75 
in estimating stability effects of profit
sharing, 123, 126 
in profit-sharing firm productivity 
analysis, 
60-64, 68
in testing productivity and stability 
theories, 13-19 
Parsons, Donald O., 23 
Peel, Michael, 12, 55 
Pendlebury, Maurice, 12 
Pension plans 
adoption of, 72-73 
deferred compensation in defined 
benefit, 23
deferred profit-sharing plan as defined 
benefit, 5-6 
defined benefit, 151 
ESOPs as, 6-7 
401(K) option, 6 
government regulations for, 7 
Percent-of-pay profit sharing 
employment stability with, 159 
estimates of effect of, 76-77 
motivation in, 152 
Percent-of-profit profit sharing 
estimates of effect of, 76-78 
motivation in, 152 





Perry, Charles R., 12 
Personnel policies 
changes with adoption of profit
sharing, 224 
to change work structure, 84-86, 216-
19 costs of, 79 
definitions and descriptive statistics
for, 216-17 
effect of profit-sharing interaction
with, 222-23 
interaction with profit-sharing
variables, 89-92, 220-21 
profit sharing as proxy for, 153-54 
in small and large firms, 79 
using employee information and skills,
84-86, 216-19 
Piece rates
when supervision is costly, 45 
as worker compensation system, 23-
24 
Pliskin, Jeffrey, 27t, 30, 37, 55, 58t,
108,llOt 
Poole, Michael, 27t, 29, 32, 37, 38, 41,
51, 53, 66, 149 
Prisoner's dilemma, 47-48 
Productivity 
econometric studies to analyze relation
of profit sharing to, 54-60 
effects of profit sharing on, 60-64,153 
by employment classifications, 212-13 
estimated trend with profit sharing,
68-73 
estimating effects of profit sharing,
65-73 
profit-sharing plans as choice to
increase, 52 
relation of personnel policies to
growth of, 218-19 
relation of profit sharing to, 151-52,
169, 206-9
relation to bonus size, 82 
sales and value-added per employee as
measures of, 60-64
Productivity theory of profit sharing, 2,
4
effect on employment stability, 137-38 
public policy role in, 167 
techniques used to study, 108-12 
in union settings, 166 
Profitability, firm
deferred profit-sharing plans with, 149 
raises probability of profit-sharing
plan, 34,151 
Profits
effect of firm size on share of, 81-83 
of firm when shared by workers, 48-49 
formulas for tying profit sharing to,
74-78,210-11 
formula to specify distributions to
employees, 4-5 
Profit sharing 
arguments for and against, 2-3, 154-
55
in Canada, 12 
differences in stabilizing effects, 138-
40
econometric studies of, 54-60 
firm participation in, 147 
growth in United States, 7-13, 19 
ideology of capitalism in, 1-2 
mandatory, 167 
with reduced company profitability,
24-25
as worker compensation system, 24 




conditions for predicted, 25 
predicted, 25-31, 34-38, 149-50,
190-93
studies predicting, 25-31 
Profit Sharing Council of America
(PSCA), 1, 4-5, 32, 74 
Profit-sharing payments 
formulas for, 74-78, 210-11 
in hiring decision, 157 
in share economy theory, 107-8
286
under stability theory, 120-22, 237 
as substitute for wages, 3,113,120-
22,134-38 
Profit-sharing plans 
cash, deferred, and combination cash/
deferred, 5-6 
deferred, 5-7 
definitions of, 4-5 
differences in stabilizing effects of,
138-40
firm motives for maintaining, 32-34 
formulas for sharing profits, 74-78,
210-11
prevalence and variety of, 7-13, 173 
See also Cash/deferred profit-sharing
plans; Cash profit-sharing plans;
Deferred profit-sharing plans;
Percent-of-pay profit sharing;
Percent-of-profit profit sharing 
Profit Sharing Research Foundation
(PSRF), 32 
Public policy
in productivity theory, 167 
under stability theory, 168 





Robb, Richard, 174,199,200, 201
Rooney, Patrick, 88
Rosen, Corey, 88
Rousseeuw, P. J., 199
Schuster, Michael H., 52 
Self-selection, employee
of compensation system, 50
statistical bias in, 65-68 
Share economy theory, 3-4, 105-8, 
112-13
See also Fixed-wage economy theory 
Shastri, Kuldeep, 36, 60
Shepard, Edward M., 55,59t
Singapore, 13
Singleton-Green, Brian, 12
Skillman, Gil, Jr., 49
Smith, Gillian R., 51
Smith, Lee, 167
Smith, Robert, 8-lOt, 108,109t
Smith, Stephen C, 8-lOt, 56t, 18,55
Spain, 12
Specification
for binomial logit model, 187 
for linear probability model, 187 
for stability theory analysis, 225-28
Stability. See Economic stability; 
Employment stability
Stability theory of profit sharing, 3-4, 
155-61
arguments for and against, 160-61 
assumptions of, 139 
empirical studies of, 108-12 
employment stability in, 122-28 
estimation of effects, 228-33 
implications for firms, 163-64 
implications for future research, 161 
not applied to employee stock 
ownership, 5 
predictions of, 127, 134 
profit-share substitution in, 134-38 
profit-sharing payments in, 120 
public policy role in, 168 
specifications for analysis of, 225-28 




as predictor of profit-sharing adoption, 
34, 36, 148
as reflection of profitability, 149 
in stock ownership plans, 5
Suggestion systems, 84
Summers, Lawrence, 49, 107
Surveys
for data sources, 13-15 
of employees, 84-86
287
of employer and employee attitudes,
51-52
of profit-sharing firms, 32-34, 88-89
questionnaire for, 179-86 
Svejnar, Jan, 5, 7,49,57t, 58t, 107 
Sweden, 170nl5
Tax incentives 
in cash profit-sharing plan, 5 
in deferred profit-sharing plan, 5-6 
under productivity theory, 167 
for profit sharing in United States and 
Great Britain, 167,168
Taylor, Simon, 108, 112
Thaler, Richard H., 48
Tomer, John R, 47
Unemployment
in profit-sharing and fixed-wage firms, 
3-4
in stability theory, 102-40 
Unionization
effect on employment stability, 133, 
159
effect on profit sharing of new, 31 
limits profit-sharing participation, 25, 
40-41, 150,164
as predictor of profit-sharing adoption, 
36, 38^12
relation to compensation levels, 117, 
119
Unions
distrust of profit sharing, 164-65 
participation in profit sharing, 38-42, 
194-95
usefulness of profit sharing to, 165-66 
U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 113 
U. S. General Accounting Office 
(GAO), 88
Uvalic, Milica, 12, 13, 147, 167
Vaughan-Whitehead, Daniel, 108, llOt,
112
Verbeek, Marno, 202 
Voos, Paula, 52, 84
Wadhwani, Sushil, 59t, 108, lilt 
Wages
downward flexibility in, 101
effect of changes in, 92
Keynesian theory of, 101
profit-sharing contributions as, 120-22
See also Compensation; Efficiency
wage; J?rofit-sharing payments 
Wall, Martin, 59t, 108, lilt 
Watson, Robert, 53 
Weiss, Andrew, 50 
Weitzman, Martin, 3-4, 13, 48, 49, 55,
73, 101,105, 107, 108, lilt, 152, 225 
West Germany, 29,108-12 
Wider Share Ownership Council, 51 
Wilson, Nicholas, 26t, 29, 55, 56t, 108,
109t, 114 
Wise, D. A., 202 
Workers
coverage by profit sharing of
unionized and nonunionized, 11-12, 
38
role in profit sharing, 2
See also Employees 
Work groups. See Occupational groups
Yellen, Janet, 24
Zalusky, John L., 11, 31, 164, 165,166

About the Institute
The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit 
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to 
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local level. It 
is an activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, 
which was established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late 
Dr. W.E. Upjohn, founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to 
counteract the loss of employment income during economic down 
turns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn 
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and 
sales of publications. Activities of the Institute are comprised of the 
following elements: (1) a research program conducted by a resident 
staff of professional social scientists; (2) a competitive grant program, 
which expands and complements the internal research program by pro 
viding financial support to researchers outside the Institute; (3) a publi 
cations program, which provides the major vehicle for the 
dissemination of research by staff and grantees, as well as other 
selected work in the field; and (4) an Employment Management Ser 
vices division, which manages most of the publicly funded employ 
ment and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publica 
tion programs are to: (1) promote scholarship and experimentation on 
issues of public and private employment and unemployment policy; 
and (2) make knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policy- 
makers in their pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment 
problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include: causes, 
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insur 
ance and income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce 
quality; work arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management 
relations; and regional economic development and local labor markets.
289



